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Sum m ary
The contents of this thesis have been based on the mathematics encountered in public 
key cryptography; most notably that of the RSA cryptosystem. The thesis itself is split 
into five main parts, which are outlined below.
P a r t  I: Chapter 1 gives an introduction to cryptography, and also introduces each of 
the subsequent chapters in detail. The notation used throughout the thesis may 
be found in Appendix A.
P a r t  II: The second part of the thesis is just one chapter, but it is of a different flavour 
to the rest of the work. It considers the study of smooth numbers in relation to 
detecting torsion in a group, and shows that certain smoothness constraints make 
this problem easier than may be thought.
P a r t  III: The third section of the thesis holds the majority of the work. It starts 
in Chapter 3 by giving a solid introduction to the theory of lattices, proving 
numerous results. These results are then applied to finding small solutions of 
bivariate Diophantine equations in Chapters 4 and 5. The first to be studied are 
the univariate modular equations, and a novel approach is given for their solution. 
Chapter 5 then looks at the factorisation equation xy  =  N  showing that this can 
also be treated in a similar way. The method is extended to allow for factoring 
over Gaussian integers, factoring of numbers with repeated factors, and analysing 
factors which lie in residue classes.
P a r t  IV : In Chapter 6 we consider Wiener-type attacks, i.e. exploiting the use of a 
small private exponent in RSA cryptography. We give an overview of the problem, 
and then show that if one has many public exponents all corresponding to small 
private exponents modulo N , then one can improve on Wiener’s original attack 
considerably.
P a r t  V: Finally, in Chapter 7, we summarise in detail the work of this thesis, showing 
the original results that have been proved and highlighting the problems that 
remain open.
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In this chapter we give an idea of where this thesis stands in the area of cryptology 
and computational mathematics. To this end the first section gives a broad account of 
cryptology whilst the second section deals with the RSA cryptosystem in particular. 
Section 1.3 then details each of the subsequent chapters and their relevance to today’s 
cryptology.
1.1 A n  overv iew  o f  cryp to logy
Before defining cryptology let us turn our attention to cryptography. Cryptography, par­
ticularly public key cryptography, is a fascinating area of current research, in which the 
work relies heavily on computational results in pure mathematics (especially number 
theory), combined with practical computing experience.
The history of cryptography is also fascinating, and a good non-technical account of this 
is given in (Kahn, 1967). More up to date and technical references include1 (Menezes 
et al., 1996), (Schneier, 1996) and (Pinch, 1997) from which most of the following 
information comes.
Cryptography can be defined to be the study of mathematical techniques to achieve 
information security goals. In today’s society these goals are diverse, and range from 
such things as ensuring that messages are being passed without being tampered with 
(data integrity), or without being understood by unauthorised parties (privacy) to 
ensuring that one knows who one is talking too (authentication) and that this person
1 There are of course many more references than these, see for instance the references held within 
them.
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cannot, at a later stage, deny having sent a message they did2 (non-repudiation).
A particular set of primitives for achieving (some of) these goals is referred to as a 
cryptosystem. A cryptosystem can be measured against criteria such as the goals it 
meets, the security it offers, its performance and the ease of its implementation.
To meet an information security goal invariably one must describe a protocol (i.e. set 
of rules /  distributed algorithm) that the relevant parties should follow. However one 
must take in to account that there may be malicious parties either “listening in” or 
editing any information being passed, and also that some of the “legitimate” members 
of the protocol may also wish to undermine the information security goal.
For instance the following diagram represents the situation where one party (named 
Alice) wishes to send a message m  to a second party (named Bob) ensuring the secrecy 
of the message, i.e. that any other party (e.g. the one named Eve) cannot recover the 
message either by passively “listening in” to any exchanged information, or actively 
interfering3 with the exchanged information.
A simple protocol for secrecy (a cipher)
m  G M ,  kA €  /C
E k a : At —> C 
Ek a (rn) = c
Alice Bob
Eve D k b '■ C -+ M  
D K b (c) = Tn
In the above situation it is assumed that Alice and Bob are in possession of keys 
K a ,K b  G JC respectively; the set K is referred to as the key space. Let M. denote the 
set of all possible messages; this is called the message space. Alice encrypts the message 
m  G M. by applying an encryption function E k a : A4 C, E k a (iti) =  c dependent 
on the key Ka- The image, C, of the encryption function is called the ciphertext space. 
Bob then decrypts the message by applying a decryption function D k b '• C A4 which
2i.e. it ought to be possible to prove to a third party that the second party did send the message.
3 In this simple privacy model an active attack will not help Eve read the message m  though it might 
be possible to prevent Bob from receiving a valid message. Also it makes no sense to assume that Bob 
is malicious since we are sending him the message.
3
should satisfy
DKB(EKA(jn)) =  Tn for all m  E M ,  (1.1)
for the particular values of K A and K b -
It is sound cryptographic practice to assume that the spaces M ,C  and K, are public 
knowledge4 and so are the functions EKa and DKb for all K a ,K b G JC. The security 
of this protocol rests on how hard it is for Eve to deduce m G M  from c G C, which is 
clearly no harder than determining K b G JC.
In describing protocols throughout this thesis, we will keep to the use of Alice and 
Bob (A and B) to signify the legitimate parties involved in a protocol, and Eve (the 
eavesdropper) to denote an attacker (either passive or active).
As mentioned above, the design of protocols for achieving information security goals 
is referred to as cryptography. Conversely an analysis of attacks on cryptographic 
protocols is referred to as cryptanalysis, and the study of both of these fields is called 
cryptology; as in the title of this section.
The cryptanalysis of ciphers can be aimed either at determining the deciphering key 
K b  G /C or uncovering a particular message m  G M  from its ciphertext c G C .  The 
former of these (key recovery) would imply that Eve was able to read all messages sent 
to Bob, and achieving this is considered to have completely “broken” the cryptosystem. 
The latter (specific message recovery) is less disastrous, but is still of serious concern, 
and one should ensure that neither of these situations can occur with non-negligible 
probability.
Often in cryptanalysis one assumes that there is further information available to the 
attacker, for instance one might assume that it is possible to get hold of the (possibly 
physical) enciphering or deciphering algorithms without knowledge of the underlying 
keys.
Even if it can be shown that it is infeasible5 to determine the key K b or the message
m  from its ciphertext c the protocol may still be attacked. For instance Alice may
have been fooled in to the disastrous situation of using a key K a corresponding to Eve
rather than Bob, or perhaps Eve observed Bob’s action when a particular message was
sent and resends this ciphertext to hopefully induce the same behaviour (without ever
4 Or rather it is weak to assume this information will remain secret indefinitely.
5The infeasibility might be due to assuming the attacker has polynomial time computing power to 
attack the cryptosystem, or that the problem is at least as hard as a well known hard mathematical 
problem.
4
understanding the underlying message). To aid cryptographers prove the security of 
protocols the use of formal logic on protocol analysis is suggested in (Burrows et al., 
1990).
In the cipher above we assumed that Alice and Bob were in possession of keys K a 
and K b such that equation 1.1 was satisfied. However as the attack in the previous 
paragraph shows, it is imperative that Alice receives the correct key K a corresponding 
to Bob’s key K b - Therefore a large and important part of cryptography is to do with 
issues concerning key management, e.g. the distribution of keys, the updating and 
storing of keys, and the certification of valid keys.
There are two important branches of cryptography at present; public-key cryptography 
and private-key cryptography. In public-key cryptography Bob makes public a key K ' 
which is related to his secret key K b - For instance in the cipher example above, Alice 
might use this key as her encryption key K a (i.e. it satisfies equation 1.1). This sets 
up a one-way secure line6 to Bob from anyone interested in sending him a message. It 
must clearly be infeasible for Eve to deduce K b from Bob’s public key K'. By contrast, 
in private-key cryptography, one can easily determine the key K a from K b and vice 
versa (in fact they are very often the same key) and thus both must remain secret.
The idea for public key cryptography was first given7 in 1976 (Diffie & Heilman, 1976), 
and the first effective public key cryptosystem (rather than simply a protocol for key 
exchange), RSA, was then discovered in 1978 (see (Rivest et al., 1978)).
At present the challenge facing practical cryptography is to identify the required in­
formation security goals and to set in place world standards for secure and efficient 
protocols which achieve them. In this process it is useful to “build up” protocols from 
the notion of underlying secure primitives.
1.2 R S A  cryp to logy
As mentioned in Section 1.1 RSA (see (Rivest et al., 1978)) was the first practical public- 
key cryptosystem invented after the existence of such systems had been speculated in 
(Diffie & Heilman, 1976). In this section, because of the enormity of the subject, we can 
only give a summary of the attacks and variations on RSA cryptography. An interested
6 Often this secure line is used to send a private key, since in practice private key cryptography is 
often quicker that its public key counterpart.
7 At least this was the first published result available to the academic community. Readers interested 
in the non-public history of public-key cryptography (alternatively named non-secret encryption) should 
visit h t tp : //www. c e sg . gov. u k /ab ou t/n secret. htm
5
reader is encouraged to look at (Boneh, 1999) and (Joye, 1997) from which most of 
this information directly comes.
Transm itting secure messages
Let A denote the Carmichael lambda function, i.e. \{jpq) =  lcm(p — l ,q  — 1) for any 
primes p and q. The RSA protocol is a method for setting up a one-way secure channel 
to Bob from “anyone else”. In order for this to work Bob must, in private, decide upon 
primes p and g, and a number e, and then (still in private) he calculates N  = pq and8 
d = e-1 (mod \{N)). He then publishes the values of N  and e.
Anyone wishing to send a message x  to Bob, Alice say, reads Bob’s public values of N  
and e, and then sends y = x e (mod N ).
Bob is able to decrypt this message by raising it to the power d modulo N , since 
y d = x de = x (mod N) by an extension of Fermat’s little theorem, i.e. taking d’th 
powers is equivalent to taking e’th roots modulo N  = pq when de =  1 (mod A(N)).
Typically Bob would choose the primes p and q to be of approximately the same size, 
to make the factoring of N  as hard as possible. A suitable size for N  given todays 
computing technology might be around 300 decimal digits, or 1024 binary digits. Of 
course, the reason Bob wishes N  to be hard to factor is that if anyone could find p and 
q then they could calculate d in the same way Bob did, and thus deduce x  from the 
intercepted message y = x e (mod N ).
In practice, Bob might wish to decrypt the message y by making use of the Chinese 
remainder theorem (CRT), i.e. when forming his private information he also calculates 
dp =  d (mod p —1), dq = d (mod q—1) and (from the extended Euclidean algorithm) 
u and v such that
Then to find x  =  yd (mod N ) it suffices to find xp =  ydp (mod p) and x q =  ydq 
(mod g), whereupon x = uxp +  vxq (mod N ). This takes approximately a quarter 
of the time of conventional exponentiation modulo N. However to use this technique 
notice that Bob must keep the primes p and g, which may be a security risk in itself.
8 Actually e and d axe interchangeable in the sense that Bob could choose d first and then calculate 
the e that satisfies this property.
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Signing m essages
Bob’s private information may also be used in a protocol for signing messages. If Alice 
wishes Bob to sign a message a;, she could send it to him as plain rr, and then he returns 
z = x d (mod N). Alice can then verify that Bob signed the message by raising it to 
the (public) power e modulo AT, since ze = x de =  x  (mod N ).
1 .2.1 O ther R S A  ty p e  cryp tosystem s
The basic idea behind RSA can be extended to other structures, including Lucas se­
quences (the LUG cryptosystem) and elliptic curves (the KMOV and Demytkov’s cryp­
tosystems). It is not the aim of this thesis to discuss these variants, but an interested 
reader may find details in (Joye, 1997) and (Pinch, 1997).
1.2.2 Factoring large integers
As mentioned above the RSA protocol is no more secure than factoring the integer N.  
For this reason p and q are chosen to be very large and approximately the same size 
(but not too close; see for example the attack in Section 5.3), since this “shape” of 
factorisation seems the hardest to factor.
The most efficient general purpose factoring algorithm presently known is the General 
Number Field Sieve (GNFS), which has a running time of
exp ^(c -I- o{\))m1^  log2/3(m)^
for some 1 < c < 2 when applied to an m-bit integer. The RSA parameters are chosen 
so as to make this attack completely infeasible. However if the integer N  has a special 
form, e.g. (p — 1) is only comprised of small prime factors, then there may be more 
efficient factoring methods (see Section 2.3.1). One should make sure that the modulus 
N  is not susceptible to any of the known factoring attacks.
Very recently the 140 digit RSA challenge modulus RSA-140 was factored using the 
GNFS in a time estimated to be equivalent to 2000 mips years. It did indeed have two 
70 digit prime factors; see (RSA140, 1999) for details.
It is known (and shown for example in (Boneh, 1999)) that knowledge of a pair e and 
d such that ed =  1 (mod A (AT)) enables one to factor N.  This implies that if two 
parties are using the same modulus AT, supposedly without knowledge of p and q (but 
with knowledge of their own and dj), then they are able to factor N  and decipher
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each others messages.
Conversely it is an interesting theoretical question to ask whether being able to take 
arbitrary e’th  roots modulo N  leads to a polynomial time factoring of N. It was 
recently shown in (Boneh Sz Venkatesan, 1998) that this may not be true in general, in 
particular for small e, since if it were then one could devise a general polynomial time 
factoring method (and this is thought unlikely). This means, at least for small e, that 
breaking RSA may not be as hard as factoring.
1.2.3 Low private exp on en t attacks
Let us assume that RSA is being used with the standard (i.e. non-CRT) decryption 
process, and also assume that Bob has chosen a small d to speed up this process. It 
was shown in (Wiener, 1990) that if \d\ < iV1/4 (and assuming the likely situation that 
e /n  «  1) then there exists a polynomial time algorithm to find d, and hence to factor 
N.  These kinds of results are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
1.2 .4  Low public  exp on en t attacks
In a similar vein to Section 1.2.3 Bob may wish to ensure that e is relatively small to 
allow Alice, say, to encrypt information to him quickly.
Coppersmith has shown in (Coppersmith, 1996b) that the small solutions to a univari­
ate modular polynomial may be found in polynomial time using lattice basis reduction, 
and he further showed in (Coppersmith, 1996a) that similar techniques could factor an 
integer N  given the top (1/4 +  e )  bits of one of its factors. Indeed these results were 
the main motivation behind the work in Chapters 4 and 5.
One may use these results (and others) on low exponent RSA to discover information 
in (at least) the following situations.
P a rtia lly  known p la in tex t: If Eve can guess the plaintext of an encrypted message 
apart from one block of data (at a known position in the message) then she can 
discover this unknown block provided that it is sufficiently small.
B roadcast a ttack : If Alice wishes to send a message to many people using different 
RSA moduli, but uses a polynomial of low degree to hide the fact they are the 
same message, the message may still be uncovered if the number of recipients is 
large enough.
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R elated  m essages: If Alice sends Bob two messages which are related by a known 
low degree polynomial relationship then both messages may be quickly deter­
mined.
S hort pad a ttack : If Alice sends two messages to Bob which only differ by a small 
amount, say they only differ by a small amount of random padding9, then the 
message can still be deciphered.
P a rtia l key exposure a ttack : If Eve can uncover the bottom [n/4J bits of the 
decrypting exponent d then she can reconstruct the rest of the bits, and hence 
factor N.
The details of these attacks are left until Chapters 4 and 6 when we will have developed 
the necessary tools for their analysis.
1.2.5 Im p lem en tation  attacks
Any information that Bob decrypts should be treated as secret, even if it does not seem 
to make any sense at all. This is borne out of the following example due to (Davida, 
1982). If Eve intercepts a message y = x e (mod N)  to Bob and changes it (referred to 
as “blinding” the message) to z = key =  (kx)e (mod N ) for some randomly chosen k , 
then when Bob calculates zd = kx  (mod N ) the message (probably) makes no sense. 
If he discards it in a place accessible by Eve, then all Eve must do is divide by k modulo 
N  to reveal the true message x.
A similar security risk is described in (Bleichenbacher, 1998) it is shown that if an 
application expects the encrypted information to be a specific format (in this case the 
(now outdated) PKCS#1 standard), and the application returns an error message if 
this is not the case, then it is possible to use multiple adaptations of an intercepted 
message to actually deduce the intercepted message completely. This is a clear warning 
to keep all information about the decrypted message secret. This includes the situation 
of signing messages. Bob should only return signed messages that he understands (and 
agrees to!) since otherwise the technique of blinding can be used to get Bob’s signature 
for something he would not like to apply it to.
Another, more serious, instance of taking care with signing is when the CRT variant 
of RSA is being employed. In this case, as observed by A. K. Lenstra, if there is a 
transient fault in the decryption protocol (possibly encouraged by Eve by bombarding
9Or perhaps a timestamp.
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a smartcard with electromagnetic radiation, or just observed by Alice from a signature 
that did not verify) then this might allow Eve or Alice to factor N. For example, 
if a fault occurs during the modulo p exponentiation, but not during the modulo q 
exponentiation, then the signed message 2 will be correct modulo p, but not modulo 
q, i.e.
z = x d (mod p) ze = x  (mod p) , , „
u. d ( A n =*  e / ( A \ = * e c d ( *  ~ X ,N ) = p .z yt x (mod q) z x  (mod q)
This is very serious since it gives away the factorisation of AT, so allows the discoverer 
to sign fraudulently in the place of Bob. It is however possible and advisable for Bob 
to take time to check that ze = x  (mod N) before sending the signed message.
A completely different type of attack was devised by Kocher in (Kocher, 1996) using 
information on the speed of signing known messages to deduce the bits of the decrypting 
exponent. Rivest has pointed out that this attack can be circumvented by “blinding” 
the message in a similar way to Davida’s attack, so that the attacker no longer knows 
the messages being decrypted. More recently Kocher also showed that from the power 
analysis of a smartcard one could deduce the bits of the exponent d since the power 
consumption for a multi-precision multiplication is above average.
1.3 T h e stru ctu re  o f  th e  th esis
In this section we detail the structure of the thesis, and the specific interest of each 
chapter. Note that there is no chapter devoted to background mathematics; rather 
the background is introduced where necessary. Most notably this occurs at the start 
of Chapter 2 (smooth numbers, addition chains, and the detection of torsion) and 
Chapter 3 (lattices). This was done to make the respective chapters more self-sufficient, 
and not to artificially group together such different areas of mathematics.
The thesis itself is split in to five main parts, of which this introductory chapter is the 
first; we now describe the remaining parts.
P art II: On d etec tin g  group torsion
The second part of the thesis is just one chapter, but it is of a different flavour from 
the rest of the work. It considers the study of smooth numbers in relation to detecting 
torsion in a group.
The chapter starts by giving a brief analysis of smooth and semi-smooth numbers, and
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the Dickman-de Bruijn distribution function.
In the following section a fairly thorough treatment of addition chains for both integers 
and more importantly sets of integers is given. We start by showing their link with 
powering algorithms, and show examples of the binary and factor addition chains. We 
also give reference to the graph theoretical model of addition chains and state the main 
theorems concerning the function l(n). We then define the concept of T-reliant addition 
chains to re-place the ideas of (Brickell et al, 1992) in an addition chain framework, 
and discuss the consequences of this in connection to finding efficient addition chains 
for sets of integers.
The next section is concerned with the detection of torsion. It starts by defining 
what we mean by detecting torsion, and then details the use of this in Pollard’s p — 1 
factoring algorithm. The large prime variant of this algorithm is discussed, as are the 
higher order “cyclotomic group” extensions. We also briefly touch on the elliptic curve 
factorisation method. We then show how the detection of torsion can also aid the 
breaking of a cryptosystem proposed by Vanstone and Zuccherato, and highlight the 
slightly different nature of this problem.
The last section of the chapter introduces the notion of deficient numbers, and shows 
how to classify and produce such numbers. We then show that when artificial smooth­
ness constraints are placed on the size of a group, as in Vanstone and Zuccherato’s 
cryptosystem, the problem of detecting torsion can be speeded up with the use of an 
algorithm that employs deficient numbers. We also explore the use of parallel processors 
in this problem.
P art III: L attice  m eth od s for finding sm all so lu tion s to  D io p h a n tin e  
equations
This part of the thesis is by far the largest, and explores the mathematics behind the 
relatively new lattice methods due to Coppersmith for finding small solutions to various 
Diophantine equations.
The work starts by explaining lattices in detail, and giving the relevant definitions 
and theorems used in subsequent chapters. We then consider modular polynomial 
equations, concentrating mostly on univariate modular equations. Finally we consider 
the equation xy = N ,  and hence derive some interesting new results on factoring. These 
chapters are discussed in more detail below.
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L attices
We describe the theory of lattices in some detail. This starts by touching on their roots 
in linear algebra and explaining the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure. We 
then define the algebraic concept of lattices via the notions of Z-modules and quadratic 
forms. We show how the use of a concrete basis allows us to move from this (rather 
platonic) algebraic situation to representing lattice elements as vectors, and quadratic 
forms and alternative bases as matrices.
The concept of lattice equivalence is then introduced which leads on to a second, 
equivalent, notion of a lattice, and this is the one maintained throughout the thesis.
The introductory section on lattices concludes by stating some interesting problems 
concerning lattices and the complexity classes of their solution, and then shows a few 
of the uses of lattices in present-day computational mathematics and cryptanalysis.
The second section considers the basic properties of lattices, such as the determinant of 
a lattice, and the successive minima of the quadratic form. The results achieved here 
are used extensively in later sections.
In the next section we consider the problem of recognising and effectively producing, 
a reduced basis for a lattice. We introduce the notions of a weakly reduced basis, a 
KZ-reduced basis, and finally an LLL-reduced basis.
We study in detail the implications of a LLL reduced basis, and introduce the slightly 
weaker notion of an effectively LLL-reduced basis. We then consider the LLL reduction 
algorithm in some detail and touch on some of its extensions.
We then progress by showing the connection between the LLL reduction criteria and 
the concept of the dual of a lattice. This has implications on the work in Chapter 4.
The final sections of this chapter then deal with extending the notion of lattice reduction 
to lattices over number fields. Section 3.5 is independent work, which introduces the 
notion of unitary lattices (i.e. those over the Gaussian integers), and details all the 
steps (analogous to those in the integral case) for the working of the LLL algorithm over 
such structures. However, as explained in Section 3.6, this problem has been previously 
looked into in the general context of lattices over number fields.
Finding small roots of modular equations
In Chapter 4 we consider the problem of finding small solutions to modular equations; 
particularly univariate modular equations.
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Both Coppersmith’s approach and an alternative method axe shown to be valid tech­
niques both theoretically, and on a given example. The alternative technique is then 
explained from a graphical point of view. The connection between the two methods is 
actually based on the theory of dual lattices and LLL given in Section 3.6, as explained 
in Section 4.4.
There are a few relatively simple improvements that can be brought to bear on the 
basic algorithm, and these are discussed in Section 4.5.
The practical results achieved from an implementation of the algorithm written by 
the author (in C) are then given. These show the effect on the running time of the 
algorithm due to both an increase in the degree of the univariate polynomial, or an 
increase in the size of the solutions that are being searched for (necessarily less than a 
theoretical limit). It is also shown that there axe optimal choices of the size of solutions 
searched for, for a given polynomial. Finally the benefits of the small improvements to 
the algorithm explained in Section 4.5 are analysed.
In the next section of the chapter, we briefly turn our attention to multivariate modular 
equations, and indeed general Diophantine equations. We explain the approach taken 
in (Jutla, 1998), and show that a lemma from Chapter 3 slightly improves on this 
result.
The chapter concludes by showing how the use of finding small solutions to modular 
polynomial equations affects the security of the RSA cryptosystem. This includes 
attacks in the following situations:
• when there is only one small block of unknown plaintext,
• (Hastad’s) broadcast message situation,
• when a message is repeated with only a small change in random padding,
• when there are many (very) small blocks of unknown plaintext.
The last of these attacks is a new result in this field.
Factoring
In Chapter 5 we analyse the equation xy — N  in a similar way to (Coppersmith, 
1996a). However we show that one can use a “modular” approach similar to that used 
in Chapter 4 that has a simpler exposition, and analysis, and removes the need for 
resultant calculations.
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We then extend this factoring algorithm to one over the Gaussian integers, and show 
how this helps to factor a particular class of integers which are used in a cryptosystem 
by Vanstone and Zuccherato.
The following section deals with factoring numbers which have repeated divisors. We 
show that the lattice techniques are particularly effective in this situation, and even 
for N  =  p2q we have an 0 (V 1/8) factoring algorithm.
The last section of this chapter consider the problem of finding divisors of an integer N  
which lie in known residue classes. One method to construct such divisors follows from 
(Coppersmith, 1996a), but we extend the modular approach to give a simpler method 
to analyse these divisors and bound the number of them. We compare our results with 
those previously obtained by H. W. Lenstra.
P a rt IV: W iener ty p e  attacks on R SA
The fourth part of the thesis considers attacks on RSA when a low decrypting exponent 
is being used. We describe the general technique of Wiener, and then briefly touch on 
a better result recently achieved by Boneh and Durfee.
We then consider the approach taken by Guo, in which one studies the related problem 
of breaking RSA when one has knowledge of more than one encrypting exponent, each 
with relatively small decrypting exponents modulo a given N. Such a position could 
possibly occur if one is using different exponents to sign different classes of message, 
but is content with just one choice of N. We improve on Guo’s results and in fact 
show that as the number of such exponents tends to infinity, one can factor the integer 
N  when the decrypting exponents are as large as However the approach is not
feasible with more than about 10 exponents.
P a rt V: C onclusions and op en  problem s
Finally, in Chapter 7, we summarise in detail the work of this thesis, showing the 
original results that have been proved and highlighting the problems that remain open.




On D etecting Group Torsion
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Chapter 2
D etecting group torsion
In this chapter we aim to give, in Section 2.4, a result that aids the detection of group 
torsion when we have definite bounds on the smoothness of the group order. Before this 
result can be described we must give brief overviews of the notions of smooth numbers, 
addition chains and the detection of torsion; these are the subjects of Sections 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.3. The work in Section 2.2 contains the novel notion of T-reliant addition chains.
2.1 S m o o th  num bers
In this section we define the notion of smooth and semi-smooth numbers, and then 
discuss the distribution of these numbers. They have been the objects of a considerable 
amount of study to understand better the probabilities involved in algorithms that use 
factor bases (see, for example Chapter 9, of (Cohen, 1991)) and for algorithms that 
detect torsion (see Section 2.3).
The study of smooth numbers began in (de Bruijn, 1951); the criterion for being smooth 
was that they were “crossed off” during the sieve of Eratosthenes. We may state this 
more precisely as the following.
D efin ition  2.1.1 A number x is said to be ?/-smooth if all the prime divisors of x 
are < y.
For detailed information on the distribution and study of smooth numbers see (Hilde­
brand, 1986), (Hildebrand Sz Tenenbaum, 1986), (Moree, 1993) and (Tenenbaum,
1995). However the use of smooth numbers in this chapter does not warrant exces­
sive analysis, and for this reason we only give a brief overview of this subject, based
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mainly on a short summation in (Pinch, 1997).
Let S (x , y) denote the set of ^/-smooth numbers up to x  (where x  is not necessarily an 
integer), and let ip{x,y) = |5 ( r ,y)\. If we let p be the largest prime < ?/, then it is 
clear that S(x,y) = S(x,p). For any s £ S(x,p) it is either divisible by p or it is not; 
if it is then s/p  is in the set S(x/p ,p ) otherwise s is in the set S{x,p') where p' is the 
previous prime to p. This implies that ip{x,y) = ip(x,p') +  ip(x/p,p). By repeated use 
of this idea we have for any z that
i/j{x,y) = ip(x,z)+  <t>(x/p,p), (2 .1)
z< p < y
(the summation being over prime p only) which is called Buchstab’s identity.
If we let u =  log(:r)/ log(y) and u < 1 then it is clear that ip(x, y) = |_#J • The situation 
is more interesting when 1 < u < 2 in which case (placing z =  x in equation 2.1 and 
hence negating the summation) we obtain
ip(x,y) = [xJ -
y < p < x
x{l — logu),
the latter approximation coming from the Prime Number Theorem.
By induction on [wj it can be shown that ?/>(x , y) «  xp{u) where
p{u) = p(k) — f  p ( v -  1) — , (2.2)
Jk v
for k < u < k +  1. This is called the Dickman-de Bruijn function, and it can be shown 
that p(u) «  u~u as u —> oo.
In plain terms this means that the fraction of y-smooth numbers less than x  depends 
only o n u  =  log (a:) /  log (y) and is approximately u~n.
The idea of smooth numbers can be extended to the following types of number.
D efin ition  2.1.2 A number x is said to be (y,z)-semi-smooth if each of its prime 
factors is < y, and all but one are < z.
Many algorithms that make use of y-smooth numbers may be adapted slightly to use 
semi-smooth numbers, and thus be speeded up significantly because of the increased 
likelihood of x being semi-smooth rather than just smooth (for suitably chosen x , y, z). 
The adaptations to the algorithms are often referred to as large prime variants; see 
Section 2.3.1 for an example.
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One can, as above, define ip(x, y, z) to be the number of (y, z)-semi-smooth numbers 
up to x , and to try to work out the distributions for semi-smooth numbers. This has 
been done in (Bach Sz Peralta, 1996). The formula for semi-smooth numbers is not 
quite as simple as that for smooth numbers, but in both cases, due to error terms, it 
is better to rely on pre-calculated tables. Below we show a few (low precision) results 
from the table in (Bach & Peralta, 1996) to give an idea of the probabilities involved 
(cr(v,u) is the 2-dimensional equivalent of p(u)).
iP(t10,t) = '0(^10, t,t)  «  <7(10,10) « 3 x  10’ 11 
ip(t10, t2,t) «  <t(10, 5) « 5 x  10~ 9 
ip(t10, t3,t) «  <7(10, 3 .3) «  1 x 10-8
2.2 A d d itio n  chains
D efinition 2.2.1 An  addition chain for a positive integer n is a list of integers ao, . . . ,  ar 
such that ao=l, aT = n and ai = aj +  a* for some j, k < i. The length of the chain is 
defined to be r, and l(n) denotes the smallest possible length of chain for an integer n.
Firstly note that one can make an addition chain strictly increasing, i.e. a{+1 > ai 
by ordering them non-decreasingly and simply removing any duplicate entries. This 
implies a{+1 < 2aj, and therefore
l(n) > \l0 g2 n]. (2.3)
For example 1,2,4,8,12,14,15 denotes a chain of length 6 for 15, but actually Z(15) =  5, 
as attained by 1,2,3,5,10,15 or 1,2,3,6,12,15.
An important application of an addition chain for an integer n is that it implies how 
to exponentiate “some element” to the n ’th power via repeated multiplication. For 
instance if x € E  Z 1 0 1  say, and one wished to calculate x 15 then this could be done by 5 
multiplications, e.g.
yo =  X
yi
2 2 
=  2/0 =  x
2/2 -  2/12/0 =  x '
2/3 =  2/22/1 =  x '
2/4 =  !/32 =  * 10
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2/5 =  2/42/3 =  X 15
where we can see yi =  x ai = x ai+ak =  x ai x ak =  yjy^ for some j , k  < i. An overview of 
many exponentiation methods is given in Section 14.6 of (Menezes et a/., 1996). As we 
will see below they themselves can conversely be associated with (generalised) addition 
chains.
The binary addition chain B (n ) for an integer n is defined to be
t
B(n) = <
1 if n  =  1 ,
B (n /2 ),n  if n is even,
B (n  — l) ,n  otherwise.
For instance the longest of the above addition chains for 15 is the binary addition chain 
for 15. In general the length of a binary addition chain B(n) is [log2 nj + v(n) — 1 where
v(n) is the number of l ’s in the binary expansion of n. This implies that the expected
length of the binary addition chain is (3/2)log2n and also that l(n) < 2 [log2 nJ. On 
comparison with equation 2.3 this shows that the binary addition chain is of length at 
most 2 times longer than the length of the optimal addition chain.
Another common addition chain for an integer n is the factor addition chain F(n), 
defined as
1 if n = 1,
F (n ) =  < F(a), a x F'(b) if n — ab,
F(n — l ) ,n  otherwise,
where the list F'{ri) is the list F(n) but with the first entry (i.e. 1) omitted, and 
multiplication on addition chains is defined by
k x "(uq, . . . ,  — (2uAq, . . . ,  .
Notice that this addition chain implies that l(ab) < l{a )+  1(b). On average, as quoted 
in (Knuth, 1981), the length of the factor addition chain is less than that of the binary 
addition chain.
Other examples of addition chains, a thorough analysis of the function Z(n), and a graph 
theoretic model of addition chains are all given in (Knuth, 1981). A nice summary of 
the graph theoretical model of addition chains is also described in (Bleichenbacher,
1996) along with techniques for searching for optimal addition chains. Methods for 
efficiently finding near optimal addition chains are described in (Brlek et al, 1991). It
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was shown by Brauer in (Brauer, 1939) that l(n) < log2(n) +  O(loglogn).
The concept of addition chains for a positive integer n may also be extended to a set 
of positive integers S  = { n \ , . . .  ,n m}.
Definition 2 .2 . 2  An addition chain for a set S  of positive integers is an addition 
chain containing every element of S. Again we denote by l(S ) the minimal length of 
an addition chain for S.
It was shown (Downey et al., 1981) that finding an optimal addition chain for a set S' =  
{n i , . . . ,  nm} is NP-complete, and the theorem of Brauer was extended in (Yao, 1976) 
to show that l(S ) < log2(iV) +  cX )£i 1 ° S 2 / (1°S2(1°S2 +  2))) for some constant c, 
where N  = max{nj}i<j<m.
We now introduce slightly more general definitions of addition chains for integers and 
sets.
Definition 2.2.3 A T-reliant addition chain for a positive integer n is a list of integers 
a i , . . . ,  ar such that aT — n and ai =  b+c for some b,c G T u A i- i  where Ai = {aj}i<j<i 
and T  is a set of integers. The length of a T-reliant addition chain is defined to be r, 
and lT(n) denotes the smallest possible length of chain for the set S  with respect to the 
“stored” set T . A T-reliant addition chain for a set S  of positive integers is a T-reliant 
addition chain such that S  C T  U Ar.
This definition allows us to “pre-compute” some integers (the ones in the set T), and 
then form an addition chain for a set, S say, which is allowed to make use of these 
“stored” values. For example if T =  {1,2,4,8,16} and S  = (2,7,10,25} then the chain 
3,7,10,24,25 is a T-reliant addition chain for the set S  of length 5. Note that an 
ordinary addition chain for a set S  is equivalent to a {l}-reliant addition chain, with a 
1 placed at the start of the chain.
Although we explicitly define T-reliant addition chains for the first time here, they have 
been implicitly studied in the context of “fast exponentiation with precomputation” 
in (Brickell et al, 1992). In fact T-reliant addition chains have been defined here to 
demonstrate the connection of this work with classical addition chains.
Two interesting question regarding T-reliant addition chains are the size of T, and the 
computational cost of calculating T. The first of these is simply a matter of how much 
storage one is prepared to use, and the second of these is analogous to the length of an 
addition chain for the set T.
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An interesting observation is that T  itself could be formed by being reliant on a pre- 
pre-computed set T ', etc.
In (Brickell et al, 1992) there is no concept of an explicit set S, the problem is rather 
to form a set T  such that one could form a reasonable T-reliant addition chain for any 
given integer s uniformly distributed on {0 , . . . ,  N  — 1}. Of course if we are explicitly 
given the set S  then the best solution is to find an optimal addition chain for this set 
S, and there is no concept of T-reliance. However when S  is large this seems a hard 
problem to attack (indeed as mentioned above it is certainly NP-complete), and so the 
approach taken in (Brickell et al, 1992) seems a practical way to proceed. Put another 
way, the list {£;}, {r^} may be a reasonably efficient addition chain for S, where {£*} is 
a reasonable addition chain for T, and {r^} is a reasonable T-reliant addition chain for 
5.
Clearly one may deem the computational cost of producing T as being significant or 
not, dependent on memory allowances and the (expected) size of the set S .
In (Brickell et al, 1992) they explain that if
771—1
71 =  £  (2-4) 
i=0
for some set T =  {£o, • • • , tm- 1} and where 0 < ai < h, then one may firstly1 calculate
Cj =  ^  t{
a i= j
for all 1 < j  < h, and then calculate
k
=  ^  1 Ch+l—j
3=1
=  < 4-1  +  Ch+l-k-
From which it follows that
h
n = ^ 2 d k.
k - i
For instance if T =  {1,5,10,22,30} and n =  7 x l  +  3 x 5 - | - 3 x l 0 - | - 7 x 2 2 - f - 2 x 3 0 ,
1 Conceptually this may happen before the following stages of the algorithm, but as shown in (Brickell 
et al., 1992), one can do all parts together.
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and h = 7 then
n = 7 x 2 3  + 3 x 1 5  +  2 x 3 0
=  4 x 23 +  1 x (23 +  15)+ 2 x (23 +  15 +  30), (2.5)
which we calculate by forming a T-reliant addition chain for T ' =  {15,23,30} and then 
a T'-reliant addition chain for T" =  {23,38,68}, and finally a T"-reliant addition chain 
for n. Thus the T-reliant addition chain for n is
15,23,38,68,46,69,92,130,198,266,
of length 10, assuming e.g. 4 x 23 is simply worked out by adding 23 four times since 
in general most of the coefficients of equation 2.5 would be 1. It is true that the binary 
addition chain for 266 has a shorter length, but as we will see for a good choice of set 
T  we may improve markedly on this.
Note that (through T') the length of the T-reliant addition chain for T"  is at most 
|T| — 1 (when, as in this case, all the elements of T  axe used in the representation of n 
so we need to add them all to form 68), and the length of the T"-reliant addition chain 
for n is at most h — 1 (when, as in this case, the largest aj is equal to h). Thus the 
length of the T-reliant addition chain for n is at most |T| +  h — 2.
In order to put a number n in the range {0, . . . ,  N  — 1} in the form of equation 2.4 the 
approach taken in (Brickell et al., 1992) considers storing a set of the form
T  = {jb{ | o < i <  Uog6iv j, j e J } .
for some set J  C {±1, . . . ,  ±(iV — 1)}. They associate with J  a set D(J, h) =  {jk  \ j  G 
J, 0 < k < h} which is designed to be a basic digit set (see (Matula, 1982)) for the base 
b.
Since D( J, h) is a basic digit we may use the algorithm of Matula to find a representation 
of n of the form
TO
n = where a\ G fi(J,/i),
i=l
TO
=  ^  aijib1 for some 0 < ai < h and ji G J ,
i—1 
m
= ^ 2  aiti for some U G T. 
i=l
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The choices of base 6, set J  and integer h (subject to the condition D(J, h) being a basic 
digit set for the base b) affects the size of T, computational cost of T  and computational 
cost of finding a T-reliant addition chain for a general n E {0, . . . ,  N  — 1}. Good choices 
for b for N  = 2160 and N  = 2512 are given in (Brickell et al, 1992) with [J, h] varying 
from [{1},6 —1] to [{±1}, — 1)/2J] right through to [{j | 1 < j  < b— l , j  ^  k22l+l},2]
and [{j | 1 < j  < b — 1}, 1] (the optimal base b increases as the size of J  increases).
To give an idea of the savings achieved even when using [J,h] = [{1}, b — 1] we see that 
|T| =  [logftiVj + 1 , so we may find a T-reliant addition chain for n of length at most 
|_log6iVJ + b — 2, and on average of length [log6 iVj + 6  — 2 assuming (1/6) of the 
digits of the base 6 representation for n are zero. For N  = 2512 the optimal choice of 6 
is 26 in which case the T-reliant addition chain is of length 127.8 on average (132 worst 
case) rather than the 765 on average (1022 worst case) achieved by the binary addition 
chain.
In (Brickell et al, 1992) they also explain how this process can be parallelised for a given 
n E {0,1, . . . ,  N  — 1}. From the point of view taken in this section one could therefore 
define the concept of parallel (T-reliant) addition chains, and express the results in this 
framework. However we leave this as an exercise for the reader and simply state that 
with 0(logiV/loglog N ) processors the expected time for the necessary additions (i.e. 
probably the concept of the expected length of parallel addition chains) is 0(log log N ).
Thus far we have ignored the cost of computing the set T. If T  =  {6l}o<i<jfc where k = 
[logfe iVj, then we may firstly find an optimal addition chain for 6 and then repeatedly 
use this (akin to the factor addition chain) to produce higher powers of 6. The cost 
of this is small and, as mentioned before, almost definitely better than the binary 
addition chain for N  with expected length (3/2) log2 N. When J  is larger than simply 
{1} we could find a good addition chain for J  and use this (again akin to the factor 
addition chain) to produce jbl for each i E {0, . . . ,  k} and j  E J. Of course this second 
stage could be parallelised by treating each bl separately. The most costly case when 
J  = {1, . . . ,  6 — 1} would entail (6 — 1) (k +1) — 1 additions (the cost of producing the b1 
being reduced to just one extra addition) which could be reduced to an expected time 
equivalent to at most (6 — 2) +  (3/2) log2 N  additions when using k +  1 processors.
Let us end by summing up the total cost for the two important cases J  = {1} and 
J  =  {1 , . . . , 6 - 1}:
• With J  =  {1} and for some base 6 we would expect to form an addition chain 
for a set S  of length at most (3/2) log2 N  +  v (^ p  [1°S6 + 6  — 2) when S  has
v entries uniformly distributed on {1, . . . ,  N }. The number of values that would
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be needed to be stored is [log&Nj +  1.
• With J  = {1, . . . ,  6 — 1} for some base b we would expect to form an addition 
chain for a set S  of length at most (b — 1) ( |_log6 N \ + 1) — 1 + v ( b^  [togft N \ ) when 
S  has v entries uniformly distributed on {1, . . . ,  N }. The number of values that 
would be needed to be stored is (b — l)([logh N \ +  1).
For example with N  =  1045 (which is relevant to the discussion in Section 2.4.1) the 
optimum choice of 6 for J  =  {1} is 6 — 12 in which case the addition chain for S  
will be of length approximately 48.2i> +  224.3. Since log2 N  «  149.5 this will be an 
improvement on finding optimal addition chains for each s G S  whenever v > 3.
For the case J  = {1, . . . ,  6 — 1} the optimum value of b is 0 (v f  log v) i.e. dependent on 
the size of the set S. This implies the length of the addition chain is 0 (v  logv N ). If 
the storage requirement of 0(b \ogb N ) exceeds a practical upper limit one can simply 
maximise b with regards to this restriction. For instance with v = 2.7 x 1014 and 
b = 105 (again relevant to the discussion in Section 2.4.1) then the addition chain for S  
will be of length approximately v logft N  «  9v which is over 5 times shorter than using 
J  =  {1}, and almost 17 times shorter than finding optimal addition chains for each 
s G S.
It is worth remarking that when one has a large set S  and many processors it is more 
efficient to split S  amongst the processors rather than making use of the processors in 
parallel exponentiation methods.
2.3 D e tec tin g  group torsion
D efinition  2.3.1 An algorithm A  is said to detect torsion in the (multiplicative) group 
G if given any element g 6 G and n £ Z ,  it can determine if gn is the identity element 
of the group.
This may seem a curious notion, because if one has a group, then it might seem easy 
to raise it to the power n, using perhaps the addition chain techniques of Section 2.2, 
and verify if gn is indeed the identity element. However this assumes that one has a 
representation of the group in which it is possible to apply the group operation and 
also to check for the identity of the group.
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2.3 .1  P o llard ’s (p — 1) factoring m eth od
Pollard was the first to use the detection of torsion to aid the factoring of an integer, 
N  = pq say. He considered the group (Z*, x) (where p is prime) and represented the 
elements (non-uniquely) as elements of Z*N. One is able to apply the group operation 
since multiplication in Z*N respects multiplication in Z*. Further one is able to detect 
a representation x  € Z*N as the identity element in Z* since it is either 1 E Z*N or 
gcd(ir — 1 ,N ) = p. Therefore, in this group, detection of torsion almost always leads 
to finding a non-trivial factor of N.
One can pick a random element in x E Z* by picking a random element in but how 
is one to know what n will be a multiple of the order of x l  To answer this Pollard noted 
that the order of Z* is (p — 1) and he assumed that this was a J5-smooth number (i.e. 
its largest prime factor is less than or equal to B\ see Section 2.1). He also assumed 
a maximum bound w on the size of the highest prime power dividing (p — 1). Under 
these assumptions he suggested using
n =  n  ^  (2 .6 )
devB
where Vb  is the set of primes < B , and ded < w < ded+1. By the Prime Number 
Theorem we have v = \ V b \ ~  B /lo g B .
It is clear that the order of any element x E Z* must divide (p — 1) which must 
divide n under the given assumptions. Therefore by picking a random x E Z*N (as a 
representation for a random element of Z*) then an algorithm which detects torsion 
will discover p unless we have the extremely unlikely situation that x n = 1 E Z*N (in 
which case one should choose a different initial x , and repeat the algorithm).
If we assume that w =  B  =  yjp (and that (p — 1) is as likely to be as smooth as 
any other number of the same magnitude), then n «  wv yjp'/v/log v^, and therefore 
using addition chains we will need approximately log n «  yjp multiplications to detect 
torsion. The probability of the smoothness assumption being correct is approximately 
1 — log 2 ~  0.3, and as we will see in Section 2.4 the condition on w is likely to be true.
We will now briefly describe an extension to the algorithm so that, without much 
computational effort, it can detect torsion if the group order is (B', f?)-semi-smooth 
rather than requiring it to be B-smooth; the extension is called the large prime variant 
of Pollard’s (p — 1) method. One firstly calculates h = gn as before, and now one is 
(hopefully) in the position that hm' =  1 for one prime power m! < B ' . In fact normally 
B ' < B 2 in which case m! is actually a prime < B' (rather than a prime power). Let
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A(x) denote the difference between the prime above x  and x itself, then by calculating 
gn x gA(n) x pA(n+A(n)) x . . .  (in that order) we shall eventually find m!. The saving is 
made from the fact that the difference between the primes around P  are much smaller 
(i.e. around logP) than P  itself, and also that the common values of may be 
stored and reused.
A problem with Pollard’s technique is that (p — 1) may not be smooth at all, indeed 
it might be the case that p — 1 =  2q where q is prime. In this case the method, as 
stated, will not work. However one may use the general technique of detecting torsion 
on groups other than just Z*.
For instance if one uses the group of elements of GF(p2) of norm 1; this has order 
(p +  1) and if this is smooth one may find the factor p along similar reasoning to the 
above. Higher order extensions allow one to generalise this approach to whenever $>d(p) 
is smooth, where <&d is the cfth cyclotomic polynomial. However as the degree of &d 
increases, so the size of &d(p) increases, and hence it becomes less likely that &d(p) is 
smooth.
Far more usefully, H. W. Lenstra suggested in (Lenstra, 1987) using the elliptic curve 
groups P a)b(Zp), which have order p +  1 — £, where \t\ < 2y/p depends on a, 6 G Zp. 
Thus by trying many a ,6  G Zp it is reasonable to assume that a typically smooth (if 
not better) group order will be attained. The distribution of the order of E a,b{^p)  
for a, 6 G Zp is dependent on the class number of t2 — 4p as explained for example 
in (Silverman, 1986), and empirical information about this distribution for practical 
parameter values has been given in (McKee, 1990).
2.3 .2  O n a cry p to sy stem  o f  V anstone and Z uccherato
In (Vanstone & Zuccherato, 1997) they proposed a cryptosystem in which an elliptic 
curve F?ajb(Zjv) is chosen such that N  = pq for two primes p and q, where the number 
of points on both E aj>(Zp ) and E a^ {Zg) are both ^-smooth. It was suggested that 
B = 1016 when p and q were both approximately 1075. Without going in to the details 
of this cryptosystem we will show in the subsequent sections that having a known 
ceiling2 on the smoothness of group elements allows one to employ a technique (akin 
to the large prime variant) that speeds up the detection of torsion.
2This is opposed to the situation in Pollard’s (p — 1) factoring method say, in which we simply make 
plausible assumptions as to the smoothness of group elements.
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2.4  D efic ien t num bers
In this section we introduce the notion of deficient numbers, and show how they can 
help the detection of torsion when one has a known bound on the smoothness of a 
group element, as in Section 2.3.2. In the following let w be an upper bound on the 
size of the order of the group element; the situation when such a bound is not known 
in advance is examined in Section 2.4.3.
D efinition 2.4.1 Lei ipp(k) denote the highest exponent of the prime p such thatp^p^  
divides k. A natural number m  is called (w,B)-n- deficient if for any B-smooth number 
s < w there are at most n primes Pi < B  for which ipPi(m) < i/jpi(s). When w and B  
are implicitly defined we will refer to such numbers simply as n-deficient. The number 
m  is called minimally (w, B)-n-deficient if this is the least such n with this property 
(i.e. for some B-smooth number s < w there are exactly n primes pi < B  for which 
ipPi(m) < ipPi(s)).
For instance the number m =  22 x 3 x 5 x 7 i s  (500,7)-2-deficient (as shown in Ex­
ample 2.1 below) and the number in equation 2.6 is (w, B)-0-deficient. The deficient 
numbers are related to detecting torsion (with known bounds) in the following way: if 
one has a 0-deficient number m  then one can simply detect torsion by raising the group 
element g to the power m, but if m is a 2-deficient number say, then after calculating 
h =  gm one only knows that hp°qb =  1 for some primes p,q < B  and natural numbers 
a, b.
We are able to classify the (minimally) deficient numbers exactly.
Theorem 2.4.2 A natural number m  is minimally (w, B)-n-deficient if and only if
1- n 2 ? P ? * (m>+1 > w f or possible prime (n -I- 1 )-tuples p i , . . .  ,pn+1 < B , and 
2. there exist n primes qi, . . . ,  qn < B  such that Il£=i q fqi^ +1 < w.
The first part classifies exactly the (w, B)-n-deficient numbers, whilst the second part 
ensures minimality.
Proof: Assume m  is (w , B )-n-deficient. If there were n -I-1 primes p i , . . .  ,pn+i < B
such that r  =  Yli^i p tPi^ +1 < w then m  would be at least (n + l)-deficient (since r  is 
B-smooth and < w), which shows that the first condition must be true. If we further 
assume that m is minimally (w , B )-n-deficient this implies that there is a B-smooth
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number s < w and n primes gi, . . . , gn < B such that i)qi{m) < ipqi(s). Therefore 
n ? = ig r iV ' < n ?= i < w shows that the second condition must also be true.
Conversely we now assume the first condition is true. If w were not (w , B)-n-deficient 
then there would exist a B-smooth number s < w and at least n +  1 primes Pi < B  
such that ipPi{m) < 'ippi(s), so r = n S i ! p fPi^ +1 < Y liii p fPi^  ^  w■ This contradicts 
the first condition, so w must be (w, B )-n-deficient. If we further assume the second 
condition then this implies that s =  11^ =1 qfqi<^m)+1 is a B-smooth number < w which 
has ^ qi(m) < 'ipq{(s) for all 1 < i < n, so m  must be minimally (w ,B)-n-deficient. □
Exam ple 2.1 Let w = 500 and B  =  7, then the B-smooth numbers < w are given by
0 < e2 < 8
0 < 63 < 52e23e35e57e? < 500
0 < 65 < 3
0 < e? < 3 J
The number 1260 =  2 x 3 x 5 x 7  can be shown to (500,7 )-2-deficient, by considering 
the following (1) products:
23 x 32 x 52 =  1800
23 x 52 x 72 =  9800
32 x 52 x 72 =  11025
23 x 32 x 72 =  1764
► all more than 500.
The size of them above 500 might suggest that 2520 is (500,7)-1 -deficient, but this is 
shown not to be the case by
23 x 32 = 72 < 500.
More efficiently we only need to find the (n +  1) smallest values o/p^p(m)+1 and verify 
that the product of all of them is more than w whilst the product of the smallest n is 
< w.
Thus we are now in a position to identify a (minimally) (w , B)-n-deficient number. Let 
us turn our attention to how to efficiently produce one.
T heorem  2.4.3 Let <f>p(w) denote the largest power of p such that p ^ w) < w. The 
number m  will be minimally (w,B)-n-deficient whenever the following two conditions 
hold.
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1. F or all p r im e s  p  6 V b  we have
V’p ( m )  >  £ n -_ ! i  x -
2. For at least n primes p 6E Vb we have
if>p(m) < - 1 .
The first condition ensures that m is (w,B)-n-deficient whilst the second condition 
ensures minimality (although neither of these conditions are necessary for m  to be 
minimally (w,B)-n-deficient).
Proof: We make use of Theorem 2.4.2. For any prime (n +  l)-tuple p i , . . .  ,pn+i < B  
we have
n + 1 , , x . n+1 </>Pi(,w)+i
IIp fPi(m) > Up.  ” + I
i—1 i=l
n+1 i 
> JJ W K +T = W,  
i=1
which shows that m  is at least (w, £)-n-deficient. The second condition implies there 




< =  w,
i= i
which shows that m  is minimally (w , JB)-n-deficient. □
This theorem implies that one can create a (w, B)-n-deficient number of size less than 
the (n +  l ) ’th  root of the size of the least (w ,B)-O-deficient number.
Exam ple 2.2 Suppose w = 3000 and B = 13 and we wish to find a (w, B ) -2-deficient 
number. Notice that <fip(w) = 11,7,4,4,3,3 for p =  2,3,5,7,11,13, so 211 x 37 x 
54 x 74 x l l 3 x 133 =  19654365366155520000 is the smallest (w,B)-0-deficient num­
ber. Using Theorem 2.4-3 we form the number m  with ipp(m) = 3 ,2,1,1,1,1 for 
p = 2,3,5,7,11,13, i.e. m  = 23 x 32 x 5 x 7 x 11 x 13 =  360360.
29
This is not the only method to create a (w, B)-n-deficient number, but a fairly natural 
approach. Notice that in this case there are many smaller (it;, £?)-2-deficient numbers, 
e.g. m/13 (seen because 24 x52 x 13 > 3000). For this reason one might consider defining 
the concept of a reduced (w , S)-n-deficient number in which none of the prime exponents 
can be reduced while the number still remains being only n-deficient, or perhaps one 
might devise an algorithm to find the very least (w , £?)-n-deficient number. However for 
the practical purposes of the following sections the types of (w , L?)-n-deficient numbers 
that Theorem 2.4.3 produces axe completely adequate.
2.4.1 T he use o f  1-deficient num bers
Suppose we have known upper bounds on the size and smoothness of a group element 
g and we wish to detect torsion (as in the cryptosystem mentioned in Section 2.3.2). 
We now show how the use of 1-deficient numbers can aid this process.
A lgorithm  2.4.4 Torsion detection using (w , 5 ) -1-deficient numbers.
1. Given w and B  form a (w, £)-l-deficient number m (as from Theorem 2.4.3).
2 . Calculate h = gm using a standard (near-optimal) addition chain.
3. Let S  = | p g Vb }, and form hs for each s 6  S  by calculating a
T-reliant addition chain for S  (as shown in Section 2.2).
The correctness of this algorithm follows since, by the definition of 1-deficiency, 
is the identity element for some prime p 6  Vb and natural number a < 4>p(w) — tpp(m) 
(due to fact that the the element order is assumed to be < it;).
This algorithm approximately halves the time needed to detect torsion using the clas­
sical approach with a (it;, £)-0-deficient number mo say (as in equation 2.6). To see 
this note that the size of mo is approximately wv where v ~  B /  log B  by the Prime 
Number Theorem, and so the normal addition chain would be of length about v logit;. 
However the (it;, B)- 1-deficient number m is approximately the square root of this, and 
hence has an addition chain of approximately half the length. The remaining part is 
to find an efficient addition chain for the set S  which has v entries around the size of 
y/w. If one was to calculate each of these by ordinary (near optimal) addition chains 
this too would take about ( l / 2)i? logit; multiplications, but we may use the techniques 
of Section 2.2  to speed this up considerably. For instance assuming that this can be 
done 10 times faster, means that torsion can be detected in about 0.55 of the time of
30
the classical (w , B)-0-deficient approach. The third stage may also make use of parallel 
processors to move this ratio nearer to 0.5.
E xam ple 2.3 Let w =  1075 and B  =  1016 as is suggested in the cryptosystem in
Section 2.3.2, and suppose we want to detect the torsion of a group element g. The
smallest (w,B)-0-deficient number is
m 0 = 2249 x 3157 x . . .  x 99999999999999374,
so we form the (w,B)-l-deficient number
m i = 2124 x 378 x . . .  x 99999999999999372.
We then form h = gmi using a standard addition chain, which should take approxi­
mately half the time of calculating gm°.
I f  torsion still has to be detected then it remains to check
fl (2125) friZ79) ^(99999999999999372)





so v = |5| «  2.7 x 1014, and the largest element of S  is approximately 1045.
Let us assume we can store 106 group elements, then we choose a base of b = 105 
with J  =  {1, . . .  ,6  — 1} and store the set of group elements hf where t 6  T  and T  = 
{jbl \ j e J , o  < i < 8}. This entails 9 x 105 group multiplications (negligible compared 
to computing the set S  below), and storing 9 x 105 group elements (deliberately made 
to be near the storage bound).
By using the set T  as shown in Section 2.2 each element of s can now be calculated 
in 9 multiplications, and thus all the hs for each s E S  in 2.4 x 1015 multiplications. 
Although this is extremely large (hence its use in cryptography), it is small compared to 
calculating gm i. To see this note that to calculate gm° we need about v log2 w «  6.7x 1016
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m ultip lica tion s, so gmi needs about half o f these a t 3.3 x 1016.
We now explain the connection between the 1-deficient algorithm and the large prime 
variant algorithm given in Section 2.3.1 . Both have two stages; the first stage forms 
h = gni from which one knows that hn2 is the group identity for some n 2 from a fixed 
set of integers. In the large prime variant this set is the set of primes (and their powers 
if applicable) between B\ and B 2 , whilst in the 1-deficient algorithm it is the set of 
(specific powers of the) primes up to B. This also explains why the two techniques 
cannot be used together; there would be 2 “missing primes” which would effectively 
make the situation akin to a 2-deficient problem. We study general n-deficient numbers 
in the next section.
2.4 .2  T h e use o f  n-deficient num bers
The technique of the previous section can be extended to general n-deficient numbers 
thus.
Algorithm  2.4.5 Torsion detection using (w, B)-n-deficient numbers.
1. Given w and B  form a (w, B)-n-deficient number m  (as from Theorem 2.4.3).
2. Calculate h = g171 using a standard (near-optimal) addition chain.
3. Let S  =  {Iir=ipfP’^  | for all prime n-tuples p \ , . . .  ,pn < B}, and form 
hs for each s E S' by calculating a T-reliant addition chain for S  (as shown in 
Section 2.2).
Again the correctness of this algorithm follows from the definition of n-deficiency. The 
second stage is now done in l / (n  +  l ) ’th of the time needed for the classical (w,B)-0- 
deficient method, but it is the third stage that becomes a problem. This is because the 
set S  has grown exponentially (compared to the (w , B)- 1-deficient algorithm) to be of 
size (^) with entries about u>n/(n+1). Even with n =  2 we have \S\ =  (2) ~  B 2/ ( 2 log2 B) 
and so the third stage would take time approximately
2B 2 log w 
3c log2 B  ’
where c is the speed up from the techniques of Section 2.2. The increase in the size 
of S  cannot be outweighed by assuming c «  10 again; this would lead to a third stage
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of the algorithm that is far more expensive than the entire classical (w , J3)-0-deficient 
approach. However the (w,B)-n-deficient approach does allows for the third stage to 
be attacked with multiple processors (e.g. by splitting S  amongst them), and if the 
number of processors exceeds B /\o g B  then the second stage of the algorithm will 
become dominant and the entire algorithm will take approximately 1/3 of the time of 
the classical method.
In general the n-deficient approach only becomes feasible with the use of 0 ({B /  log B )n~l ) 
processors, and implies an algorithm which takes l / (n  +  l ) ’th  of the time taken by the 
classical approach. Compared with the number of processors this speed up is very 
small, but there may be cases (e.g. under the given assumptions, and when nothing 
can be gained from trying another group element g) in which this is the only way to 
proceed. It is not unreasonable to imagine a parallel architecture that could cope with 
n = 2 and B  «  106.
2.4 .3  A n  increm en tal a lgorithm
In the above analysis we have assumed we have an upper bound w on the size of the 
order of the group element g. In this section we briefly examine the situation when 
one does not know such a bound, but instead knows w = 10a for some a uniformly 
distributed on {2 , . . . ,  20} say.
The (w, I?)-0-deficient approach can cope with this altered problem with little change. 
One would simply assume that w is maximal, i.e. w =  1020 in our case, and then 
as usual calculate gm where m = Y[P£Tb P^p^ '  The only difference that care should 
be taken during the creation of gm to ensure that each prime power is approximately 
equal (to take advantage of a smaller w). We will refer to this as the modified (w,B)~ 
0-deficient method.
It is less easy to use the extend the (w, B)- 1-deficient approach, though still possible if 
the range on a is small enough. Assume for some wq one had calculated the (wq,B)~
0-deficient number mo and the group element h =  gm° . We could then use the idea of 
Algorithm 2.4.4 to “look forward” and detect torsion whenever w < Wq. However if 
it were the case that w > Wq then this “check’ (and the associated time) would have 
been wasted; we cannot, in general, reuse this information.
One can use this approach several times during the modified (w, J5)-0-deficient ap­
proach, as the following table demonstrates. Here we assume B  =  7 and 102 < w < 1020 
and we “look ahead” (i.e. calculate the set S) whenever w has grown by a power of 
3/2. We also assume that fi, the time to create the set 5, is 1/10 of the time £2? the
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time to calculate pmo, and further we assume £2 =  log2 mo- The time £3 is the total 
time using this scheme (i.e. £3  = £1 + £2 +  “all the previous (wasted) £2’s”).
w0 mo £1 wl s h £3
102 26 x 34 x 52 x 72 22.6 104 ( 26 ,34,52,72} 2.3 24.9
103 29 x 36 x 54 x 73 36.2 106 {29,36,54 ,73} 3.6 42.1
I O 4 .5 214 x 39 x 56 x 75 56.2 109 {214,39,56 ,75} 5.6 67.7
i o 6-75 222 x 314 x 59 x 77 84.7 I O 1 3 .5 {222,314,59 , 77} 8.5 104.7
^qIO.125 233 x 321 x 514 x 711 129.7 j^ q20.25 (233,321,5 14 , 711} 13.0 162.7
With this scheme it turns out we would detect torsion, on average, in 0.78 of the time of 
the modified (w , J3)-0-deficient approach when w =  10° and a is uniformly distributed 
on {2 , . . . ,  20}. No effort has been made to optimise the frequency of calculating the 
set S , which should clearly be increased the cheaper “looking ahead” is, i.e. the smaller 
the ratio £2/£i.
Finally note that if there is no upper limit on the size of w (or the range of a is just 
very large) then the (w, B)- 1-deficient approach becomes useless; we simply waste too 
much time looking ahead.
2.5 C on clu sion s
In Section 2.2 we introduced the concept of reliant addition chains and showed that 
this is a generalisation of the standard model of addition chains which allows for pre- 
computation. We then showed how this idea can be used to find an addition chain for 
a set of natural numbers S  using results from (Brickell et al., 1992). We also suggested 
(though omitted the fine details) that the same kind of model might be useful when 
describing parallel addition chains.
In Section 2.4 we then defined and classified the (it), B )-n-deficient numbers, and showed 
their use in detecting torsion when one has a known upper bound on the smoothness of 
a group element. Although this situation is rather unlikely to happen naturally, it may 
well be artificially ensured, as is the case for the cryptosystem described in (Vanstone & 
Zuccherato, 1997). In particular we showed that the (w, B)- 1-deficient approach given 
by Algorithm 2.4.4 approximately halves the time needed to attack this cryptosystem.
We also examined the associated (iu, B )-n-deficient algorithms in general in Section 2.4.2, 
and showed that with many processors they may also be used usefully. However the
34
number of processors grows exponentially for a relatively small increase in speed, so 
these approaches can only used for (very) small n, and should only be considered when 
there is no better way to proceed (e.g. one cannot gain anything by trying another 
group element g etc.).
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Part III:
Lattice m ethods for finding small 





In this chapter we introduce the concept of lattices, and give a concrete matrix repre­
sentation for them that we shall maintain throughout the thesis. We then outline some 
of their more elementary properties.
Much of the work in the subsequent chapters is based on finding a sufficiently small 
element of a lattice, and this is achieved through the LLL reduction procedure (see 
(Lenstra et al., 1982)). This is an algorithm to “reduce” an entire basis of a lattice, but 
certain properties ensure that a relatively short vector is found also. This algorithm is 
analysed in detail in Section 3.3.
The original work in this chapter starts in Section 3.4 with an interesting property 
of the LLL reduction algorithm when applied to a basis of a given lattice or its dual. 
This result has a large impact on the thesis, implying a new way to look at results in 
(Coppersmith, 1996b), and influencing all the work in Chapters 4 and 5.
In Section 3.5 the LLL algorithm is shown to extend to structures that we name unitary 
lattices. This work was done completely independently, but similar results were shown 
in (Fieker &; Pohst, 1996). As is shown in Section 5.3 this also has implications on a 
cryptosystem proposed by Vanstone and Zuccherato.
In Section 3.6 we outline the natural progression of extending LLL to unitary lattices 
and discuss the direction of current research.
A word of warning is that although every effort has been made to make this chapter easy 
to read, with examples wherever possible, some of the lattice results may be considered 
a little theoretical without first examining their applications in the subsequent chapters.
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3.1 A n  in trod u ction  to  la ttices
The theory of lattices was first built up from the 2-dimensional (see (Gauss, 1801)) and 
via the concept of quadratic forms (see (Lagrange, 1773), (Hermite, 1850), (Korkine 
& Zolotarev, 1873). A thorough treatment of the algebra of general lattices was later 
given by Cassels in (Cassels, 1971). However it was not until relatively recently that 
a large amount of interest has been generated in lattices, primarily via computational 
number-theoretic problems and the suggested use of knapsack-based cryptosystems. 
In the last few years this interest has been heightened by Coppersmith’s novel use of 
lattices in finding small solutions to bivariate integer equations. For a good introduction 
to lattices and/or attacks on knapsack-based cryptosystems see (Joux & Stern, 1998), 
(Joux, 1993), (Cohen, 1991). It is one of the aims of later chapters of this thesis to 
discuss the ways in which Coppersmith uses lattices.
Before going any further it should be noted that for a good understanding of lattices 
one must have a good understanding of basic linear algebra1. The Gram-Schmidt 
orthogonalisation procedure plays a central role in this chapter, and for this reason it is 
introduced here, before the concept of lattices. All the definitions and theorems below 
have been taken (with little or no changes) from (Cohen, 1991) where the necessary 
proofs may be found.
T heorem  3.1.1 Given a basis {&i,. . .  , 6n} of the Euclidean space Rn, one may form  
an orthogonal basis {6| , . . . ,  6* } where
bt =  (3.1)
3=1
and fiij  =  (bi • b*-)/\\bj\\2. Moreover this new basis satisfies
span{bl, ...,&*} =  span{b\,. . .  ,b{}
for all 1 < i < n.
One should observe that by dividing the orthogonal vectors by their Euclidean length 
upon their formation one may also produce an orthonormal basis of Rn with the same 
span over R.
The mathematical definitions of a quadratic form and a lattice are shown below, but
1 Having said this I would have thought it perfectly reasonable, and rather rewarding, to learn the 
two hand in hand.
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first we state a general theorem about general Z-modules, to have a context in which 
to place lattices.
T heorem  3.1.2 Let V  be a finitely generated Z-module (i.e. Abelian group)
1- I f ytors is the torsion subgroup o f V,  i.e. the set of elements of v E V such that 
there exists m  E Z\{0} with mv = 0, then V*ors is a finite group, and there exists 
a non-negative integer n and an isomorphism
V  ~  Vtors x Zn
(the number n is called the rank of V ).
2. I fV  is a free Z-module (i.e. i fV  ~  Zn, or equivalently by (1) if Vtors =  {0}/, then 
any submodule of V  is also free of rank less than or equal to that of V.
3. I fV  is a finite Z-module (i.e. by (1) is V  is of zero rank), then there exists n and 
a submodule L of Zn (which is free by (2)) such that V  ~  Zn/L .
D efinition 3.1.3 Let K  be a field of characteristic different from 2, and let V  be a 
K-vector space. We say that a map q :V  K  is a quadratic form if the following two 
conditions are satisfied:
1. For every A E K  and x E V we have
q(X • x ) =  A2q(x)
2. I f we set b(x,y) =  (1/2)(q(x +  y) — q{x) — q{y)) then b is a (symmetric) bilinear 
form, i.e. b{x +  x ', y) = b(x, y) +  b(x', y) and b(X • x, y) = Ab(x, y) for all A E K , 
x, x' and y in V (the similar conditions on the second variable follow from the 
fact that b(y,x) = b(x,y)).
D efin ition  3.1.4 A lattice is a pair (L ,q ) where L is a free Z-module of finite rank 
and q is a positive definite quadratic form on L®  E.
The above theory has treated lattices rather platonically, i.e. as objects that satisfy 
certain axioms. They may be treated far more concretely by the introduction of a 
basis for (L,q ), which can imply representations for lattice elements, for alternative 
bases, and for the quadratic form q.
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In the following lemma we have put a bias on row vectors, and on rows of matrices, 
rather than their column counterparts. This is to better fit in with the uses of lattices 
developed in the subsequent chapters (and for no deeper reason).
L em m a 3.1.5 Given a basis (&i)i<i<n of a lattice {L,q), where b denotes the symmet­
ric bilinear form associated to q, then
1. An element x E L may be represented by an integer (row) vector X  E Vn(Z) where 
x — J^Xibi. The vector X  is often referred to as the coordinate vector of x  with 
respect to the basis (&i)i<i<n-
2. An alternative basis (6^)i<i<n may be represented by an integer matrix H  E 
GLn(Z) whose rows are the coordinate vectors of the b\ in terms of the bi. It 
follows that the determinant of this matrix must be ± 1  (i.e. H  E GLn(Z)) if and 
only if (&i)i<i<n is indeed a basis for (L,q).
3. It is relatively easily checked that the properties of the quadratic form imply
Q(x ) = Qi,jx ixji
where qij =  b(bi,bj). This means the quadratic form may be represented by the 
real positive definite symmetric matrix Q =  (Qi,j)i<i,j<nt and that the associated 
bilinear form satisfies
b(x,y) =  Y Q X ‘,
where X  andY  are the (integer) coordinate vectors o fx  andy respectively. Notice
that this means q(x) =  b(x, x) =  X Q X 1.
Definition 3.1.6 We say that two lattices (L ,q ) and (L',q') are equivalent if there is 
a Z-module isomorphism between L and V  sending q to q'.
Considered as Z-modules L  and L' will be isomorphic if and only if a basis of L  maps 
via an invertible integer matrix (i.e. H  E GLn(Z)) to a basis of V . For this to map 
q on to q' means that Q' =  H Q H 1 by Lemma 3.1.5(3). The matrix Q thus gives 
a representation of a lattice that is unique modulo the equivalence relation ~  where
Q ~  Q' if and only if Q' =  H Q H 1 for some H  E GLn(Z).
The matrix Q is not the only way to represent a lattice as explained now. Given a
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positive definite symmetric matrix Q we may perform the Cholesky decomposition2 
algorithm to find a matrix B  G GLn(R) such that B B l = Q. In fact the decomposition 
ensures that B  is the unique (lower) triangular matrix that satisfies this property. It 
now follows that the lattice L' =  {y = xB  | x £ Zn} with the Euclidean quadratic 
norm q'(y) = Vi ls isomorphic to (L ,q ). Before we show this let us stress what we 
have done: We have moved from the situation of having elements of the lattice that are 
represented by integer vectors, and a complicated quadratic form function (effectively 
holding the “lattice information”) to the situation where this information is now held 
within the representation of the lattice points (real entried vectors) and the quadratic 
form is simply Euclidean.
With lattices again being written as the pair (L , Q) but now with L, Q being the matrix 
representations of their algebraic counterparts, we wish to show that
({y = x B \ x € Z n}, In) =; (Z n,BB‘). (3.2)
On consideration this follows immediately from the fact that the application of the 
quadratic forms to the basis elements coincide.
The above theory gives a justification for the following second definition of a lattice.
D efinition 3.1.7 For a given basis {61, . . . ,  6n} of Rm which form the rows of a (n ) x (m) 
matrix B , a lattice L is defined to be the set of points
L = {y = xB  \ x € Zn} ,
together with an associated Euclidean quadratic form yf-
This is the definition of a lattice (with the matrix B  being the implied representation) 
that we shall be using throughout the thesis. When we refer to the size or more 
accurately norm of a lattice point x E L we shall mean the square root of the Euclidean 
quadratic form and denote it ||a;||. Note that this definition does not imply that the 
basis matrix B  is triangular, or even that the basis vectors are of dimension equal to 
the rank of the lattice (though the rank is obviously a lower bound). However one may 
clearly enforce these situations by finding the Cholesky decomposition of B B l.
This representation of a lattice is not unique. One many change the basis, i.e. multiply 
on the left by any H  E GLn(Z), and also one may right multiply by an orthonormal
2Cholesky decomposition of a matrix M M 4 is akin to the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure
on M  (see (Cohen, 1991) for more details). The matrix M M 4 is often called the Gram matrix.
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matrix N , i.e. N f = iV-1  since this will not affect Q =  B B l (geometrically this is 
equivalent to twisting the axes). However the absolute value of the determinant of 
Q remains unchanged by either of these modifications, and thus is a lattice invariant. 
Its positive square root (the absolute value of the determinant of B  if it is square) is 
referred to as the determinant A of the lattice (L,q ).
A(L,,) =  |det(B)| =  det(Q)1/2.
We shall frequently denote a lattice simply by L , when it will be considered a subset of 
Kn with the Euclidean quadratic form. There are many interesting problems associated 
with lattices, for instance those described below. Finding the complexity classes of 
algorithms to solve these problems is also very interesting, and for a thorough discussion 
of NP-completeness and related matters, see for example (Aho et a/., 1974).
The shortest vector problem: This is the problem of finding a (non-zero) lattice 
point with least norm, or in a more generalised form the problem of finding a 
vector that has a norm that is within some multiple of the smallest one. As we 
will see in Section 3.3 we may find a vector that has a norm within 2^ n~1^ 2 of 
the smallest one in polynomial time, but the problem of deciding whether a given 
vector has minimal norm is known to be NP-complete (see for instance (Ajtai, 
1998a)).
The closest vector problem: Rather than find the smallest point of a lattice (i.e. 
the closest non-zero vector to zero), it is also interesting to consider the problem 
of finding a lattice point which is nearest to some other given point in Mn. As 
above, the problem can be generalised to finding a vector whose distance from 
the required point in Mn is less than some multiple of a closest vector (although 
the zero vector is allowed as a solution to this problem).
The shortest independent vectors problem: The problem here is to find m  
linearly independent vectors v i , . . . ,  vm of the lattice whose length (defined as the 
norm of the largest one of them) is minimal. Again, one can generalise this to 
being within a multiple of the shortest length possible for m  linearly independent 
vectors.
The shortest basis problem: The problem here is to find a basis b\ , . . . ,  bn for the 
lattice that is (within some multiple) the shortest possible (with the length of 
the basis being defined as the norm of the largest one of them). Note that this
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is not the same as the shortest independent vectors problem with m = n  since n 
linearly independent vectors do not necessarily generate the lattice.
The complexity issues of these lattice problems has become an active area of research 
recently, heightened since the publication of (Ajtai, 1998b). This is because it was 
shown that if one could prove that certain instances of them are NP-hard (in the worst 
case) it would imply that finding a short element of a lattice from a certain class of 
lattices was also NP-hard, even in the average case. For a good overview of this area 
see (Blomer Sz Seifert, 1999).
The theory of lattices is potentially useful whenever linear dependencies occur. The 
following list gives a rough, though incomplete, idea of the variety of problems in which 
lattices have been found to be useful:
Factoring  un ivaria te  in teger polynom ials: This is the area that the original LLL 
paper, (Lenstra et al, 1982), was applied to.
K napsack-based cryptosystem s: Much work has been done on lattice attacks on 
Knapsack-based cryptosystems, see for example (Joux &; Stern, 1998).
Search for linear dependencies: In cryptography one way of attacking a cryptosys­
tem is to make use of unexpected linear dependencies, and the LLL algorithm 
can be used to spot these, again see (Joux &: Stern, 1998).
M inim al polynom ials: With an approximation to an algebraic number, one can 
use the LLL algorithm to guess its minimal polynomial; see (Cohen, 1991) and 
(Joux Sz Stern, 1998).
F ind ing  sm all solutions to  b ivaria te  D iophantine  equations: This is really 
what the rest of the thesis is based on. In fact the methods can be used heuris- 
tically to find solutions to Diophantine equations in more than 2 variables, but 
the guaranteed proofs of success fail when applied to these situations.
3.2 B asic  p rop erties o f  la ttices
As shown in the previous section, the first and simplest property of a lattice is that 
it has an invariant determinant. In this section we describe some other basic lattice 
properties.
In (Cassels, 1971) the important notion of the successive minima of || • ||2 on lattice 
points was defined, which we state precisely below.
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D efinition 3.2.1 The Vth successive minimum of a lattice L is the smallest real 
number r such that there are i linearly independent vectors in L with || • ||2 at most r.
We start by showing that there is a maximum bound on Ai, which depends only on 
the determinant of the lattice.
Lem m a 3.2.2 There exists a positive constant 7 n such that in any lattice (L , q) with 
determinant A there is an element x  G L such that q(x) < 7 nA2/n .
Proof: We will actually prove this result constructively (under the assumption of
the existence of a least element) by showing 7 n < (4/3)(n-1)/2. Let us first assume 
we have a two dimensional basis B  representing the lattice (L, q), and that 6 = X\ = 
m[nxeZn{\\x B W2}- The following diagram shows the steps necessary to show 72 < \/4 /3  
(an empty box □ denotes an unspecified entry).
B  = H B N * = det B
H B N ‘= VS
<i VS det B
The above diagram is representing the following situation: Let h\ G Zn be such that 
6 = ||/iil?||2 is minimal, and let H  be any matrix such that H  G GLn{Z) and H  has h\ 
as its first row, then we have that B ' — H B  also represents the lattice (L, q). We now 
find the orthonormal basis of B' (via the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure) 
which we call N , and then H B N t is yet another representation our lattice, which is 
triangular and has top-left entry equal to \fd. One may now perform a second change 
of basis to ensure that the bottom left entry has absolute size at most (1/ 2) y/6.
From the assumption that 9 corresponds to the the lattice element of minimum size, 
then we must have
0 < (1/4)0 +  ^ ^ ,  so
6 < det B, which proves that 72 < ^/4/3.
We show how to extend this result to n  dimensions after briefly showing the argument 
for 3 dimensions:
v s 0  0 \
□ det B
□ Vo >





The above diagram represents the situation for a 3-dimensional basis B  where we again 
manage to put \[Q in the top left corner, but now use the above 2-dimensional result to 
show that we may find a 2-dimensional lattice point of size at most (2 det B /\ /W ) ll 2 
from the sub-lattice of determinant det B/y/d. From the minimality of 6  we now have
- 1« [4 det B .
0  -  i-e-
$ <  ^det B 3/2, so 73 < 4/3.O
The general pattern is unfolded by induction; if we assume that
/ 4 \  (n -1 ) /2 9/
On < ( 3 )  A2/",
then following the above procedure we can form the equation
1 / 4 \  (n—1)/2 /  A \ 2/"
0n+i <  j  0n+ i + ^ g j  I - 1 , which im plies
e„+i < ( | ) n/2 A2/(n+1),
and thus our induction hypothesis is correct and 7„ < (4/3)^n-1)/2. □
The optimum values of 7 „ are only known for n < 8 and are
7 i =  1, 72 =  73 =  2, 74 =  4, 7 ! =  8 , 7 $ = y ,  jJ  = 64, 7 $ = 256,
whilst a table for the best known bounds are given in (Conway & Sloane, 1988) for all 
n < 24.
The above analysis has put an upper bound on the size of Ai; we now switch our atten­
tion to calculating a lower bound for Ai. Towards this aim let {61, . . .  , 6„} be a basis 
of (L ,q ), and let us consider some properties of the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation 
procedure. From equation 3.1 we know that ||6*|| < \\bi\\ and that bj • b*j =  ||6*||2. The 
first of these properties shows that
a = n  iifciii <  n w i ,  (3.3)
i=l i=1
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whilst the second property may be used to show that for ri ^  0
|  ^  rjbj =  ^  sjbj J =$■ (ri = Si). (3.4)
\j= i j=i J
If we consider a lattice point with minimal norm, v\ =  xB  =  x 'B *, i.e. ||u i ||2 =  Ai, 
then although the general entries of x' G are real we know, from equation 3.4,
that the last non-zero entry is the same as the last non-zero entry of x , i.e. an integer.
This means that for some 1 < i < n we have
Ai >  K | | 2. (3.5)
We now extend these results in three different ways, which are stated now as Lemmas. 
The last of these appears not to be in the current literature.
Lem m a 3.2.3 Let {6i , . . . , 6n} be a basis for a lattice L, and let {&*,...,6*} be the 
orthogonal vectors achieved from the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure, then 
for any vector v G L we have
v =  aq&i + .. .  -I- OLnbn — Pib* +  . . .  +  (3nbn
where
n
f t  ~  f  ^  *]
j=i+ 1
Proof: Simply take the dot product of v with b*, and rearrange. □
This Lemma shows that although the pi are real numbers; they are not arbitrary, but 
rather integer linear combinations of the /ijj for i +  1 < j  < n. This fact is used in 
Section 3.3.2.
Lem m a 3.2.4 For any given lattice L, and any given basis {&i, . . . ,6n} of L the i th 
successive minima satisfies
Ai > l|£>j||2
for some i < j  < n.
Proof: Let ||ufc||2 =  Afc, we know Xk > \\bj\\2 where bj is the largest non-zero coefficient
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of Vk written as a linear combination of the orthogonal vectors. If we have that j  < i 
for all {vk}i<k<i then this would contradict the linear independence of the {u^}. □
This Lemma is useful when putting upper bounds on the ||6*|| in Section 3.3.1.
Lem m a 3.2.5 For any given lattice L, and any given basis {&i,...,&n} of L the suc­
cessive minima satisfy
*  m u 2
3=1 3=1
for all 1 < k < n, and some unique integers 1 < i j<  n.
Proof: Let {^}i<j<A: be a set of k linearly independent vectors that attain the A j,
i.e. \\Vj |2 _= Aj  for all 1 < j  < k. Further let S  =  {zi. . .  ik) be the set of k largest 
indices i such that the projections of the vectors {vj}i<j<k are linearly independent in 
the space generated by {b*}i^s- Such a set must exists otherwise the vectors {vj}i<j<k 
would be linearly dependent. Let
vi  =  V'j + Y , a i>,iibl
h= 1








(  6*j \
We now examine the sub-lattice L' of L generated by the vectors {vj}i<j<k-> and trans­
form the basis {vj}\<j<k of L' to {wj}i<j<k where
f  W \ \
W2
\ w k J






0 \  (  b ^ \
\  0k,ii 0k,i? • • • 0k,ik /
12
\ bl  7
(3.6)
Such a transformation is possible since the a jtik are all integers (by equation 3.4) and 
thus we can perform integer row operations to leave only one non-zero entry in this 
column, i.e. f3k,ik- Having done this the rightmost entries of the new rows are also all
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integers, since they too correspond to lattice points, and so we can repeat the process 
until we have the triangular matrix above.
From equation 3.6 it is clear that w\ is such that ||u;i|| > ||6* || since /?i)i1 G Z\{0}. 
From the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure we also have that
j - 1
wj = wi ~ Y ,  Vj.W j =  +■■■
h = l
so HiUj || > ||6* || which implies the following
n  A i= n  ii^ii2 ^  A i - = n  k h 2 ^  n  k j 2
j=i j=i j=i j=i
which completes the proof. □
C oro llary  3.2.6 Let <7i , . . . , c rn be the non-decreasing values of {||&*||2}i<*<™ for a 
given basis {&i,. . . ,  bn} of a lattice L. Then the successive minima X{ satisfy
m  m
n  Ai > n  g''
i— 1 z=l
This corollary is useful because one may find lower bounds for n^=i from any basis 
of L. In the next section the concept of a reduced basis is given, but this result holds 
for any basis e.g. the original basis that describes the lattice. This fact is used in 
equation 3.19 to find upper bounds for the sizes of the vectors in a reduced basis.
It should be noted that if one is given a lattice in triangular form (e.g. from the 
Cholesky decomposition) one can read off, from the diagonal entries, values for ||6*|| 
(for this particular basis).
3.3  L attice  basis red u ction
As was explained in Section 3.1 there are many bases of a lattice (L , q) all equivalent via 
an invertible integer matrix H  G GLn(Z). It has been a long-standing mathematical 
problem to say which of these bases should be considered “reduced”.
Naively one may think that a basis should be considered reduced if and only if it is 
comprised of vectors that attain the values for 1 < i < n. However, as this example 
from (Joux, 1993) shows, it is not as simple as this. If one considers the lattice below
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generated by the rows of the matrix on the left, it can be noticed that \  = 2 for all 
1 < i < 5, however there is no way to attain five linearly independent vectors that all 
have size 2, and that span this lattice. The lattice is certainly not equivalent to the one 
generated by the rows of the matrix on the right for example (they even have differing 
determinants).
(  2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 2 0
V i  i  i  i  i  /
( 2 0 0 0 0 \
0 2 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 2 0
\ 0 0 0 0 2 /
The notions of reduction are strongly linked to the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation 
procedure, and so we shall maintain the notation b* for the orthogonal vectors resulting 
from this procedure, and Hij = (bi • b*)/\\bj\\2. It may be helpful to keep the following 
diagram in mind.
h  = b{
b2 =  +&2
63 =  fl3,lb\+ fl3,2b*2 + b*3 (3.7)
64 =  /44.1&1 + AM,2^2 +  +  b\
Perhaps the easiest sense of a reduced basis is that < 1 / 2  for all 1 < j  < i < n, 
and a basis that satisfies this property will be referred to as weakly reduced.
To produce a weakly reduced basis notice that by changing the basis by bi bi — mbj 
this changes in the following way
((bi — mbj) • bn* bi • bi*
W F  =<-------- im f2 — ^  =  i r i f e -  “  m = w j  -  m .
In such a way we can ensure that \^ij\ < 1/2. However by changing bi we may 
have changed all the /ijfcj for k < i, so they must then be modified in the same way. 
Effectively this is simply the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure, but we are 
limiting ourselves to integral changes of base.
Another, far stronger, notion of a reduced basis was introduced by Korkine and Zolotarev
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in (Korkine & Zolotarev, 1873), which is stated below.
D efin ition  3.3.1 A basis {61, . . .  ,bn} of L is said to be KZ-reduced if, were the Gram- 
Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure applied to it, the following conditions would hold.
1• IMijI < 1 /2  for all 1 < j  < i < n  (i.e. it is a weakly reduced basis), and
2. b* is the shortest non-zero vector in the lattice generated by { ^ ( 6^) , . . . ,  7Ti(bn)} 
where ni(bj) is the projection of bj on to the space (Rb\ +  . . .  +  i)1 .
In terms of the Gram-Schmidt algorithm and looking at the set of equations 3.7 this defi­
nition means that b\ — b\ is the shortest vector of the lattice generated by {&i,. . . ,  bn}, 
then, blocking off all the Pi,ib* terms, b% must be the shortest vector in the lattice 
generated by {b^, 1*3 ^ 2  +  63, ^ 4,2^2 +  ^ 4,3^3 + b%,...}, and so on.
One can produce a KZ-reduced basis if one can find a shortest vector of any given 
lattice. To do this, one would firstly find the shortest vector of the lattice generated by 
{61, . . . ,  bn}, and rearrange the basis so that this was 61. Then one would consider the 
lattice generated by {6J5 A^3,2^2 +  A*4,2&2 +  ^ 4,3^3 +  64, •. •}, find the smallest element,
and change the basis so that this corresponded to 62, etc.
The problem with a KZ-reduced basis is that it is too hard to produce. As mentioned 
before finding the shortest vector in a lattice is an NP-complete problem, and thus so 
is the production of an KZ-reduced basis. In the next section we examine a notion of 
reduction which has proved far more computationally useful.
3 .3 .1  T h e  LLL a lg o r ith m
The landmark paper of (Lenstra et al., 1982) gave a definition of an LLL-reduced basis 
of L, and more importantly an effective way of computing one in polynomial time.
D efinition 3.3.2 A basis { b i, . . . ,b n} of L is said to be LLL-reduced if, were the 
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure applied to it, the following conditions would 
hold.
\Vi,j\ < 1/2 V I  < j < i < n ,  (3.8)
||6* +  Mi,i-ii>*-il|2 > (3/4) | | ^ !  ||2. (3.9)
The second condition is known as the Lovasz condition, whilst the first will be referred 
to as the weakly-reduced condition. As explained in (Lenstra et al., 1982) the 3/4
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in the Lovasz condition may actually be replaced with any constant c in the range, 
1/4 < c < 1, though for simplicity we will state all results with respect to c =  3/4.
In Section 3.2 we showed that there exists a positive constant 7n such that in any 
lattice (L, q) with determinant A there is an element x 6  L such that q(x) <  7 nA2/n, 
and that 7 n <  (4/3)(n-1)/2. In the following analysis we will show an alternative proof 
of this statement, with the (slightly weaker) bound of 7 n < 2 n^~1^ 2, but it is shown in 
Section 3.3.1 that not only does such a lattice element exists, but we can actually find 
it in polynomial time.
Im plica tions
Before showing how to produce an LLL-reduced basis we first examine the implications 
of its definition. Let us start by relaxing the LLL weakly reduced condition to
K i - i l  < 1/2 V 2 < i  < n . (3.10)
We call a basis that satisfies conditions 3.10 and 3.9 an effectively LLL-reduced basis. 
This is the only coefficient condition that has an impact on the Lovasz condition, 
and it is unchanged by the algorithm (equivalent to Gram-Schmidt) needed to weakly
reduced the remainder of the basis. For this reason one can transform an effectively
LLL-reduced basis in to a fully LLL-reduced basis very easily, by simply performing 
the weak reduction algorithm.
The effectively LLL-reduced conditions imply that
K - i l l 2 <  2||6*||2, (3.11)
or using this fact repeatedly that ||6* ||2 < 2-7- *||6*||2 for all i < j .  Restricting ourselves 
to i =  1 we have that for all 1 < j  < n,
I N I 2 < 2^ 1 ||6‘ ||2, (3.12)
so from equation 3.5, and assuming the worst case (and unlikely) situation that 6* is 
the smallest orthogonal vector, we have
I N I 2 < 2n_1A1. (3.13)
Thus we have shown that if ever one could satisfy the (effectively) LLL-reduced condi­
tions, the vector 61 would not be “much” larger than a shortest vector of the lattice.
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Again considering equation 3.12 but now taking the product with j  ranging from 1 up 
to n we find
IIMI <  2<"-1>/4A 1/n, (3.14)
which means that, again assuming one could satisfy the (effectively) LLL-reduced con­
ditions, the vector b\ would be proof that 7 „ < 2^ n_1^ 2. However note that we have 
yet to show that the LLL-reduced conditions are actually achievable; this is left to the 
following sub-section.
In a similar way to the formation of equation 3.14, one may use the inequality in
equation 3.11 the other way around to show that
IKII > (3.15)
which is relevant to the discussion in Section 4.2.
Now let us consider the implications of the full LLL-reduced conditions (equations 3.8
and 3.9) These, together with equation 3.1, allow us to show
IN I2 < l ^ f H N I 2 <  ^ I N I 2, (3.16)
and so
A < n ”=ilM I < 2"<n- 1>/4A, (3.17)
and then making use of Lemma 3.2.4 for the right hand inequality one can prove
21-'A j <  ||6*||2 <  INI2 <  2 " - 1Ai . (3.18)
Equation 3.18 shows that the vector bi of an LLL-reduced basis is relatively close to 
attaining Ai.
In a similar way to the formation of equation 3.14, we may put the following upper 
bound on the ||6j|| for i>  1 .
i|7 i| < 2n(n—1)/(4(n+1—0 ) [ _________—_______
1,111 -  V2 (i- i)(i- 2)/2 n j - 1iii&-
(
< 2n(n_1)/(4(n+ i- i ))
V(nr=\ 1/2
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l / ( n - t - l —i)
< 2 n ( n - l ) / ( 4 ( n + l - t ) ) (3.19)
where g\ < cr2 < ... <  are the smallest || • ||2 of the orthogonal vectors w.r.t. 
any basis of the lattice L (using Lemma 3.2.5). Normally one would be given L w.r.t. 
some basis, and this result would be used with this basis in mind (and if the basis were 
triangular then the Gi are just the squares of the smallest diagonal entries). This result 
is an extension of one found in (Jutla, 1998), and is made use of in Section 4.7.
It should be mentioned that all the bounds achieved above are only the best that can 
be proven theoretically; in practice far better bounds are often achieved. For instance 
if one was actually given an LLL-reduced lattice one could work out from the smallest 
b* how much smaller the smallest vector could be (for instance if b\ were the smallest 
then b\ would actually attain Ai).
We now give a brief summation of these reduction criteria.
The LLL reduction conditions
i-1 i-1
Figure 3.3.3 This diagram represents the real 
plane which is spanned by the projections of b{-\ 
and bi on to the space (K&i + . . .  + R6i_2)'L. It is 
scaled to the size of 1 : proj(&i_i), but the pro­
jections (proj) will be just assumed from now on,
i.e. in the diagram and text below. The radius 
of the circle is \/3/2. For the vector bi to satisfy 
the (full or effective) LLL conditions it must lie 
in the shaded area (which tends to infinity above 
and below).
The full LLL conditions ensure that the vectors 
bi are fairly orthogonal, i.e. they are fairly close 
to the 6*, and thus the product of their sizes 
approximates the determinant of the lattice.
The effective LLL conditions simply mean that 
the b* are not decreasing in size very much, so 
that b{ = &i is relatively small (and 6* is rela­
tively large) w.r.t. the determinant of the lattice.
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T he reduction  algorithm
To show that there is an effective algorithm to find an LLL-reduced basis we will firstly 
show that for a lattice (L, q) with basis {61, . . . ,  6n}, then the following quantity is lower 
bounded by a bound dependent only on the lattice itself (not on the particular choice 
of basis).
d  = (ii6;ii2) n (iif’2ii2) n' 1 - - - ( ||6" - i ||2) 2 ( ||6"ii2)
To see this consider the lattices Li generated by {61, &21 • ■ • > &»} with determinants A i 
and first minima Ai^ for 1 < i < n. Then, by Lemma 3.2.2 for each i we have that
A? =  r i  IIM2 > ( A y l V  >
3= 1
so writing Ai)Tl just as Ai, and noticing D = ]lfc=i A? implies
D > (A,)’* * 1) '2 ^ )  1
which is only dependent on the lattice itself (not any basis of it).
As shown above we can ensure that the basis is weakly reduced very easily, so the only 
problem in ensuring that the LLL-reduced conditions hold is ensuring that the Lovasz 
condition (equation 3.9) holds for all 2 < i < n. Let us assume that it does not hold 
between b*_x and bj, i.e. b* is somewhere inside the circle and the lines of Figure 3.3.3.
In this situation we would change the lattice basis by swapping b j-1 and bj. If we were 
to apply the Gram-Schmidt algorithm to this new basis only the vectors b*j_x and bj 
would change, since all the other vectors b* would still satisfy the orthogonality and 
spanning properties of the Gram-Schmidt algorithm. Let us call the new vectors dj_i 
and dj.
Firstly let us note that HdjLiHHdjH must equal ||^ _ i || | |^ || since the determinant of the 
lattice (the product of the sizes of the orthogonal vectors) is invariant.
Visually we can show this swap by the following diagram, which like Figure 3.3.3 is 
supposed to represent the projections of the relevant vectors in the space (R&i +  . . .  +  
R ii-2)-1-.
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Figure 3.3.4 The effect of swapping adjacent vectors
= t>:j-1
If we let D' denote the new value of D then
, \  n + 2 —j
D' = ( i K - J 2) ( ikii2)
n + l —j
( l6i- ill2) J (ll<^ll2) " +1_i 




We are now in a position to give a polynomial time algorithm to reduce the basis b{: We 
could weakly reduce the basis, find the lowest i  for which the Lovasz condition is not 
satisfied, swap them, and then repeat this whole process. We could not do this forever 
since each time we swap, then quantity D falls by 3/4 and it is lower bounded, thus 
the algorithm must terminate. Having said this the following flow chart demonstrates 
a far more efficient algorithm.
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Change basis to ensure 
Hi i-1 <  1/2
All the vectors have been examined?
Swapbj.j and bj so change II b* 
II b *_j It  ^and relevant |Xj j
Perform the Gram-Schmidt algorithm, store 
the values of jxj j and lib* ll^for l < j < i < n
Notice that the Lovasz condition is equivalent to
I l l ’ l l 2 >  ( |  -
so can be computed just from the ||6* ||2 and In fact notice that we only store the
||b* ||2 and the fiij, and not any of the vectors bt or b*. Of course if one wants to have 
a matrix representation for the reduced basis one can store and update the vectors bi 
throughout the algorithm. Alternatively one might want to have a representation of 
the reduced basis in terms of the original basis, in which case one can store and update 
a matrix H  € GLn(Z) throughout the algorithm.
It can be seen, from looking at Figure 3.3.4, that the necessary changes to ||&j_i||2* | |^ | |2, 
and P jj- i  when bj-i and bj are swapped are
H * - i l l 2 =  l l ^ f + ^ V i l l V i l l 2 .,  
, , - n l  =  l | f t ; - l l | 2| | f t j H 2
1 1 , 1 1  K * — 1 II2  ’
_  i i^ - d i2' 1" -1 ’
where, as above, Hdjf-ill2, denote the new values of ||6J_i||2, ||6J ||2 and
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H jj-1  respectively.
The remaining /Li’s that need to be changed are Hj,k for 1 < k < j  — 2 and
^ k ,j-1? Alk,i for j  +  1 < k < n. The and Hjtk simply need to be swapped for
1 < k < j  — 2. The latter adjustments are slightly more complicated, but again by 
considering Figure 3.3.4 (picking an arbitrary point for the projection of bk in to this 
space, and considering similar triangles) one can show:
Vkj ~  ^k,j—1 — LLj,j—l(J'k,ji
Vk,j-1  ~  Mfc j  +  V jj-iV k ji
for j  +  1 < k < n.
This algorithm will be referred to as the LLL algorithm for lattice reduction. It is 
slightly different from the versions given in (Lenstra et al, 1982) and (Cohen, 1991) 
because the weak reduction is done in one block at the end, rather than throughout the 
algorithm, which seems slightly more efficient, although there may be some coefficient 
explosion with the m j  when j  ^  i — 1 (the effect of this has not be analysed, but for 
simplicity of exposition the above algorithm is preferred).
When it is applied to an integer basis bi G Zn, 1 < i < n, it can be shown (see (Lenstra 
et al, 1982)) to have complexity 0 (n 6 log3 R) where n  is the dimension of the basis, 
and R  = maxi<i<n{||&i||2}. This complexity however, is typically quite pessimistic, 
and faster times axe often achieved in practice. If the entries of the basis are rational, 
then one can clear denominators before applying the LLL algorithm.
3.3 .2  E xten sion s
When the LLL algorithm is applied to a basis with integral entries, one can ensure, 
at little expense, that all calculations are done with integers (see for example (Co­
hen, 1991)). However it is almost always preferable to use LLL with floating point 
approximations; see (Schnorr, 1988).
A problem with the LLL algorithm, is because the counter i works its way up from 2 to 
n, the algorithm is sensitive to the order of the initial basis. To combat this problem it 
was suggested in (Schnorr Sz Euchner, 1991) that one use “deep insertions”, effectively 
scanning ahead (past bi) to see which vectors will cancel “nicely” with bi-1.
Although the LLL algorithm frequently finds a shortest element of a lattice (indeed it 
must if the next shortest linearly independent vector is more than 2^n ~ 1^ 4 times larger) 
it is not immediately clear how to prove that this is the shortest vector, or find the
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shortest vector if it is not. An answer to this problem was given in (Kannan, 1983), 
and is sketched below.
For v =  a\b\ +  . . .  anbn = P\b\ +  . . .  +  PnKi ^e the smallest vector we must have 
that it is not larger that &i, i.e.
this is true from Lemma 3.2.3, which shows that (3n-1  =  otn-1  -F /in,n-i«n, and thus 
Q'n-i is an integer in the range - 2(n~ 2) /2 -  /in,n-i«n • • • 2 n^ -2 /^2 -  finiTl- i a n. Working 
backwards like this one can find, in the worst case, the smallest vector of a lattice after 
a linear search of 2(n -1 )(n~ 2) /4+1 values for the /Vs.
Another interesting extension of the LLL algorithm was given in (Schnorr, 1987) which 
mixes the ideas of LLL-reduction, and KZ-reduction, and the above idea of Kannan. 
The resulting (hierarchy of) algorithms are named blockwise Korkine-Zolotarev algo­
rithms, because of the introduction of the concept of reduced “blocks” of vectors. 
Schnorr improves on the efficiency of finding shorter vectors in the lattice.
3.4  T h e dual la ttice  and LLL
The dual (or polar) lattice, as given in (Cassels, 1971), is defined as the following.
D efinition 3.4.1 I f  {&i,... ,bn} is a basis for a lattice L, then there do exist vectors 
{di , . . . ,  dn} such that
PlWKf < N l 2 <  I N I 2 <  2 ’* - 1 I K | | 2
so pn £ Z is in the range —2^ n ^ /2 . . .  2^ n 1^ /2, and we know that an =  pn.
We can continue this idea and show that \pn- i\  < 2(n_2)/2, but pn~i is not typically an 
integer so it is not immediately obvious that this limits Pn- \  to a finite search, however
1 i f i  = j ,
0 otherwise.
(3.20)
The lattice which is spanned by the basis {di , . ..  ,dn} is called the dual lattice of L.
In terms of matrices, if the rows of B  form a basis for a lattice L, then the rows of 
(JE?-1 )* form a basis (the dual basis) for the dual lattice of L, In (Cassels, 1971) the 
notation L* and B* are used for the dual lattice and basis respectively, however to 
avoid confusion with the Gram-Schmidt procedure we shall adopt the notation L~l
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and B 1 for these concepts. Notice B 1 =  (B  1)t =  (B l) 1. We now give a theorem 
linking the dual lattice and the LLL algorithm which is made use of in Section 4.4.
T heorem  3.4.2 Let the rows of an (n) x (n) matrix A  form a basis for a lattice L, 
and let B  be an effectively LLL reduced basis for this lattice. Further let A~l denote 
the inverse transpose of A, i.e. A~l — (A- 1 )4 =  (A*)-1 , and A r denote the matrix A  
with the rows reversed. Then the rows of the matrix
D = (£ "* )r (3-21)
form an effectively LLL reduced basis for the dual lattice L 1 generated by the rows of 
A- t .
Moreover, if {b \,. . .  ,bn} and {d \,. . .  ,dn} denote the rows of B  and D respectively, 
then the following relationships hold for all 1 < i < n;
bi =  <3-22)
II n + l —i  I
and
h  ’ K - i  _  d n + 2 - i  • d * + 1 _ j  .
W - ill2 K + i - J 2 '
P roof: To show the rows of D are a basis for L~l at all, let B = H A  where
H  E GLn(Z)\ thus
D = (cHA]r 4) r 
=  ( tf^ A -* )7-
= (h - 'Y  A-*,
and (H  f)r E GLn(Z ) as required.
From the definition of the dual lattice we have
1 if i + j  = n +  1 , 
* dj — \ (
0 otherwise.
By induction on j  we have b{ • d*j = 0  for all j  < n — i, and bi • dn+i-i = 1 . Further, 
since 6i =  6* =  E « i X  with a i,< =  ( &i ' di)/\\di II2  t h i s  S i v e s  b i  =  d n / \ \ d n \ \ 2 -
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Now we assume b* =  rf*+1_i/||rf*+1_ i ||2 and induct on i. Thus we write b*+ 1  = 
52a i+ ijdj where
If j  < n — i then both terms on the right hand side are 0, so cti+ij =  0. If j  = n — i 
then bi+i • dj = 1 and the terms in the sum axe 0, so i =  l/ ||^ n -i ||2- Finally
if j  > n — i then dj = ||dj|||6J+1_J- by the inductive hypothesis (since (n +  1 — j)  < i) 
which implies ai+ ij = 0. Thus only ai+iiU-i  is non-zero, and so equation 3.22 is true.
With this result we have
I l l ' l l  a i + l , j
k = 1
d n + 2 - i  ’
=  < + 2 - i ' K
which shows equation 3.23 is valid, and hence equation 3.10 holds for the basis D  of 
Z/, assuming B  is itself effectively LLL reduced.
Finally to show equation 3.9 also holds for the basis D of V  when B  is effectively LLL 




Let the rows of a matrix C form a basis for a lattice I / , and suppose that a vector 
d* is required such that ||d*|| > 2_ (n_1) /4 IdetCI1^  for some basis D of L  with rows 
{c?i,. . . ,  dn} (i.e. condition 3.15 is required). Clearly the LLL algorithm could find such 
a d* by reducing the matrix C\ the following corollary implies an alternative method.
C oro llary  3.4.3 Let the rows of a matrix C form a basis for a lattice V . A vector 
d* such that ||d*|| > 2- (n_1)/4| det C\lfn for some basis D of L' can be found by LLL 
reducing the matrix C~l .
Proof: Let A  =  C~l, and apply the LLL to this to form the matrix B. From
theorem 3.4.2 we know that D = (B“*)r is an effectively LLL reduced basis for C 
(where d* =  &i/||&i||2), so ||d; | | 2 > 2-(n" 1)/4|d e tC\l!n. □
If, as in the method in section 4.2, it is not explicitly the vector d* that is required but 
a coefficient 7  such that ||vC|| > |7 | 2 - (n -1)/4d(L)1/n, then the following corollary is 
more useful.
C orollary  3.4.4 Given a basis C of a lattice L ’ and a vector v E Z n, one can find a 
constant 7  E Z  such that
||wC|| > |7 | 2 - (n- 1)/4d(L')1/n> (3-24)
by LLL reducing the matrix C~l.
Proof: As the theory in section 4.2 shows, the normal way to find such a 7  is to form 
an LLL reduced basis D from the initial basis C , and then 7  =  (u(jy'/)-1 )n will satisfy 
equation 3.24, where D = H'C.
Instead if we LLL reduce A  =  C~l to form a basis B, where B  — H A, and H  has rows 
{ h i , . . .  hn}, then
M  = \\vA-*\\
= Wv&B-'W
= IKfff  (s_t)1’
where (H t)c is H l with its columns reversed, and we know D = (B- t )r is an effectively 
LLL-reduced basis for V . Thus
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where 7  =  (t;(^/’t)c)n =  v • h\. □
This theory suggests that if the LLL algorithm is being used for “something to do with” 
a large vector d*, it may be better to consider the dual lattice and search for a small 
vector b\. The advantage of this is that the LLL algorithm (since it works its way up 
through the vectors) can have an “early exit” when it has found a small enough 61, 
rather than reducing the whole basis to find a large d*.
3.5 U n ita ry  la ttices  and LLL
In this section we show how to extend the use of the LLL algorithm (see (Lenstra 
et al., 1982)) from lattices to any free (/-module of finite rank (with associated positive 
definite unitary quadratic form), where Q denotes the Gaussian integers. We call such 
a structure a unitary lattice3, and the extension is analogous to that from an E-inner 
product space to a C-inner product space in linear algebra.
This work was done completely independently by the author in connection with the 
work in Section 5.3. It has since come to the authors attention that prior work was 
done in this area in (Fieker & Pohst, 1996), and consequently in (Schiemann, 1998). 
This work is discussed in Section 3.6.
In the following theory the symbol Q will be used to denote the Gaussian integers 
{a +  ib | a, b E Z}. We now state the definitions and results needed to consider the 
formation and basis reduction of unitary lattices. The exposition follows very closely 
that given in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
D efinition 3.5.1 Let V  be a C-vector space. A mapping q : V  —> E is called a unitary 
quadratic form if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. For every A E C and x E V  we have
q{ Xx) =  |A|2 q(x).
2. I f we set b(x,y) = J (q(x +  y) — q(x — y) +  iq(x +  iy) — iq(x — iy )) then b is a 
bilinear form satisfying b(Xx,y) =  A b{x,y) for all X EC  and x ,y  E V .
Note this definition implies b(x,x) = q(x) E E and b(x,Xy) =  Ab(x,y). The unitary 
quadratic form is called positive definite if for all non-zero x E V  we have q(x) > 0.
3We define the concept of a unitary lattice to better fit in with standard linear algebra, however it 
is acknowledged that unitary lattices can be restated in terms of (higher dimensional) real lattices.
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D efinition  3.5.2 A unitary lattice K  is defined to be a free Q-module of finite rank 
together with a positive definite unitary quadratic form q on K  ® C.
With the unitary quadratic form defined as above, we call the bilinear form b a dot 
product and denote it by x - y  = £"=i xfyi for x — (aq,. . . ,  x n), y = { y i , . . . ,y n) € K . 
It is a relatively easy exercise in linear algebra (see, for instance (Stoll Sz Wong, 1968)) 
to show that, given a basis {61, . . .  , 6n} of Cn, the Gram-Schmidt procedure, which is 
again defined iteratively by
i_1 b{ • b*
K =  Vi,3 bj where L,
j = 1 i ' J
still produces an orthogonal basis {6| , . . . ,  6* } such that
1. span {&*,..., b*} =  span {61, . . . ,  bi} for all i < n ,
2. if Ak  is the determinant of the unitary lattice K  then
a k  =  n  i*« 1 •
i=i
In a similar way to Lemma 3.1.5 when given a basis of a unitary lattice we can represent 
certain concepts by vectors and matrices.
Lem m a 3.5.3 Given a basis (6i)i<i<n of a unitary lattice (K ,q ), where b denotes the 
symmetric bilinear form associated to q, then
1 . An element x  G L may be represented by a (row) vector X  G Vn(Q) where x = 
Y^Xibi. The vector X  is often referred to as the coordinate vector of x with 
respect to the basis (6i)i<{<n-
2 . An alternative basis (&i)i<i<n may ho represented by an integer matrix H  G 
GLn(Q) whose rows are the coordinate vectors of the b\ in terms of the bi. It 
follows that the determinant of this matrix must be ±1 (i.e. H  G GLn{Q)) if and 
only if (&i)i<i<n *5 indeed a basis for (K ,q ).
3. It is relatively easily checked that the properties of the quadratic form imply
q{x) — ^ ' QijEiXj,
1 <i,j<n
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where qij = b(b{,bj). This means the quadratic form may be represented by 
the complex positive definite symmetric matrix Q =  {qitj)i<ij<n, and that the 
associated bilinear form satisfies
b(x,y) =  Y Q X \
where X  andY  are the (integer) coordinate vectors o fx  andy respectively. Notice
that this means q{x) = b(x,x) = X Q X t .
D efinition 3.5.4 We say that two unitary lattices {K,q) and (K \q ')  are equivalent 
if there is a Q-module isomorphism between K  and K ' sending q to q'.
Considered as {/-modules K  and K ' will be isomorphic if and only if a basis of K  maps 
via an invertible integer matrix (i.e. H  G GLn(Q)) to a basis of K ' . For this to map 
q on to q' means that Q' = H Q H 1 by Lemma 3.1.5(3). The matrix Q thus gives a 
representation of a unitary lattice that is unique modulo the equivalence relation ~  
where Q ~  Q' if and only if Q' = H Q H 1 for some H  G GLn(Q).
As in definition 3.1.7 we prefer to define a unitary lattice as a subset of Cn.
D efinition  3.5.5 For a given basis {b\ , . . . ,  bn} ofC™ which form the rows of a (n) x (m) 
matrix B , a unitary lattice K  is defined to be the set of points
K  = {y =  xB  | x G Qm] ,
together with an associated Euclidean quadratic form yiyi-
In a similar way to real lattices we have that the representation of a lattice by the matrix 
B  is only unique up to left multiplication by H  G GLn(Q) and right multiplication by 
a complex orthonormal matrix N . The invariant determinant of the lattice is thus 
defined as
&(K,q) = I det(£)| =  Idet(Q)!1/2.
The concept of the successive minima Ai of || • ||2 still holds for unitary lattices. For 
instance the analogue of Lemma 3.2.4, i.e. Ai > bj for some i < j  < n still holds for 
unitary lattices.
The notion of an LLL-reduced basis also extends easily to unitary lattices.
D efin ition  3.5.6 A basis {b \,. . .  ,bn} of K  is said to be LLL-reduced if, were the 
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure were applied to it, the following conditions
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would hold.
\Hij\ < l/y/2  V 1 <  j  < i < n, (3.25)
l|6? +  Mi,i-i6.*-ill2 >  (3/4)116?.! ||2. (3.26)
To understand the change in the weakly reduced condition, notice that if
b i ' K
m
then by performing the change of unitary base hi bi — ([a] + i [ 6])6j we can transform 
, (6i - ( H + j | 6D6. ,)-6;
H i  =  p i j j j   =  -  ( L ° l  +  n & D -
This means we can only ensure that \nij\ < v/TV2p_^ F^T/2)^ =  l/\ /2 .
As before one can relax the weakly reduced condition to just considering j  — i — 1 and
together with the Lovasz condition this implies ||6*_x||2 < 4||6*||. It is then simple to
prove
I N I 2  < 4n_1Ai, and (3.27)
I N I  < 2 n^_1^ 2A 1/n. (3.28)
The full LLL conditions allow one to show ||&i||2 < 4l_1 ||6*||2 and hence
A  <  m = i  I N I  < 2 n^_1^ 2A, (3.29)
and
4 '-* ^  < ||6*||2 <  Hftill2 <  2’- 1A1. (3.30)
The LLL algorithm follows similarly, and is shown below for completeness sake.
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Change basis to ensure
k i - i l <
Swapbj.j and bj so change II b* 
II b *_ j II  ^and relevant |ij j All the vectors have been examined?
Perform the unitary Gram-Schmidt algorithm
The complexity of this algorithm is again 0 ( n 6 log3 R ) where n  is the dimension of the 
basis, and R = maxi<i<n{||&i||2}, since we have a similar quantity D to the real lattice 
case, which is lower bounded, and is again multiplied by a factor of at most 3/4 each 
time two vectors that fail the Lovasz condition axe swapped.
3 .6  F u r t h e r  e x t e n s io n s  o f  L L L
One can extend the ideas of Section 3.5, and make LLL work over other algebraic 
structures. For instance it is relatively easy to extend the approach to allow LLL to 
reduce over Z [ o ; ]  ~  {a +  a b  | a, b G Z }  where a  is a degree two algebraic integer, 
satisfying a 2 -1- r a  -f- s  =  0 and 4s — r 2 > 0. In this case we can define a positive definite 
norm function N ( a  T a b )  =  a2 +  s b 2 — r a b  and if we also define a  +  a b  =  ( a  — r b )  — b a ,  
then it is left to the reader to verify that the methods of Section 3.5 still hold.
Recently work has been done on extending LLL to work over higher degree algebraic 
number fields. The started with (Fieker & Pohst, 1996), and more recently has been 
approached in (Schiemann, 1998). This is an enormous and complicated field of ex­
pertise, beyond the scope of this thesis. We refer the interested reader to the above 
references. However we note that there are complications in determining the complex­
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ity of an analogue of the LLL algorithm when working over these higher dimensional 
algebraic number fields.
Yet another approach to dealing with algebraic integers is to place them within a 
(standard) integral lattice framework. This has been done in Section 4.7 to help find 
small solutions to “modular” algebraic integer equation. The benefit of this approach 
is that the integral LLL algorithm is well understood, and thus the complexity of the 
method can be well approximated.
67
Chapter 4
Finding small roots of modular 
equations
Let p(x) be a univariate modular polynomial of degree k\
p(x) =  x k +  ak~\xk~l +  . . .  +  cl\ x  + clq (mod N ). (4.1)
It is assumed that p(x) is monic and irreducible, and that N  is not prime, but hard to 
factor1. The following theorem was proved in (Coppersmith, 1996b).
T heorem  4.0.1 Ifp{x) is a univariate polynomial of degree k, then for any modulus N  
all the solutions p ( x q ) = 0 (mod N) with |xo| < N ^/k may be found in time polynomial 
in log N  and k.
In this chapter we describe another computational method for the proof of this theorem 
i.e. how to find all the small integral roots, xq E Z, of equation 4.1, and show the 
relationship between the approach taken here, and that taken in (Coppersmith, 1996b). 
It will be proved, via the general result on dual lattices developed in Section 3.4 that 
these two algorithms axe in fact equivalent, though the present approach is preferred for 
mathematical simplicity (and therefore ease of implementation), and also, very slightly, 
for efficiency reasons.
It has been shown in (Coppersmith, 1996b), and (Coppersmith et al., 1996), that 
finding small solutions to equation 4.1 can lead to various attacks on the RSA crypto­
graphic scheme when using a small encrypting exponent. These attacks are outlined
1 These assumptions axe only to prevent there being easier ways to attack the problem. Only the 
fact that p(x)  is monic is important in what follows.
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in Section 4.8. However we start in sections 4.1 and 4.2 by giving expositions of the 
algorithms in question, together with proofs of their validity. Examples of both algo­
rithms are then shown in section 4.3, together with a pictorial explanation of the new 
method.
In Section 4.4 we show that it is indeed the theory of Section 3.4 that links the two 
methods. Section 4.5 then gives two slight practical improvements to the basic algo­
rithm.
Implementation considerations are discussed in Section 4.6, with timings results given 
for a C implementation written by the author, using Gnu MP for a multi-precision integer 
package. Reference is also given to more extensive results recently achieved.
In Section 4.7 we extend the basic idea of Section 4.1 to finding small roots of algebraic 
modular equations.
As mentioned above, in Section 4.8 we conclude by examining the applications of this 
work to cryptography. This section contains a novel result in which we show that there 
are provably weak places to hide information even when splitting this between many 
blocks.
4.1  T h e m eth o d
In this section we give an exposition of a new method for finding the small roots 
of a (monic) univariate modular equation p(x)  =  0 (mod N).  The work has been 
published in (Howgrave-Graham, 1997).
Observe that for any polynomial r(x), and natural number X , we have the following 
upper bound on the absolute size of r(x) in the region |r | < X .
|r(®)| <  \xk\ +  \ak -\xk~l \ +  . . .  -I- |a ix | +  |a0|
< (X^l -f- |^ +  . . .  +  |a iX | ~t“ |uo| for all |r | < X .
For some integer h > 2, and natural number X  we define a lower triangular (hk) x  (hk) 
matrix M  = (rriij). The entry rriij is given by e ^ X 7-1, where e^j is the coefficient of 
a;-7-1 in the expression
quA*) = (4.2)
with v = [(i — 1)/A:J, and u = (i — 1) -  kv . Notice that qu,v{x o) =  0 (mod N h~l ) for
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all u, v > 0 . All other entries of the matrix are zero, and so this matrix has determinant
detM  =  x hk<<hk~ 1^ 2 . (4 .3 )
Let B  be an LLL-reduced basis of the rows of M,  and denote the first (small) row
vector of B  by 61. Equation 3.14 implies that
II&1 II2 <  2^hk~ 1^ 4 X ^ hk~ 1^ 2 N ^ h ~ 1^ 2 . (4.4)





J —  (
'/hk V
y/hk \








+ 5 3  ^ m *,2 
i= i
+  . . + y   ^^hk^ifhk
4 =  1
+
hk \






ZiA: /  hk \ /  hk \
’W  =  5 3  +  ( 5 1 ^ 2 ) x  +  . . .  +  I 5 3 Cfc/fcei^ jfc) x hk~l
i=l \i=l /  \i=l /
ZiA: /ifc AiA;
=  <4 5 3 ei j x3~l +  c2 5 3  e2,j£J-1 +  • • ■ +  c/»fc 5 3
j=i j=i i= i
(4.6)
So H&ill is “almost” an upper bound for the polynomial r(x) in the entire range |x| < X.  
Notice also that r(x0) =  0 (mod iV*1-1) since each sum is zero modulo jV*1-1.
Combining equations 4.4 and 4.5 means that, from making the matrix M  with a natural 
number X , we can form a polynomial r(x) that satisfies r(xo) =  0 (mod N /l_1) and
|r(x)| < ( d hk- lV4 \ fhk) x {hk- 1)/2 M h ~ 1 ) /2  for all \x\ < X .
Thus choosing
X  =  |’(2~1/2(/iA:)_1/(,lA:~1))iV ^~ 1)/ (,lA:_1)] - 1  (4.7)
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means that we can form a polynomial r(x) such that r(a;o) =  0 (mod N h x) and
|r(rc)| < N *1 - 1  for all |a;| < X.
This implies that r{xo) =  0 over the integers as well, for any xq such that |zo| < X, 
and p(xo) = 0 (mod N).  Solving this univariate equation over the integers can be 
done in polynomial time (for instance by Hensel lifting the linear factors, or by finding 
small factors of the trailing coefficient), and then one can test each solution to see if it 
satisfies p(xo) =  0 (mod N).  Notice that the bound X  —» 2~ll2 N llk as h —» oo.
The polynomial r(x) can be formed from equation 4.6 or the coefficients may be ob­
tained by dividing the entries of the vector b\ by appropriate powers of X.
This kind of reasoning has appeared before in (Hastad, 1988).
4.2 A  review  o f C o p p ersm ith ’s m eth o d
Below we outline the approach given in (Coppersmith, 1996b) for finding small roots 
of univariate modular equations. One firstly chooses a natural number X, and forms 




• D = ( )  is an (hk x hk) diagonal matrix with entries d^i =  X 1-1,
• A = (a,ij) is an (hk x (h — l)k) matrix, where the entry a^j is the coefficient of x l 
in the expression x u((jp(x))v, with v =  [ (k+ j  — 1)/&J, and u =  (j — 1) — k(v — 1).
• D' = (d[ j) is an ((h — l)k x (h — l)k) diagonal matrix with entries d^  =  N v 
where v = [(k + i — l) /k \ .
This has determinant
det(M) =  N*ik(h-i)/2x -hk(hk-i)/2 '
Since there is a triangular sub-matrix of A  with l ’s on the diagonal it is possible to 




H \  £ G L n ( h)), to
M  =  H iM  =
This means that the absolute value of the determinant of both M  and M  are the same 
as that given by equation 4.8. We then reduce M  using lattice basis reduction to give a 
matrix B = H 2M.  Let B* (with row vectors b*) denote this basis after Gram-Schmidt 
orthogonalisation. We know from equation 3.15 that
ll^fcll ^  2 ~(hk~iy 4 N^h~1^ 2 X~^hk~1^ 2. (4.9)
Assume that p(x0) =  0 (mod N ) and let yo =  p(xo)/N  £ Z. Define the following 
vector of length (2hk — k),
co =  1 , - y o , - y Qx0, . . .  , - y 0XQ \  - y g , . . . ,  - y j  * 4  . (4.10)
Further, when given a vector v of length (2hk — k) that has 0’s for the last (h — 1 )k 
entries, then denote by [i/]sh the vector “shortened” to one of length (hk).
Assuming that |rro| < the above implies
Vhk > | | ( l , x 0 / X , . . .  (®0 / -X' ) fc* ~ 1, 0 1. . .  , o ) |
=  \\coM\\
= Hcoiff'MH
=  ||[coLff 1]shAf|| since (c o # f1)i =  0 for i > hk
= \\[c0 H ^ ] shH ^ B \ \
= \\c'B\\ where d — [ c q H i ^ H ^ 1
= \\d'B*\\ for some d' £ R hk
> K A W
= \\chkbhk\\ since d’hk =  dhk G Z
=  Kk\  WbhW
> | dhk\2~^hk~iy)//kN^h~1)/2 X~^hk~1)/2, (4.11)
which means, since dhk £ Z, that dhk =  0 for any
X  < (2_1/2(hA:)-1/('lA:-1)) (4.12)
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If instead of cq we consider the variable vector
c(x) = ( l, x , . . . ,  x hk~ \  - p(x ) /N , - xp(x) /N , . . . ,  - x k~lp{x)/N,
~{p{x)/N)2, - x (p {x ) /N )2, . . . ,  - x k~l {p{x)IN)h~ , (4.13)
which satisfies c(xo) =  Co, then c'hk(x) is a univariate polynomial given by
c'hk(x) =  [ c ^ f f f 1]* • (4.14)
This has integer coefficients after multiplying through by and with X  chosen as
large as possible (from equation 4.12), this polynomial must satisfy c'hk{xo) =  0 for any 
\ x* \< X .
The polynomial c'hk(x) is not identically zero since it is the sum of integer multiples of 
polynomials of different degrees, and not all the multiples can be zero; otherwise H 2 
would have zero determinant.
4 .3  E xam p les
We examine the approach used by both methods to solve the equation p(x) = x 2 +  
l^x  +  19 =  0 (mod 35) with h =  3 (thus X  =  2). Actually this polynomial has a 
solution xq =  3, but as we will see the methods still find it even though xq > X .  It is
often the case that the theoretical X  given in the previous two sections is a little too
low.
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4.3.1 C oppersm ith’s m ethod




0 19 0 361 0
14 19 532 361
2-2 1 14 234 532
2"3 1 28 234










0 -1 9  x 2~2 266 x 2-3 -3363 x 2~ 4 42028 x 2-5
2-1 -1 4  x 2~2 177 x 2-3 -2212 x 2 ~ 4 27605 x 2-5
-35  x 2-2 490 x 2-3 -5530 x 2~ 4 58800 x 2-5 0
-35  x 2-3 980 x 2~ 4 -19250 x 2-5
0 -1225 x 2~ 4 34300 x 2-5 
-1225 x 2~ 5
2~2 -14  x 2-3 158 x 2~ 4 -1680 x 2-5 1
2-3 -28  x 2 ~ 4 550 x 2-5 1
0 2 ~ 4 -28  x 2 ~ 5 
2 ~ 5 1 7
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where M  =  H i M ,  and
0 -19 266 -3363 42048
1 -1 4 177 -2212 27605




1 -14 158 -1680
1 -28 550
1 -28
We then examine (after clearing denominators and swapping the rows and columns), 
the (6) x (6) sub-matrix below.
/ -1225 0 \
34300 -1225 x 2
-19250 980 x 2 -35  x 22
58800 -5530 x 2 490 x 22 -35  x 23
27605 -2212 x 2 177 x 22 -14  x 23 24
V 42048 -3363 x 2 266 x 22 -19  x 23 0 25 )
This is LLL reduced to
100 0 15 x 22 0 -1 0  x 24 0
-51 36 x 2 20 x 22 -11 x 23 - 4  x 24 - 2  x 25
108 -45  x 2 33 x 22 2 x 23 6 x 24 1 x 25
16 -9 0  x 2 1 x 22 4 x 23 - 3  x 24 2 x 25
13 -58  x 2 —4 x 22 6 x 23 5 x 24 - 4  x 25
154 -43  x 2 -28 x 22 -25  x 23 7 x 24 - 2  x 25
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where B 2 =  H 2 M ,  and
f 0 4 5 4 0i-H1 0 >
3 4 6 3 - 4 - 2
1 00 - 4 - 5 - 3 6 1
1 0 0 0 - 3 2
1 to -2 -5 0 5 - 4
V 15 3 7 - 1 7 - 2
Now
19 0 361 0 >
14 19 532 361







 ^ 1 1225 )
so [c(x)Hi1]sh has (as is typical) the following form
/  —{x2 +  14a; +  19) — x(x 2 +  14x +  19) — (x2 +  14a; 4 -19)2 — x(x 2 +  14x +  19)2
\  ,X’ 35 ’ 35 7 1225 ’ 1225
and
f - 5 4 - 2 1 -1 - 2
138 -109 56 -18 31 57
-7 7 60 -32 8 -1 8 -32
231 -171 104 - 7 59 98
109 -82 48 -6 27 46
166 -125 73 -9 41 70 )
Thus taking the dot product of [c(x)H1 1]sh with the last column of H 2 1 (and then 
multiplying by 1225) gives the polynomial
r{x) =  2x5 — x 4 — 8 x 3 — 24a;2 +  8 x  +  3,
which evaluates to zero over the integers at the root of (p(x) (mod 35)), xq = 3.
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4.3.2 The alternative m ethod
The approach given in Section 4.1 would immediately form the (6) x (6) matrix below.
(  1225
Mi =
0 1225 X: 2
665 490 X 2 35 X 22
0 665 X 2 490 X 22 35 x 23
361 532 X 2 234 X 22 28 x 23
0 361 X 2 532 X 22 234 x 23
\
25
This is then LLL reduced to
Bi =
/ 3 8 x 2 -2 4  x 22 - 8  x 23 - 1  x 24
49 50 x 2 0 20 x 23 0
115 -8 3  x 2 4 x 22 13 x 23 6 x 24
61 16 x 2 37 x 22 --16 x 23 3 x 24
21 - 3 7 x 2 -1 4  x 22 2 x 23 14 x 24
\  --201 4 x 2 33 x 22 —4 x 23 - 3  x 24
= iLMi, and
(  70 46 -98 32 -5 7  2
73 48 -104 32 -56  2
55 36 -74 27 -50  2II  =
125 82 -171 60 -109 4
-175 -115 254 -74 126 - 4
I  41 27 -59 18 -31 1 J
2 x 25 
2 x 25 
4 x 25 
- 4  x 25 
1 x 25
The polynomial relationship required can be obtained from
• looking at the vector &i, and forming the coefficients by dividing the entries by 
1 ,2 ,... 25; this gives the polynomial r(x) = 2x5 — a;4 — 8 x 3 — 24a;2 +  8a; +  3,
• using the entries of hi = (ai) to form the sum
r(x) =  a i N 2 +  az2 N 2x +  a^Np(x)  +  a±Nxp(x) +  05  p2 {x) +  aexp2 (x), 
which is (obviously) the same polynomial as above.
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4.3 .3  A g ra p h ic a l ex p lan a tio n  o f th e  new  m e th o d s
The algorithm in Section 4.1 can be seen from a pictorial viewpoint. Given the uni­
variate modular equation p{x) = x 2 + 14a: +  19 (mod 35) we can represent this by
the following diagrams where Figure 1.1 gives the value of p{x) modulo 35 in the range 
— 17... 18 for —17 < x < 18, and Figure 4.3.1(B) gives the multiple of 35 that needed 
to be subtracted. The sharp vertical lines in Figure 4.3.1(A) do not really exist, but 
serve to show discontinuity. The problem is to determine whether or not any of the 
points near the origin actually lie on the r = 0 axis.














-20 0 5 10 15 20•20 •15 •10 •5
Figure A: r  vs. x  Figure B: q vs. x
The technique described in Section 4.1 finds a multiple of p ( x )  modulo that is
itself small for small values of x  (and obviously shares the same roots as p ( x ) ) .  In our 
example
r ( x )  =  m { x ) p { x )  (mod N 2 )
=  (2a:3 -  29a;2 +  360a; -  4513)(a;2 +  14a: +  19) (mod 1225)
=  2a;5 — x 4 — 8a:3 — 24a;2 +  8a: -I- 3 (mod 1225),
and we represent r { x )  graphically, in the region —17 < x  <  18, below.
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F igure 4.3.2 The polynomial r (x)  =  35q + r, for —17 < x  <  18
-20 -IS -5 S•10 0 10 IS 20-20 -15 •10 -5 0 S 10 15 20
Figure A: r vs. x F igure B: q vs. x
It can be seen that no multiples of 1225 need to be removed in the region — 3 < x < 3, 
which means that the polynomial is true over the integers in this area (shown by the 
“continuity” of r). Solving this equation will determine whether r(x) touches the axis 
at an integral point.
The process described in (Vallee et al., 1988) can be thought of as multiplying p(x) by 
a suitably chosen constant and reduce modulo N,  whereas the approaches given in this 
chapter multiply p(x) by a polynomial of degree (h — 1)A; — 1 and reducing modulo N h.
4.4 T h e connection  betw een th e m ethod s
We must actually show that it is the theory in Section 3.4 that links the lattices 
produced by the two methods given in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Define the (hk) x (hk) matrix,
E  =  ( n h  I A VV o(fc_i)fc | ) ’
where A is defined as in Section 4.2. By the process also defined in Section 4.2, the 
matrix M  is almost E -1 , but the f  th column is multiplied by X 1--7 , and the i ’th row 
is multiplied by —iVu, where v = [(j — Alternatively stated, M  = P E ~ lQ ,
where P — (pij) is diagonal and has entries pij = —N v (v defined above), and Q =
This implies that M ~l = P~tE tQ~t, with P~l = (p'ij) diagonal and such that p'{ i =
—N  v, and Q t = diag {1, X ,. . . ,  X hk x}. After clearing denominators we verify that 
N h~lM ~ l =  Mi, where M\  is the matrix formed by the method given in Section 4.1.
4 .5  S ligh t im provem ents
There are (at least) two relatively small improvements that can be made; the first 
decreases the size of the initial matrix by one, and the second considers placing rows 
corresponding to different polynomials into the initial matrix.
Before examining these slight improvements it is interesting to note that it is not 
always better to perform each of the steps described in Section 4.1. For instance if one 
considers the (relatively sparse) cubic polynomial x 3 +  ax +  6 =  0 (mod N),  then we 
might firstly reduce the matrix on the left, and then “improve” this to the matrix on 
the right.
(  N 0 0 0 0 >
( N 0 0 \ 0 N X 0 0 0
0 N X 0 0 0 N X 2 0 0
y, b aX X 3 J b aX 0 X 3 0
\  0 bX a X 2 0 X 3 j
However it can easily be checked that the bound on X  implied by the matrix on the 
left is better!
4.5 .1  R em ovin g  th e  constant colum n
Consider removing from the matrix M  the column corresponding to the constant terms 
of the polynomials (i.e. the left hand one), and the row corresponding to the constant 
polynomial N h ~ 1 (i.e. the top one), and then dividing all the entries by X  to form a 
matrix M ' . If one now applies the LLL algorithm to this basis we find a small vector 
b[ = h^M'  that satisfies
||&i lb  <  2 (/lfc_2)/4 X^hk~2)l2 N ((hk-2)l(hk-l)){(h-l),2)
Let h\ = (e, Q!i,. . .  ,ahk-i)  where h[ =  (c^) and e is such that \(hiM)i\ < (1/2)N h ~ 1 
(calculated by reducing (h'iM')i modulo N h~l ), and then consider the vector b\ =
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h\M.  This has || • ||i norm
K / u M H I  +  l l & i l M r
(1/2)N I' ~ 1 + (hk — 1)  | |6i | | 2 X
(1/2)N h~l + sj(hk -  1)
N h~ \
X  < aKAA).
Thus this improvement actually marginally increases the permissible bound X whilst 
reducing the size of the initial matrix!
4.5 .2  Including different p olyn om ials
This improvement comes from the following observation.
Lem m a 4.5.1 Given a polynomial p(x) modulo N  of degree k, and provided gcd(N, k\) = 
1, then one can produce a polynomial q(x) modulo (k\)N also of degree k, which shares 
the same roots as p(x).
Proof: We know p(xo) — ~  0 (mod iV), and q(x) — n ? = i — 0  =
Y i= o QiX1 — 0 (mod k\) for all x  E Z. Therefore, using the Chinese remainder the­
orem, we can produce a polynomial r(x) = Y^i-o rixl where rt =  pi (mod N ) and 
ri = qi (mod &!). By its formation r(x)  satisfies r(a:o) =  0 (mod iV), and r (x o) =  0 
(mod /c!), so r(zo) =  0 (mod (k\)N ). □
This theorem may be immediately applied to the polynomial p(x) in question, slightly 
increasing N  (and hence X), but it is better to make use of the theorem continually 
whilst creating the matrix M, i.e. making all the polynomials in the matrix zero modulo 
{ h k - i y . N b - 1.
Another approach might be to use the fact that (p{x))m =  0 (mod iVm), and thus 
we can find a polynomial r(x) = 0 (mod (mk\)Nm) with the same roots as p{x), and 
we can find all solutions of this up to 0((mA:!)1/mfciV1/ fc) in polynomial time. However 
(n!)1/71 < n for all n > 2, so this is not considered a large improvement, and probably 







4.6 Im plem entations and practical resu lts
Implementations of both algorithms have been written by the author in C using Gnu 
MP as a multi-precision integer package. The timing results are from runs on a SGI 
Indy with one 100MHz IP22 processor. The main part of the program wets an efficient 
implementation of the integral LLL algorithm, details of which may be found in (Cohen, 
1991).
Firstly let it be said that these algorithms only find solutions of univariate modular 
equations up to 0(iV1//fc), and that the time to find these solutions is of complexity
t = 0(h 9 k6 log3 N). (4.15)
Therefore as the degree of the polynomial k increases, less possible solutions are checked 
in greater time, i.e. the method becomes increasingly bad compared to a brute force 
search.
Several timing graphs are given below for various /i, k and N. For a given degree k 
these are created by forming 3 pseudo-random polynomials of degree k , which have a 
maximal X  as a root, and then averaging the time taken by the algorithm on these 
polynomials.
Below we show the average times needed to find solutions up to 0 ( N 2^ 3k~^)  (i.e. 
h = 3) for polynomials modulo 10n, 10 < n < 200 of degrees 2,3,4 and 5.
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As we increase h (to increase X ), this also increases the time needed to find these 
solutions. Below we show the average times to find solutions up to 0(N^h~l^^3h~1^ ) 
for cubic polynomials modulo 10n, 10 < n < 200 with h = 2,3,4 and 5.
Figure 4.6.2 A plot of time t (in seconds) vs. log10iV for cubic polynomials with
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Comparing Figures 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 (or examining the complexity given by equation 4.15) 
we see that the algorithm is far more sensitive to an increase in h than one in k. 
Furthermore X  —»• 0 ( N l' k) as h —>• oo (i.e. t oo), which means there must be a 
compromise as to which h to use to maximise the number of X  checked per unit time. 
This is shown below for cubic polynomials modulo N  = 1050.
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All the above results have been achieved using the new algorithm with an in-built early 
exit, and the algorithmic improvement given in Section 4.5.1 (but not that explained 
in Section 4.5.2; the effect of which is yet to be fully analysed). To see the effect of
n o t  using the improvement in Section 4.5.1 we show the time taken for the two cases
( h  =  2, k  =  2) and ( h  =  4, k  =  4) for various N .
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Figure A: F igure B:
Time, t  vs. log10 N  for h  =  2, k  =  2 Time, t  vs. log10 N  for h  =  4, k  =  4
Lastly we examine the effect of the early exit of the LLL algorithm, by comparing the 
algorithm given in Section 4.2 to that given in Section 4.1 where no other improvements
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are used. The figure below shows the two cases {h =  3, A; =  3), and (h = 3, k = 4). 
The main speed up seems to come when there is a root that is significantly less than 
the maximum X , enabling the last row(s) not to be used in finding a small enough 
element. This is something that only the new method is able to take advantage of, and 
the cases below indicate that the theoretical maximum X  is a little too low.
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Figure A: F igure B:
Time, t vs. log10 N  for h = 3, k = 3 Time, t vs. log10 N  for h = 3, k = 4
Since the publication of the dual method further practical results have been achieved in 
(Coupe et al., 1999) which make use of the NTL library of Victor Shoup (see (Shoup, 
1995)) this is a far more efficient and sophisticated implementation of the lattice 
reduction algorithm of Section 3.3. However their results do confirm the above analysis.
4.7  A lgebraic univariate m odular equations and general 
m ultivariate equations
In this section we briefly discuss the general problem of finding small solutions to 
multivariate modular equations, and then develop techniques using algebraic numbers 
that allow us to attack certain instances of this problem. This work was undertaken 
at IBM, Yorktown Heights and the helpful input of Don Coppersmith is gratefully 
acknowledged.
Some discussion was given in (Coppersmith, 1996a) in which it was explained that the 
general lattice techniques (e.g. as described in Section 4.1) can be applied to multi­
variate modular equations. We omit the exact details here, but the general approach
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is that the rows of the matrix now correspond to the (multivariate) monomials of the
extension: firstly one needs to ensure that the lattice reduction techniques produce
enough norm), and secondly that the resulting equations are algebraically independent, 
so that resultant or Grobner base techniques will recover the solutions. As noted in 
(Coppersmith, 1996a) the success of such an approach must be limited in general be­
cause it is shown in (Manders & Adleman, 1978) that finding bounded solutions even 
to the trivariate integer equation x 2 — z — 0 mod N,  is NP-hard.
The first of the above problems (ensuring enough small vectors) was studied in (Jutla, 
1998). If we label the vectors produced by the LLL reduction algorithm by &i,. . . ,  6n, 
then equation 3.14 gives an upper bound for the size of b\. Jutla realised that a lower 
bound for any lattice element is achieved by the minimum (in terms of absolute value) 
entry on the diagonal of the Coppersmith matrix. He then used this to bound the 
vectors bi for i > 2. This idea is generalised by Lemma 3.2.5 to produce the improved 
bounds on the bi given by equation 3.19.
A problem with this extension of Coppersmith’s algorithm is that the number of mono­
mials (hence dimension of the lattice) can increase dramatically when exponentiating 
the initial polynomial (see Section 4.7.4 for an example).
In the remainder of this section we concentrate on a particular type of multivari­
ate modular equation, namely solving univariate polynomials in an algebraic variable, 
“modulo” an algebraic ideal. In particular we attack low exponent RSA (with encrypt­
ing exponent e) with random padding in more than one location, i.e. we assume we 
know most of the message M, but do not know some small random pads X{. However 
the locations of these pads throughout the message (the F{ shifts below - which are 
perhaps powers of 2) are known. This implies we must solve the following equation:
We will further assume that F{ = F l for some F, i.e. that the padding is spread in 
equally spaced blocks throughout the message, and also that there exists a polynomial 
r, of low degree m, and with small coefficients (of absolute value at most R) such that
relevant modular polynomials. It was explained that there are two problems with this
enough equations that axe true over the integers (i.e. produce enough rows with small
0 mod N. (4.16)
r(F) = 0 mod N
k N , and gcd(k, N)  =  1.
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Under these assumptions we can re-write equation 4.16 as the following
-f- y ;  XjF1^  — c = 0 mod iV, (4.17)
and then, since r (F ) =  0 mod N , we can introduce the algebraic number a  such that 
r(a) = 0. It follows that (a — F)g(a) = k N  for some g{a)j which suggests that we 
work modulo the ideal generated (over Z[o]) by N  and a — F. We shall denote this 
ideal I  = (N ,a  — F ) ^ a^ and we shall continue to use the “mod” notation to denote 
algebraic numbers that are in the same equivalence classes of Z[a]/I.
With the use of the algebraic number a, we may re-write equation 4.17 in the following 
way:
'^M  +  ^ 2  — c = 0 mod I. (4.18)
It might be possible to develop a solution to this problem using the work in (Fieker Sz 
Pohst, 1996) and (Schiemann, 1998) (see Section 3.6), however extending Theorem 4.0.1 
to this framework seems a daunting task, and also the complexity of such an approach 
may be unclear. Instead we develop techniques based on the ordinary (integral) lattice 
reduction techniques, which ensures us of a polynomial time attack, and enables us to 
show that there are provably weak locations to place the random padding.
It seems important to show that this type of algebraic attack does exists, without
being overly drawn in to technical details and efficiency issues. However if the attack 
or general technique turns out to be particularly useful in some practical situations 
(cryptological or not), then further and deeper analysis may well be warranted.
Since we are using the integral LLL algorithm for reduction we define the size of an 
element (3 E Z[a\ to be the maximum (absolute) size of its coefficients when expressed 
as a polynomial (of degree at most m  — 1) in a, and denote this H(/?). This quantity 
if often referred to as the height of (3 in Z[a]. It would perhaps be nicer to use the 
concept of the algebraic norm N(@), but this seems harder to align with LLL.
In order to extend the general technique of Section 4.1 to solving equation 4.18 we 
attack the following three sub-problems.
• We bound the (H) size of a univariate polynomial when we have bounds on the (2) 
size of the variable and the coefficients of the polynomial, and also have bounds 
on the (absolute) size of the coefficients of the minimal polynomial defining a.
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• We find a Z-basis for I  = (N , a — F ) | ^  for i > 1, and use this to show that some 
elements of Z[a] may be considered minimal modulo I, i.e. they are the smallest 
element (in terms of the 2  size) of their equivalence class in Z[a]/1 .
• We use the previous two results to build a lattice, which when reduced yields an 
univariate (algebraic) polynomial that is valid over Q(a) (i.e. no longer modu­
lar). Since Q(q;) is a field the number of solutions is bounded by the degree of 
the polynomial, and is therefore finite. This implies that the (algebraic) roots of 
the polynomial may be found by performing resultant or Grobner base calcula­
tions on the integer polynomial equations corresponding to the powers of a. See 
Section 4.7.4 for an example.
4.7 .1  B ou n d in g  an algebraic polynom ial
Using the above notation, we introduce the algebraic number a  such that r(a) =  
YliLoriai and |r*i| < R. Let us assume that we have two algebraic numbers /?, 7 , such 
that 2(/?) < B  and 5 (7 ) < C. We can express the product /?7 as a polynomial in 
a  of degree 2(m — 1) with coefficients < mBC.  However 2  is defined only when we 
have reduced this with respect to r to be of degree < m  — 1. Each time we decrement 
the degree the coefficients can increase by at most a factor of 2R, so we have that 
2 (^7 ) < m(2R)m~1BC.  Although this is a rather loose bound, it will serve for our 
purposes. However note that for any given polynomial r  one might be able to calculate 
a better bound than this, or at least form a good bound on average (see Section 4.7.4 
for more details).
We can use the above result repeatedly to bound the (2) size of an algebraic polynomial. 
If we have
m—1
s = £ 7^,






4 .7 .2  A n  integral basis for th e  ideal
We wish to find a Z-basis for the ideal U =  (iV, a — -F)^aj for i > 1. In order to do this 
we will firstly show that Ii = J{ where =  (Nl, (a — i r)1)z[a], and then find a Z-basis 
for the latter ideal.
The elements of Ii =  {N,a — F ) ^ a  ^ for i > 1 are {(J1 | (3 6 I\},  and so obviously Ji Q Ii. 
To show that Ii C Ji we prove the following lemma.
Lem m a 4.7.1 For all 0 < u,v < i, u +  v = i we have
N u(a  — F )v e  Ji.
Proof: By the definition of a  we have
g(a)(a — F) = k N , so
g{a)u{ a - F ) u = kuN u
h(a)(a — F)u =  INU (4.20)
h ( a ) ( a - F ) u+i; =  lN u{ a - F ) v,
where we allow for cancellation of factors of ku and the coefficients of h(a)u in equa­
tion 4.20.
Let I' be such that W T s N v = 1, then
l ' h ( a ) { a - F ) u+v = (1 - s N v)Nu{ a - F ) v
= N u{ a - F ) v - s ( a - F ) vN u+v.
This shows that N u(a — F)v 6 Ju+v for any 0 < u, v < i. □
This lemma implies that (a(a)N  +  b(a)(a — F ) ) 1 6 Ji for any a(a),b(a) G Z[a], i.e. 
Ii C Ji, so we have that Ii = Ji.
To find a basis for Ji we simply write the coefficients of the aPN'1 and at? (a — F)% for
0  < j  < m — l a s  the rows of a matrix, and find the span (a set of (m — 1) vectors) of 
these 2(m — 1) rows (e.g. by putting the matrix in (row) Hermite normal form). One 
can view this procedure in a larger matrix which also includes rows with the minimal 
polynomial of a  present. An example is shown below.
Exam ple 4.1 Let a be an algebraic number with minimal polynomial r(x) = x 3 +
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2x2 — 4a; — 1 over the integers (the fact that r is monic is unimportant in what follows). 
We have r(5) =  7 x 22, so
(a2 +  7a +  31) (or — 5) =  7x22 ,
(13a2 +  69a + 139)(a!-5)2 =  7 x 222.
(In general cancellation of factors of k is unlikely, but we show it in this example to 
highlight that this situation is no harder than typical).
With 222 =  484 we can find a Z-basis for I 2 by removing the linear dependencies from 
the following matrix rows.
0 0 0 0 484 \ (  °
0 0 0 484 \ /  1 0 0 0 35 \
0 0 0 484 0 0 0 0 484 0 0 1 0 0 337
0 0 484 0 0 0 0 484 0 0 0 0 1 0 327
0 0 1 -1 0 25 1 0 0 4 1511 0 0 0 1 369
0 1 -1 0 25 0 0 1 0 2 1559 0 0 0 0 484
1 - 1 0 25 0 0 0 0 1 4 1803 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 - 4 - 1 0 0 0 7 2583 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 - 4 - 1 0 / \  0 0 0 0 3388 J \  0 0 0 0 0 /
We now show that the determinant of the basis that spans Ji is equal to N %. In general 
one can see that the larger matrix (with the minimal polynomial of a  included) has 
a Sylvester matrix as its bottom (m — 1) X (m — 1) sub-matrix. The resultant 7Z of 
(x — F ) 1 and r(x) is defined to be the determinant of this Sylvester matrix, and has 
the property that it equals the product of r(x) applied to the roots of (x — F)1, i.e. in 
our case 7Z = r (F ) 1 =  k 'N 1.
Thus we can put the Sylvester matrix in row Echelon form with diagonal entries that 
multiply to (k N )*. Since we have the property h(a)(a — F ) 1 = IN l , then the only 
diagonal entry that can contain a factor of N  is the rightmost one (with respect to 
the above example), whereas the factors of kl may be spread amongst the diagonal 
entries. When we reduce such a basis with oPN% for 0 < j  <  m  — 1 and use the fact 
that gcd(fc, N )  =  1 we obtain a basis with rightmost diagonal entry N l and all other 
diagonal entries equal to 1. Thus the determinant of the Z-basis of Ii is N l .
In the above example this Z-basis can be read off from the non-zero vectors in the
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right-hand m  columns of the matrix on the right, i.e.
( I 0 327 \
0 1 369 ,
 ^ 0 0 484 j
so 7*2 — {a(a;2 -(- 327) +  b(cx. -I- 369) -f- 484c | fl,6,c G Z}.
If we apply the LLL algorithm to this basis to give a reduced representation:
(  - 6  4 -2  \
- 4 - 3  5
V - l  ~ 7 " 6 /
then from equation 3.13 we see there cannot exists two elements of X  G Z[a]/l2 which 
correspond to vectors (in the above sense) with norm less than 2-1 \/56 sa 3.7
In general we will assume that the LLL reduction of the basis for Ii has the smallest 
vector b\ such that |6i| «  det(/t)1/m = so approximately the same bound holds
for any element of 7j, and also the bound applies to all the elements of any basis of Ii. 
This is a plausible assumption on random lattices, though it would be nicer to justify 
the assumption in more rigorous terms for our particular lattices.
4.7 .3  T he la ttice  and general result
If we let /? =  q1 x ial , and |xj| < X  so that S(/3) < X , then we may re-write 
equation 4.18 as
p(/J) =  (M +  0 Y - C  (4.21)
=  0 mod I.
In a similar way to Section 4.1 we consider many equations which are zero modulo 
Ih =  (77, a  — for some integer h. In this case however we first work out integral
bases for the ideals Ij for 1 < j  < h — 1, and then we know 7 p{i3) 1 = 0 mod Ii+j for any 
7  G Ij since p{(3) = 0 mod I. Let 'jij be the i ’th element of a basis for Ij] we consider
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the following polynomials:




for 0 < i < m  — 1 and 0 < k < h — 1.
To place these polynomials within a matrix we have columns corresponding to the 
“monomials” a ll33 for 0 < i < m  — 1 and 0 < j  < e(h +1) — 1. This produces a square 
matrix L of dimension em(h +  1).
As in the ordinary univariate case, we must multiply the columns of the matrix by 
different amounts according to their exponent of /?. For 0 < j  < e(h + 1) — 1 we 
multiply the m  columns that correspond to j33 by B 3 where B  =  m(2R)Tn~1X  is taken 
from equation 4.19.
The determinant of the matrix is thus given by
detL =  Bm(>{h+l)(e{h+l)-l) / 2  jyeh(h+\)/2 '
We now LLL reduce the matrix L , and let &i be the first vector of the LLL reduced 
basis. Under the assumption that the smallest element in Ih has E size roughly equal 
to N h/m, and using the fact that the E size of the (algebraic) polynomial corresponding 
to the &i is (roughly) bounded by the norm of this vector, means that if we ensure
^ m e ( / i + l ) ( e ( h + l ) - 1 ) / 2 l / ( eTTlC^l+1)) jyh/m
then the polynomial (in (3) corresponding to b\ will be equal to zero over Q(a). By 
re-substituting ft =  SDEo1 x *a% we can t i^en so v^e the m  integer polynomial equations 
in m  variables X{ by using resultant or Grobner base techniques, since we are assured 
of a finite number of solutions by virtue of the fact that Q(a) is a field.
The bound on B  implied by equation 4.22 is
B < ]\ (^1/eTn)(eh/(eh+e- 1)) 
which means that we can find the variables Xi in polynomial time whenever \x{\ < X ,
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We state this result as a general theorem now.
T heorem  4.7.2 Suppose that (M  -f X]™ q* ^ %xi)e ~ c =  0 mod N, and there exists a 
polynomial r of degree m whose coefficients are bounded by |ri| < R, such that r(F) =  
k N  where gcd(k,N)  =  1. Also assume there exists an h such that the smallest (in 
terms of E) element in (N , a  — is approximately N hlm. Then the variables Xi
may be discovered in polynomial time whenever |xi| < X  and
X  < jv(1/em)(e^ /(e/l+e_1))/(ra(2.R)m_1).
Notice that as h —> oo the bound X  —>• N l^ ern^ /  {m(2R)m~l ).
4 .7 .4  A n  ex am p le
We now exhibit the method working for the case of
N  =  2776419924431 x 11618928225217 =  32259023825026196088576527
and F  =  231, in which case we find the relation that F 3 — 3 =  307iV. The fact that we 
introduce an n ’th root of an integer (i.e. a  =  -^3), and that we have a relatively small 
multiple of N  (i.e. 307) is not important to the method, but places us in the relatively 
nice situation that the random padding is (roughly) in n equally spaced blocks starting 
from the bottom.
Assume we know the plaintext to be M + F 2 X2 +F xi  -\-x$ for some small X{. We wish to 
solve (M +  j3)3 — c =  0 mod (A, a — F ) ^ a  ^ where a 3 — 3 =  0 and f3 =  X2 a 2 +  x \a  +  xq, 
i.e.
p{(3) — /33 +  3M(32 + 3M 2/3 + M 3 — c =  0 mod (iV, a — F ) ^ ay
Let us choose h = 2. We have that (a2 + 231a; +  262)(a: — 231) =  —307AT, and the ideals 
of Ii for i = 1,2 correspond to the rows of the matrices Tj below.
f 1 0 32259019213340177661188623 \
Ti =  0 1 32259023825026193941092879
 ^ 0 0 32259023825026196088576527 }
/  1 0 231264508904394298184937453565234678988358039525426 \
T2 = 0 1 578135898968673335914228437568534195239429376957565
 ^ 0 0 1040644618143607751116024675892568259248385135381729 j
If we LLL reduce the last of these we obtain
(  -80295565554254907 19180902889356093 31951861464601304 ^
-16881151744752424 -63414413809502483 82595316698858576
-14581400600148755 -94876966154403662 -75696063265047569 j
and notice that the first row does indeed have norm approximately equal to 0.87iV2/3.
Let U{, V{ denote the coefficients of (3l in p{P),p2 (P) respectively, then we wish to reduce 
the rows of the following matrix
\B 3viTq B 2v0T0
B 3v2Tq B 2viT0 B vqTq
B 3v3T0 B 2v2Tq B viTq voTo
B 3u\T\ B 2u0T i
B 3u2T\ B 2UiT i B uqT\
B 3T\ B 2u2T\ B u \T \ UqT i
b 2t 2
b t 2
V T 2 J
where To is the identity matrix (the Tj serve to show sub-matrices rather than matrix 
elements), and B  =  m (2R )rn~1X  = is to account for the columns corresponding to 
different powers of (3.
The reduction of this type of lattice can be considerably speeded up, by reducing 
whole blocks (corresponding to the bases of the ideals) together. We omit the details 
of such an improvement here for the sake of brevity, though details may be found in 
(Coppersmith & Howgrave-Graham, 1999).
If we compare this to Jutla’s approach on p ( x , y , z) =  (M +  F 2x  4- F y  +  z ) 3 — c, then 
notice that p3 has 220 monomials. This corresponds to the dimension of the necessary 
lattice to reduce, and is almost certainly infeasible with todays computing power.
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4.7.5 Conclusions
This attack on RSA encorporates a novel use algebraic numbers in the general lattice 
techniques. Using these methods we have been able to show that there axe provably 
weak places to hide information even when splitting it in more than one block. The al­
gebraic variant also allows us to significantly reduce the size of the lattice in comparison 
to treating equation 4.17 simply as a multivariate equation.
At present it seems a relatively theoretical attack in all but a few exceptional situations 
(e.g. the example in Section 4.7.4). It would be nice if it were possible to extend this 
technique to more general and practical situations.
One minor extension is to get around the (relatively weak) condition gcd(k,N)  =  1: If 
1 < gcd(fc, N)  < N  then we have a non-trivial factor of N,  and with the application 
to RSA, this breaks the cryptosystem immediately. If gcd(fc, N ) =  N l for some i > 1 
then we can work in the ideal generated by M  = N 1 and a — F,  and use the fact that 
p(x ) 1 =  0 mod M.
Finally it would seem that the condition that the minimum E size of any element of 
(N, a  — F ) j ^  should be around N h/m may be possible to prove (and so it may be 
possible to drop the assumption in Theorem 4.7.2). This is the subject of further work.
4 .8  A p p lica tion s to  low  exp on en t R S A
The implications of being able to find small solutions of univariate modular equations 
on the RSA cryptosystem have been well studied, and we start by summing up some 
well known attacks; for further details see (Boneh, 1999). In Section 4.8.4 we note that 
the theory of Section 4.7 gives a new result which shows that there axe provably weak 
places to hide information even when splitting this information between many blocks.
As in Section 1.1 we revert to the use of Alice, Bob and Eve. All of these attacks 
can be prevented by using larger public exponents, but we shall assume that for some 
applications (perhaps smartcards) this would rather not be done.
4.8.1 O ne sm all b lock o f  unknow n p la in text
The simplest application of Theorem 4.0.1 to RSA is when there is one small block of 
unknown plaintext. We will explain this idea with Alice using a public exponent of 3 
firstly, and then generalise it to an arbitrary exponent.
95
Suppose Eve knows 2/3 of the message that Bob is sending Alice, but is unsure of the 
last 1/3, i.e. Eve knows the message M  is (M 1 +  x) ,  for some known M '  and small 
|rr| < IV1/3, and she also intercepts the ciphertext c, then all she must do is solve the 
equation
(M 1 + x )3 =  c (mod AT),
for |rr| < IV1/3, which is possible using the lattice methods.
In genera], if Alice uses an encrypting exponent of e, then for this attack to work Eve 
must know (e — l)/e  of Bob’s message.
4.8 .2  B road cast attack
It would seem rather unlikely that Eve should know any of Bob’s message as in the 
previous attack. In this section we examine the case when Bob broadcasts the same 
message M  to many of his friends, k say, all with their own moduli Ni and secret keys 
e^ , as studied in (Hastad, 1988). Let the respective ciphertexts be c*.
Consider the simplest case that k =  3 and all the e* are 3. If Bob does not try to hide 
the fact this is happening then Eve will know M 3 =  c* (mod Ni) from which she can 
deduce M 3 =  c (mod N 1N 2 N 3 ) where c (mod N 1N 2N 3 ) is obtained by applying the 
Chinese remainder theorem2 to the Ci (mod Ni). However since M  is less than the 
least Ni and therefore M 3 is less than N 1N 2N3 we actually have that M  = c1/3.
This idea can be generalised even if Bob tries to hide the fact that they are the same M  
by applying a known polynomial pi  to the message of each friend prior to encryption 
(e.g. the linear polynomial Pi{x)  = x  + 2Tni if M  were m  bits long).
To see this observe that Eve knows {pi{M))ei =  C{ (mod Ni). From this she may find 
the following
k
p(M) = c (mod J jA i)
i — i
where c is calculated as before, by applying the Chinese remainder theorem to the c*, 
and p is also found by applying the Chinese remainder theorem to each of the coefficients 
of the polynomials p^(M )  (in a similar way to Lemma 4.5.1). This univariate modular 
equation may obviously be solved using the lattice, methods if M  is sufficiently small.
2 In the rare case that the Ni  are not relatively prime the CRT would obtain a non-trivial factor of
some N{.
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As an example of this, if all the pi are linear polynomials (c.f. the possible padding 
function above), then p will be of degree e;, so p  will be of degree emax =  max{ei}. 
Therefore as long as M  is less than (n£=i  ^ it will discovered by the lattice
methods, and note that this will be the case if k > emax when all the N{ axe approxi­
mately the same size.
Note that this attack would fail if Bob were to attach random (rather than known) 
padding to the message to each friend.
4 .8 .3  R ep ea ted  m essage and short pad a ttack
In the last section we saw how random padding might help Bob secure his message, 
however this is not always the case if there is not enough of it. Consider the situation 
when Bob sends two messages to Alice that only differ by a small amount; either 
because of the types of message they are, or because Bob sends the same message twice 
(perhaps due to a noisy transmission line) and is appending a small amount of random 
padding (or a timestamp). Also, for simplicity, let us assume that Alice is using a 
public exponent of 3.
In this case Eve knows M 3 = c\ (mod N ) and (M +  x ) 3 = C2 (mod N). She can 
eliminate the unknown M  from these equations by using resultants, and is left with
x 9 +  3(ci — C2 )x6 +  3(c| +  7ciC2 +  Ci)x3 -f (cl — c2)3 = 0 (mod iV),
so she may discover the padding as long as |x| < iV1/9.
It is not obvious that Eve can recover M  from the knowledge of x, but this is true due to 
a clever trick of Franklin and Reiter, which is explained and generalised in (Coppersmith 
et al., 1996). To explain this in our case let m  be a polynomial indeterminate and 
calculate gcd(m3 — c\, (m +  x ) 3 — C2 ) over Zat[m] using the Euclidean algorithm3. It 
can be shown that the result of this gcd will be the linear polynomial m  — M  (it is 
clear that this divides the gcd), and hence we have discovered the original m.
The way to prevent this attack is to use more random padding. Conversely this implies 
that keeping the same amount of padding and increasing ones modulus N  for “extra 
security” is a very dangerous thing to do!
Another precaution one might also choose is to distribute the random padding through­
out the message, rather than in any one block. As is discussed in the next section it is
3 Although Sat [to] is not a Euclidean ring, it can be shown that if the Euclidean algorithm ever
breaks, it gives a non-trivial divisor of N.
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by no means certain that this action alone would prevent these kinds of attack.
4.8 .4  M any sm all blocks o f unknown p la in text
Using the theory in Section 4.7 we may sometimes uncover small blocks of plaintext 
even when they are placed in many locations throughout the message. See Section 4.7.4 
for an example of this attack, and Theorem 4.7.2 for a description of the weak locations 




In this chapter we examine the use of lattices in factoring. The work is based very 
largely on a result of Coppersmith on finding small solutions of general bivariate in­
teger equations, first shown (Coppersmith, 1996a). This result is briefly discussed 
in Section 5.1 in connection with the problem of factoring an integer IV, when some 
information is known about the bits of a factor.
In Section 5.2 we show how to produce an alternative, simpler, lattice that also implies 
the factoring result of Coppersmith. From the work in Section 3.5 we also show (in 
Section 5.3) that this factoring lattice allows one to factor over the Gaussian integers 
and thereby find solutions to the integer equation x 2 +  y2 =  n for small y. This has 
implications on a cryptosystem proposed in (Vanstone Sz Zuccherato, 1997).
In Section 5.4 we modify the lattice slightly to allow for factoring integers with repeated 
factors, and thereby produce and analyse a factoring algorithm with an interesting new 
complexity.
In Section 5.5 we then modify the basic lattice in a slightly different way to search 
for divisors in residue classes. This leads to a constructive method to find all divisors 
sx  +  r which divide N  for known r, s when s > n 1/4, and an analysis to bound the 
number of such divisors. This problem was first considered in (Lenstra, 1984), where 
it was shown how to construct the divisors whenever s > n 1/3.
5.1 C o p p ersm ith ’s approach
Coppersmith extended his idea of solving univariate modular equations (i.e. a uni­
variate polynomial in x, and a linear term in y, say) to general bivariate equations in
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(Coppersmith, 1996a). If we axe looking for solutions to r (x ,y ) =  0 and X  and Y  are 
bounds on the sizes of |x| and \y\ respectively, then the generalised approach works 
with the quantity D , which is the largest monomial of the bivariate polynomial when 
evaluated at (x,y) =  (X, Y), rather than AT as in the univariate modular approach. 
We state Coppersmith’s main theorem below.
T heorem  5.1.1 Let r (x ,y ) = Y ,ijrijxty^ be a bivariate polynomial over Z of degree 6
in x and r in y. Assume r is irreducible over Z. Let X  and Y  be bounds on desired
solutions xo and yo. Define D — maXij \rijXlY^\. Choose a  > 0. Assume
j£-5+(aT/2)yT+(<ty(2a)) ^  x  2-3(<J2+ r 2)-2^
In time polynomial in 8 , r  and log2 D, our algorithm will produce all integer pairs 
{,x0 ,y 0 )) with |zo| < X , \y0\ < Y , and r(x0 ,y0) = 0.
Let r(x,y) be as before, but with total degree 8 . Assume
(X Y )S < D x 2-662-2.
In time polynomial in 8  and log 2 D, our algorithm will produce all integer pairs (a;o,2/o) 
with |xo| < X ,  I2/0I < y ,  and r(xo,yo) =  0.
An interesting application of this result, and the one Coppersmith concentrated on in 
(Coppersmith, 1996a), is the bivariate equation (po + x )(qo +  y) = N. If we know the 
top m  bits of a factor p of AT, then by division we also know the top m  bits of q, such 
that pq — N. This means that given po, and by choosing go accordingly, we can ensure 
D — max{XY, qoX,poY, \poqo — AT|} «  q0X  «  P q Y .  Let p =  N a , and X  =  N&, so 
q = N l~a and Y  = iV1-2a+^. By using the first part of Coppersmith’s theorem with 
<5 =  r  =  1, we must ensure that (X Y )3/2 < D, i.e.
N^l-2a+2py/2 ^  j y l - a + /3
which will be true whenever (3 < a — 1/4.
This implies that whenever the top (1/4 + e) bits of a factor p oi N  are known, the 
remaining bits of p may be found in polynomial time. In fact this result can be strength­
ened slightly, as we shall see in the next section.
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5.2 A n  a ltern ative  m eth od
In this section we endeavour to reach a similar factoring result to (Coppersmith, 1996a) 
but by following a slightly different path. In fact we follow a similar approach to that 
taken in Section 4.1, i.e. we produce a matrix such that all the rows correspond to 
polynomials that evaluate to zero to some modulus at the sought after root x q . We 
then reduce this matrix using the LLL algorithm.
The situation is marginally more complicated in this case however since the modulus 
is precisely unknown, though we do have a (close) estimate to its size.
As is usual in these methods, we start by choosing an integer h which will correspond 
to the dimension of the matrix we form. The higher the value of h, the larger the value 
of permissible X  (i.e. the further away our guess po can be from the true divisor p), 
although of course, a larger matrix also implies a greater time reducing it.
We then choose an integer u < h and form the matrix M ( h ,u ,X ) with rows corre­
sponding1 to the polynomials
Pi (x)  =
N^tpo + xy 
(po +  aO V -”
0 < i < u 
u < i < h.
(5.1)
For a given h the optimum choice of u is given by equation 5.3, and one should choose 
A  to be as large as possible, but still satisfy equation 5.4.
Thus, as an example, if h =  4 and u =  2 then we form the following matrix.
M ( 4,2, X )  =
( TV2 \
Npo N X
Pi 2p0X X 2
V P20X 2p0X 2 X 3 j
Clearly all the rows of such a matrix correspond to polynomials which evaluate to zero 
modulo (po + xo)u = pu a,t x = xq, thus so does any linear combination of them.
If we LLL reduce this matrix to form a small row &i then for a general u, h and X  we
1 Having decided on the natural number X  the row that corresponds to the polynomial p(x)  =  
anxn + . . .  + a2 X2 +  a \x  +  ao, n  < h is of size h and given by
[ ao a \ X  . . . a nX T 0 0 ] ,
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have
H&iH < 2^-1^4 (j^(u+l)l2Xh(h~1}l2^ h,
from equation 3.14.
Letting b\{x) denote the polynomial corresponding to b\ then, in a similar way to 
Section 4.1, we have
\bi(x)\ < \fh  H&iH
=  2(h- 1)/4 V h N u{u+1)/2hX (h- 1V2 for all \x\ < X .
Thus, if X  was such that |&i(a;)| < (po + xo)u — Po for all \x\ < X ,  when we already 
know 6i(a:o) =  0 (mod (po +  ^ o)u) this would imply that &i(xo) =  0? i-e. we only need 
to solve 6i(a;) over the integers.
Letting po = N a , this means we want to find the maximum X  such that
2 ( h - l ) / 4 ^ J ^ j ^ u { u + l ) / 2 h - ^ ( h - l ) / 2  <  N u a ,
which turns out to be
X  <  N u(2ah- u- l)KKh-i))' ^  2)
For a given h and a  ~  logjv(Po) we can maximise the r.h.s. by choosing
u =  ah — —, (5-3)z
and so the maximum allowable X  (i.e. the maximum allowable error \p — po|) must 
satisfy
Observe that as h —> oo the maximum allowable X  —> N^a2\  which we now state this 
result precisely, as a general theorem.
T heorem  5.2.1 All x  € Z such that (jpo +  x) divides N  where po = N a and |a:| < iV7 
can be found in polynomial time whenever there exist integers h > u > 0 such that
7  h(h — 1) — luah  +  u(u +  1) < 0.
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The largest value of 7  for which this can hold is a 2 — e.
Proof: The proof follows from equation 5.2 with X  =  N 1. □
Note that with a = 1/2 we have Coppersmith’s result that only the top (1/4 +  e) log2 N  
bits of p need to be known to find it exactly, but for smaller a  this result becomes 
superior. However, although Coppersmith does not explicitly give the bounds as in 
Theorem 5.2.1, he does explain how his algorithm can be modified to achieve such 
improved bounds.
Also notice that this approach seems to eliminate the need for the resultant calculations 
used in (Coppersmith, 1996a), because it solves with respect to only one variable. 
However, given two equations in x  and y, with one equation being xy = N , then one 
could replace y by N /x  in the other and consider the numerator (a polynomial in x) of 
the subsequent expression. This shows that Coppersmith’s use of resultants was trivial 
in this case.
5.3 F actoring over th e  G aussian in tegers
Essentially there is nothing to do to extend the factoring method to Gaussian integers, 
but it should be shown that all the necessary arguments still hold.
Firstly notice that the LLL algorithm was shown to extend to unitary lattices in Sec­
tion 3.5, and that this ensures that a lattice vector b\ is found such that
I N I  < 2 (n' 1)/2A 1/Tl.
Now following the exposition of Section 5.2, but letting the symbol Z  replace X  to 
illustrate that this is now the size of a complex number, one creates the same matrix 
M (h ,u ,Z )  but with N  and po as Gaussian integers, and hence (using equation 3.28) 
we can find a Gaussian integer polynomial b\{z) such that for all \z\ < Z we have
|6i(z)| < 2(/l~1)/2\/h |N '|u(tt+1)/2'lZ (/l" 1)/2.
If this is less than \p\u then b\(z) will be true over the Gaussian integers, and can 
therefore be solved in polynomial time (for instance by substituting z = x + iy and 
then using the resultant algorithm on the real and complex parts).
By balancing u as in Section 5.2 we achieve a similar result to Theorem 5.2.1 which we 
state precisely below, again using Q to denote the Gaussian integers.
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T heorem  5.3.1 All z E G such that (po +  z) divides N  E Q where po E Q, |po| =  |iV|“ 
and \z\ < |iV|7 can be found in polynomial time whenever there exist integers h > u > 0 
such that
7 /i(h — 1) — 2 uah  +  u(u -F 1) < 0.
The largest value o f j  for which this can hold is a 2 — e.
5.3 .1  A n  app lication
Given the Diophantine equation
x 2 — y2 = N , where y — kA 1/4, (5.5)
it can easily be shown that x  is bounded by
y/N < x < y/N  +  0 (k 2),
thus integer solutions may be found to equation 5.5 after 0 (k 2) tests of x. We note 
that a similar approach can be used to find solutions to
x 2 + y 2 = N, where y = fciV1/4. (5.6)
Fermat applied this method to factorise the number
and pointed out that if (p — q) < kA 1/4 then this gives rise to an 0 (k2) factorisation 
method. It is a clear warning to cryptographers to ensure that the primes used in the 
RSA protocol for instance are not close enough together for this attack to be feasible.
The cryptographic situation is actually seen to be weaker that this, with the aid of 
Coppersmith’s result, since equation 5.5 factors as
N  = ( x - y )  (x + y)
= (V N  + 0 (k2) -  k N 1/4) ( y N  + 0 (k2) +  fciV1/4)
=  ( V N  -  k (iV1/4 -  O(k))) (V N  + k (JV1/4 +  O (k))) .
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Assuming that k < N 1!* this means that there is a Gaussian integer factor p of N  at 
about p ~  y/N — ik N 1/4, and Theorem 5.2.1 implies that for any po ~  N V2 we can 
find the true p if p =  po + x q  with |rzro| < N 1!*~e. Together these facts imply that p 
can be found after 0 (k1+e) trials of possible po-
Using the Gaussian integer methods outline above we can now use an identical approach 
to solve equation 5.6 since it factors as
N  = (x — iy)(x +  iy)
= {y/N  -  0{k2) -  ik N 1!*) ( y ^  -  0 (k 2) +  i k N 1!*)
= (y/N  -  k { iN 1!* +  0 ( k ) ) ) (V n  +  k { iN 1!* -  0 (k ) ) )  .
Assuming that k < N 1!* this means that there is a factor p of N  at about p ~  
y/N  — k N 1!*, and Theorem 5.3.1 implies that for any po ~  N 1! 2 we can find the true p 
if p = po +  zo with |zo| < iV1/4-6. Together these facts imply that p can be found after 
0 (k1+e) trials of possible po-
It was shown in (McKee &; Pinch, 1998) and (Coppersmith, 1998) that the cryptosys­
tem in (Vanstone 8z Zuccherato, 1997) was susceptible to attack from the fact that it 
produces a number N  = pq which is the product of two primes of the form either a2 -I- 4 
or a2 — 3a +  9.
For simplicity let us restrict ourselves to the case p =  a2 -f- 4 and q = b2 +  4, thus 






- 2  b
ab T 4 2(a 4- 6)
—2(a +  6) ab +  4
Let x = a6 +  4 and y = 2(a +  b), so N  = x 2 + y2, and let k be such that y =  
k N 1!* then assuming a > 6, we have that k — 0(a/b). Both McKee and Pinch, and 
Coppersmith realised this weakness and quoted the 0((a/b)2) “Fermat method” to 
break the cryptosystem. However using the Gaussian integer variant of the factoring 
algorithm of Section 5.2 this can be improved to an 0(a/b ) attack, approximately
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square-rooting2 the time necessary to break Vanstone and Zuccherato’s cryptosystem.
5.4  F actoring  num bers w ith  rep ea ted  factors
In this section we show there is a deterministic 0 (p1-ma) time algorithm for factoring 
integers of the form N  =  p^q  where p — N a. This has implications in a few recently 
proposed cryptosystems (see e.g. (Okamoto & Uchiyama, 1998) and (Takagi, 1998)) 
which use moduli of the form N  = p2 q, showing that there is at worst an 0(AT1/8) 
algorithm for factoring such iV, and that the method can be improved to 0(iV1/9) if p 
and q are chosen to be of the same magnitude (i.e. iV1/3).
5.4.1 T h e m eth od
Following the exposition given in Section 5.2, let us firstly assume that we have an 
approximation po to a true factor p = po -f xq of iV, where N  = pmq. We shall show 
that if |:eo| is sufficiently small then p may be found in polynomial time.
T heorem  5.4.1 All x  E Z such that {pa + x)m divides N  where po = N a and |z| < N 7
can be found in polynomial time whenever there exist integers h > u > 0 such that
7 h(hm  — 1) — 2uahm  +  u{u -I- 1) < 0.
The largest value of 7  for which this can hold is mo? — e.
Proof: The following is a relatively minor extension to the proof of Theorem 5.2.1,
but is shown in detail for completeness sake. For given integers h and u < h (which 
are specified in more detail later) consider the polynomials
P%Ax) = ^ i n + x r  { 5° -  ^ < 0 ^  m ) ' ^( (1 = u, 0 < 3  < \h  — u — 1 )m).
For all 0 < i < h we have that p? x 0) =  0 (mod pum), so any linear combination of
these polynomial must also evaluate to zero modulo purn at x = xo.
Let X  be an upper bound on the size of |a?o | (the maximum possible value for X  is 
also calculated later). We firstly form a (hm) x (hm ) matrix Mh,u = im i,j) where the
2 Having said this the original parameters suggested by Vanstone and Zuccherato had a «  b in which
case the cryptosystem was flawed even by an 0 ( (a /6)2) attack.
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entry rriij is the coefficient of xJ in pa,b(%) multiplied by X-7, and where a and b are 
such that b +  am = i , with a < u ,  and 0 < b < m  for all a < u. For instance, if m — 2, 
and with h = A and u = 2 we would consider the matrix
( jyi 0 0 0 0 0 0 o ^
0 n 2x 0 0 0 0 0 0
pIn 2p0N X N X 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 p2n x 2p0N X 2 N X 3 0 0 0 0
Po AplX 6p \X 2 4p0* 3 X 4 0 0 0
0 P i* AplX2 6p2 X* 4P0 X 4 X 5 0 0
0 0 v t x 2 4p30X 3 6p2 X 4 4p0X 5 X 6 0
I  0 0 0 PlX* AplX4 6p2 X 5 4p0X 6 XT )
We then LLL reduce the rows of M ^ u to find a small row b\ which satisfies 
j&i| < 2<'-1)/4 (det
^  2(/i—1)/4 ^ymu(u+l)/2j^/tm(hro—1)/2\
Letting b\ (x) be the polynomial corresponding to this small row, then we have that for 
all |z| < X
l&iMI < \J{hm) N
Note that if
\h(x)\ < pum, (5.7)
then 6i(a:o) =  0 over the integers, since we know that &i(ro) =  0 (mod pum).
For a given h and po ~  p = N a we now calculate the optimum choice of u. To ensure 
that condition 5.7 is satisfied (and thus we can find xq by finding the linear factors of 
b\ over the integers) we must have (ignoring the small factors independent of N ) that
j \ju(u+l)/(2h) j£ (hm—1)/2 ^  j y a um
which will occur whenever
^  pju(2ahm—u—l)/(h(hm—l))
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The right-hand side of the above equation is maximised by choosing u — hma  — 1/2 in 
which case we can choose X  = N 7 where
(2 ahm — l ) 2 
^ 4 h(hm — 1)
2
Notice that as h —> oo we have that X —»■ iVma which completes the proof. □
Note that if one were to choose an a. to minimise the risk from this attack, i.e. a = 1/m  
(which makes the attack an 0(y/p) method) then p = N a may well be small enough for 
the elliptic curve factorisation method (ECM) to work. Alternatively, if one chooses p 
and q approximately the same size, i.e. a — l/(m  -I- 1), then one has an 
method of factoring.
This practical running speed of this algorithm (in comparison with ECM) has been 
studied in more detail in (Boneh et a l , 1999).
5.5 D iv isors in  residue classes
Let r, s ,n  be integers satisfying 0 < r < s < N , s >  N ay a > 1/4, and gcd(r, s) =  1. 
Lenstra showed in (Lenstra, 1984) that the number of integer divisors of N  equivalent 
to r (mod s) satisfies an upper bound c(a) dependent only on a. He then proved the 
bound c(a) =  0 ((a  — 1/4)-2 ), and showed how to construct all such divisors when 
a > 1/3, in time polynomial in log AT and (a — 1/4)_1. By comparison we show how 
to construct all such divisors when a > 1/4 in polynomial time, and also improve the 
asymptotic analysis of the bound to 0((a  -  1/4)-3/2). However, at present, the actual 
bounds achieved from these techniques for o; > 1/3 are inferior to Lenstra’s results (see 
Section 5.5.4) and in fact the bound of c(a) =  0((a  — 1/4)-3/2) can be reached from a 
more careful analysis of Lenstra’s technique, as shown in (Coppersmith et a l , 1998).
The fact that one can construct the divisors in residue classes follows fairly trivially 
from (Coppersmith, 1996a), as is shown in Section 5.5.1. However in Section 5.5.2 
we extend Theorem 5.2.1 because of its simpler lattice, and for a simpler analysis in 
calculating bounds on c(q;). These bounds are shown in Section 5.5.3, and a further 
discussion on the subject is given in Section 5.5.4.
The author is very grateful for much helpful cooperation with Don Coppersmith and 
S. V. Nagaxaj in the work of this section.
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5.5.1 A n application to R SA
In this section we describe an attack given in (Boneh et al., 1998) which makes use of 
divisors in residue classes. We firstly show how to use Theorem 5.1.1 to calculate the 
divisors of a number N  which lie in given residue classes.
T heorem  5.5.1 All divisors of N  of the form sx  +  r, for some known s and r, where 
0 < r < s < N , gcd(r, s) =  1 and s = N a may be found in time polynomial in log N  
and (a — l/4 )—1 whenever a > 1/4.
P roof: Suppose (sxo+r) divides N  for some known s and r, i.e. N  = (sxo+rf^yo+r1) 
where r' =  N /r  (mod s) (note r ' exists otherwise we can find a factor of N). Then 
the polynomial
p(x ,y ) =  -  ((sx + r)(sy +  r') -  N)s
= sxy +  r'x + ry + (rr' — N ) /  s 
will be zero when evaluated at (x,y) =  (xo,yo)-
If s =  N a , and \x0\ < X  = N?  then \y0\ < Y  = N '-*<*-P and D = s X Y  =  N l~a. 
To use Theorem 5.1.1 we must ensure that (XT)3/2 < D, which will be true whenever 
a  > 1/4. □
Now suppose we are using RSA with N  = pq, where p «  q «  y/N, and some small 
public exponent e. Also assume (for simplicity) that gcd(p — 1, q — 1) =  2, then by the 
defining property of the encryption and decryption exponents e and d we have
e d + k ( E ± A _ p + l , =  j.
;) -
Now suppose that one has exposed the bottom 1/4 of the bits of d perhaps by the 
timing techniques as described in (Kocher, 1996) and Section 1.2.5. Then, assuming 
N  is an n-bit integer, we have
ed + k ( M - t )  = 1 (mod2n/4),
where M  = (N  +  l)/2  and only k and t = (p + q)/2 are unknown modulo 2n/4. Since 
we are assuming a low e, and we know k/e  «  d/N  «  1, we can iterate through k giving 
possible choices for t. For each of these candidate values for t (mod 2n/4) we can 
then work out the implied possible divisor p (mod 2n/4) of N  by solving the following
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quadratic equation
p2 - t p  + N  =  0 (mod 2n/4).
And finally, with the knowledge of p (mod 2n/4) we can then calculate the remaining 
bits of p by using Theorem 5.5.1.
There are various other attacks on RSA described in (Boneh et al., 1998), which make 
use of divisors in residue classes, which the interested reader may consult.
5.5 .2  T h e m eth od
In this section we extend Theorem 5.2.1 to account for divisors of A  of the form (sx+r) 
for some known s and r. We then form a bound on the number of such divisors by 
considering the degree of the polynomial derived from the lattice methods.
To extend Theorem 5.2.1 to divisors in residue classes we firstly assume that the size 
of x  is within known bounds.
L em m a 5.5.2 All x such that (sx + r ) divides A  where 0 < r < s < N , gcd(r, s) = 1, 
s = N a and N@ < |x| < A 7 can be found in polynomial time whenever there exist 
integers h > u > 0 such that
^h(h  — 1) — 2u(a + (3)h 4- u(u +  1) < 0. (5.8)
The largest value of 7  for which this can hold is (a +  P)2 — s.
Proof: Let s' be such that ss' = 1 (mod A), then the following are divisible by
(sx +  r):
N, and
s'(sx + r) = x + r" (mod A).
Thus we form the matrix exactly as in Section 5.2 with po = r". Now all the rows are 
equivalent to multiples of (sx 4- r)u which is at least N^a+^ u under the assumption 
that |£| > A^. Following the analysis in Section 5.2 the only change to equation 5.2 is 
that a  becomes a + (3 which yields the required result.
The best choice of u is (a +  fi)h — 1/2 implying lim ^oo 7max =  (a +  P)2- n
We now show that when a  > 0.365 we can use Lemma 5.5.2 directly to find all the
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relevant divisors.
C oro llary  5.5.3 All divisors of N  of the form (sx + r) with s = N a and (y/3 — l) /2 < 
cl < 1 /2  may be found in polynomial time.
Proof: We first find the divisors (sx + r) < y/N  and then the divisors (sx +  r) > y/N
are found by looking for their corresponding divisors (sx +  r ;) < y/N  where r' = N /r  
(mod s). Since sx < y/N  we know that x < iV1/2-0, but x could possibly be as 
small as 1 , so we set (3 — 0 and 7  =  1/2 — a and apply Lemma 5.5.2. We have that 
(1/2 — a) < a 2 whenever a > (y/3 — l)/2  «  0.365. □
When a  < (y/3 — l)/2  we cannot find all the divisors with one choice of X  =  JV1/2-0; 
instead we must split the interval [0,1/2 — a] up in to more intervals and apply 
Lemma 5.5.2 to each of these in turn.
C orollary  5.5.4 By reducing two matrices, we can find all divisors of N  of the form 
(sx +  r) where s = N a and a  > 0.32066 (approximately).
Proof: We split the interval [0,1/2 — a] in to [0, J] and [<5,1/2 — a]. Applying
Lemma 5.5.2, all the solutions in the first interval will be found as long as S < a 2 and 
all the solutions in the second interval will be found if (1/2 — a)  < (a  +  8 )2. Thus if 
we let ao ~  0.32066 be the solution to (a  + a2)2 + a — 1/2 =  0 and 8  = Qq then both 
of these will hold. □
Lem m a 5.5.5 All divisors of N  of the form (sx +  r) with s = N a and a  > 1/4 may 
be found in polynomial time.
Proof: By splitting the interval [0,1/2 — a] in to
[0, <5]J, [<5i,<52] , . •. [<5jr, 1/2 — a],
we require that
1/2 -  a  <  (a  + 8 j ) 2
8j  <  (a + <5j_i)2
<5i <  a 2
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This will be true for all a  > ao where ao is & solution to
(
2 \  ^
a  + ^a + . . .  (a  +  a 2) ^ . . . j  +  a  -  1/2
=  0
Notice that we have f j ( a ) =  ( /j_ i(a )  +  l/2 )2+ a  —1/2 which implies that f j (  1/4) —» 0 
as J  —» oo, i.e. ao —» 1/4 as J  —» oo. □
Rather than split the intervals to minimise the number of different matrices that need 
to be reduced (i.e. different values of X  with very large h) as in Lemma 5.5.5, we now 
aim to split the intervals so as to minimise the density of the possible solutions in each 
interval3, i.e. (h — l)/(7  — (3). This leads to the following result.
L em m a 5.5.6 For any given s ,r  such that o < r < s < N ,  gcd(r, s) =  1 and s =  N c 
the number of divisors of N  of the form (sx +  r) is upper bounded by
c(a) =  2 + 7ra + 4a( a - l / 4 ) 3/2 a — 1/4*
Proof: Assume we are given 0 < a  < 1. As before we consider the divisors (sx +  r) < 
y/N  first. For any 0 < (3 < 1/2 — a  where |x| > we can choose h and u to imply 
a 7  (from equation 5.8), denoted T(/?), which minimises (h — l ) / ( 7  — P). These values
are
2a
h {a + 0 ) * - P
u =  [(a +  p)h\ ,
F(/3) =  2(<x + P h h  ~  u(u + 1 ) +  g
h(h -  1)
The density then satisfies
h -  1 < 4aT ( P ) - P  '  ((„  + /?)*-/3)2- 
Since the r.h.s. is an increasing function for all P < 1/2 — a  we have that




((a +  P) 2 — P) 2 (  ((a +  v ) 2 — v ) 2 dv.
3 A  third (unexplored) option would be to split the intervals so as to minimise the expected time to 
find all the relevant divisors.
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If we split the interval [0,1/2 — a] in to
[o,r(o)), [ r ( o ) , r ( r ( o ) ) ) , [ ^ - '> ( 0 ), r« (o ))
where r ^ ( 0 )  > 1 /2  — a  and then sum (h — 1) (the bound on the possible number of
divisors in each interval) over all these intervals we have.
in (  f 1/2~a 4a , \  2a
} < [Jo  {(a + v y - v f  )  + a - l / A
it a  2 a
^  (a; — 1/4)3/2 a — 1/4
We must also account for the fact that we may have r =  1 in which case (sx +  r) will 
divide N  when x  =  0, and so we should add one to this total. The same bound applies 
to the divisors (sx +  r) > y/N  by considering their corresponding divisors as before,
and so we reach the desired formula above. □
5.5 .3  R esu lts
In this section use Lemma 5.5.2 to calculate the bounds on the number of divisors in 
residue classes for particular a .
Exam ple 5.1 For instance using just two intervals, J  — 2, and having hi = 3, u\ =  1 
for the first interval, and also /12 =  3, 1*2 =  1 for the second interval, then to find the 
relevant divisors (sx +  r) we would reduce the following four lattices, where r' = N /r  
(mod s) and p\ =  r /s  (mod N), p2 =  r'/s  (mod N), X \  =  jV1/2-0 and X 2 =
jy -5 /6 -2  a
0 7 (sx +  r) < y / N (sx +  r) >  y / N
1 — 2a \ - a
(  0 0 N  \
0 X i  p i  
 ^ X \  P 1X 1 0 J
(  0 0 N  \  
0 X i  P 2  
X l  p 2X i  0
I -  3a | - 2  a
f  0 0 N  \
0 X 2 p i  
 ^ X \  P 1X 2 0 j
0  0 n \
0 X 2 P 2  
 ^ X-2 P 2 X 2 0 j
Thus if 7/6 — 3a < 0, i.e. cn > 7/18 «  0.389 reducing these lattices will discover all the 
divisors of N  of the form (sx +  r) except the two possible divisors of 1 and N  itself. 
Thus there are at most 4 x (3 — 1) +  2 =  10 divisors of N  when a > 7/18.
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However since the lattice methods find the divisors (sx + r) where |a;| is small, we also 
find the divisors of N  of the form (s(—x) + r) = —(sx — r). Thus this result can be 
strengthened to there being at most 10 divisors of N  either of the form sx + r or sx — r.
For a given number of intervals we can choose the hi and Ui so as to minimise the 
a  for which the divisors will be found for a given H  =  J2 hi (fhe bound c(a) is only 
dependent on H ). For instance this has been done for the case of two intervals below.
a > c(a) < hi Ui U2
7/18 «  0.389 10 3 3 1 1
3/8 =  0.375 12 3 4 1 1
7/19 «  0.368 14 4 4 1 1
29/80 «  0.363 16 5 4 2 1
5/14 «  0.357 18 6 4 2 1
39/110 «  0.355 20 6 5 2 1
43/122 «  0.353 22 6 6 2 2
4339/13039 «  0.333 58 17 13 7 4
The following table, which ranges over the next three pages, shows the optimum number 
of intervals, J , and the corresponding hi, Ui, to minimise a  for 6 < c(a) < 132. This 
covers all a > 0.29.





1 3 6 0.416667 5/12 3 1
1 4 8 0.400000 2/5 4 1
2 6 10 0.388889 7/18 3,3 1,1
2 7 12 0.375000 3/8 3,4 1,1
2 8 14 0.368421 7/19 4,4 1,1
2 9 16 0.362500 29/80 5,4 2,1
2 10 18 0.357143 5/14 6,4 2,1
3 12 20 0.353846 23/65 4,4,4 1,1,1
3 13 22 0.346429 97/280 5,4,4 2,1,1
3 14 24 0.342975 83/242 6,4,4 2,1,1
3 15 26 0.340000 17/50 5,6,4 2,2,1
3 16 28 0.337209 29/86 6,6,4 2,2,1
3 17 30 0.334783 77/230 6,6,5 2,2,1
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4 19 32 0.331325 55/166 5,6,4,4 2,2,1,1
4 20 34 0.329337 467/1418 6,6,4,4 2,2,1,1
4 21 36 0.327453 761/2324 7,6,4,4 3,2,1,1
4 22 38 0.325532 153/470 5,6,6,5 2,2,2,1
4 23 40 0.323892 263/812 7,6,6,4 3,2,2,1
4 24 42 0.321733 2117/6580 7,6,6,5 3,2,2,1
4 25 44 0.320204 943/2945 8,6,6,5 3,2,2,1
4 26 46 0.318837 1261/3955 8,6,7,5 3,2,2,1
5 28 48 0.317414 6799/21420 7,6,6,4,5 3,2,2,1,1
5 29 50 0.316170 1007/3185 8,6,6,4,5 3,2,2,1,1
5 30 52 0.314856 11593/36820 7,6,6,6,5 3,2,2,2,1
5 31 54 0.313679 6719/21420 7,6,6,7,5 3,2,2,2,1
5 32 56 0.312304 1193/3820 7,8,6,6,5 3,3,2,2,1
5 33 58 0.311004 1611/5180 7,8,6,7,5 3,3,2,2,1
5 34 60 0.310045 10016/32305 8,8,6,7,5 3,3,2,2,1
5 35 62 0.309127 779/2520 9,8,6,7,5 4,3,2,2,1
5 36 64 0.308227 26301/85330 10,8,6,7,5 4,3,2,2,1
5 37 66 0.307330 41047/133560 9,8,8,7,5 4,3,3,2,1
5 38 68 0.306459 5599/18270 9,8,9,7,5 4,3,3,2,1
5 39 70 0.305619 5113/16730 10,8,9,7,5 4,3,3,2,1
6 41 72 0.304941 6233/20440 7,8,8,6,7,5 3,3,3,2,2,1
6 42 74 0.304292 77246/253855 8,8,8,6,7,5 3,3,3,2,2,1
6 43 76 0.303277 223163/735840 9,8,8,6,7,5 4,3,3,2,2,1
6 44 78 0.302601 42703/141120 9,8,8,7,7,5 4,3,3,2,2,1
6 45 80 0.301940 38911/128870 10,8,8,7,7,5 4,3,3,2,2,1
6 46 82 0.301166 43639/144900 9,8,8,9,7,5 4,3,3,3,2,1
6 47 84 0.300560 39743/132230 10,8,8,9,7,5 4,3,3,3,2,1
6 48 86 0.299811 3169/10570 9,10,8,9,7,5 4,4,3,3,2,1
6 49 88 0.299251 51929/173530 10,10,8,9,7,5 4,4,3,3,2,1
6 50 90 0.298757 69473/232540 11,10,8,9,7,5 5,4,3,3,2,1
6 51 92 0.298225 6436/21581 12,10,8,9,7,5 5,4,3,3,2,1
6 52 94 0.297753 270997/910140 11,10,10,9,7,5 5,4,4,3,2,1
6 53 96 0.297178 144161/485100 11,10,11,9,7,5 5,4,4,3,2,1
6 54 98 0.296665 146996/495495 12,10,11,9,7,5 5,4,4,3,2,1
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7 56 100 0.296248 24159/81550 9,10,8,8,9,7,5 4,4,3,3,3,2,1
7 57 102 0.295679 4243/14350 9,10,10,9,7,7,5 4,4,4,3,2,2,1
7 58 104 0.295248 69463/235270 10,10,10,9,7,7,5 4,4,4,3,2,2,1
7 59 106 0.294682 93031/315700 11,10,10,9,7,7,5 5,4,4,3,2,2,1
7 60 108 0.294256 8612/29267 12,10,10,9,7,7,5 5,4,4,3,2,2,1
7 61 110 0.293781 283669/965580 11,10,10,9,9,7,5 5,4,4,3,3,2,1
7 62 112 0.293381 26252/89481 12,10,10,9,9,7,5 5,4,4,3,3,2,1
7 63 114 0.292973 20303/69300 11,10,10,11,9,7,5 5,4,4,4,3,2,1
7 64 116 0.292595 1467028/5013855 12,10,10,11,9,7,5 5,4,4,4,3,2,1
7 65 118 0.292177 178181/609840 11,12,10,11,9,7,5 5,5,4,4,3,2,1
7 66 120 0.291819 362599/1242549 12,12,10,11,9,7,5 5,5,4,4,3,2,1
7 67 122 0.291498 357583/1226709 12,12,10,11,9,8,5 5,5,4,4,3,2,1
7 68 124 0.291178 1442773/4954950 14,12,10,11,9,7,5 6,5,4,4,3,2,1
7 69 126 0.290836 764769/2629550 14,12,11,11,9,7,5 6,5,4,4,3,2,1
7 70 128 0.290500 298351/1027026 13,12,13,11,9,7,5 6,5,5,4,3,2,1
7 71 130 0.290163 1211191/4174170 14,12,13,11,9,7,5 6,5,5,4,3,2,1
7 72 132 0.289832 1194889/4122690 14,12,13,11,9,8,5 6,5,5,4,3,2,1
5.5 .4  C onclusions
We have modified Theorem 5.2.1 to solve the problem of finding divisors in residue 
classes (sx +  r)\N , and used this to bound the number of such divisors for a given 
s = N a , a  > 1/4 by c(a) = 0( (a — 1/4)-3/2). In fact Lenstra’s technique can also be 
extended to show that c(a) =  0( (a  — 1/4)-3/2), as explained in (Coppersmith et al., 
1998).
We then worked out the values of c(a) for all a > 0.29; as shown in the final table of 
the last section. Previously known results due to H. W. Lenstra for a > 1/3 axe as
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follows:
a > c(a) <
1/2 =  0.5 2
2/5 =  0.4 4
3/8 «  0.375 6
4/11 «  0.364 7
13/37 «  0.351 8
9/26 «  0.346 9
31/92 «  0.337 10
1/3 «  0.333 11
Lenstra’s bounds can be seen to be considerably better. Firstly this is thought to be 
true because the lattice methods find the divisors of N  of the form sx — r as well 
(it is not presently known how to seperate the two problems with lattices). However 
Lenstra’s results are over twice as good which might imply there is another factor that 
needs to be taken in to account. It would be very interesting to try to align these two 
sets of results.
In contrast to the given problem one can consider the question of how to construct 
numbers N  with a given number of divisors in the same residue class. Cohen has 
shown that there are an infinitely many numbers with 6 divisors in the same residue 
class, i.e. those of the form n = (2 x  + l )(x2 +  l ) ( r2 +  a: +  l )(2 x 2 — x + l)(2 x 2 +  x  +  1) 
with r =  1 and s =  (2x +  l)(x2 +  1) — 1. Since s > iV1/3 for all x > 5 we have that 
c(l/3) > 6. Also n =  (x +  l )(2 x  +  1) with s = x and r — 1 shows that c(a) >  4 for all 
a  <  1/2.
It seems that a considerable amount of further work is needed to join the two problems, 
and therefore have exact upper bounds on the number of divisors in residue classes for 
given a > 1/4.
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Part IV: 
W iener-type attacks on R SA
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Chapter 6
W iener-type attacks on R SA
For efficient RSA signature generation it may be tempting to use a small private expo­
nent d. Unfortunately, Wiener (Wiener, 1990) has shown that when the RSA protocol 
is used with a decrypting exponent, d, less than A 1/4 and an encrypting exponent, 
e, approximately the same size as A, then the RSA system can be broken1 in time 
polynomial in d/iV1/4 (see Section 6.1.1). Very recently Boneh and Durfee (Boneh & 
Durfee, 1999) managed to improve Wiener’s result by showing how to break the RSA 
cryptosystem even when using decrypting exponents of size up to jV0-292; their idea is 
described in Section 6.1.3.
In order to simplify the RSA key management one may also be tempted to use a single 
modulus for several key pairs e,, di. However, as pointed out by Simmons (Simmons, 
1983), whenever a message m  is sent to two participants whose public exponents happen 
to be relatively prime, then the message m  can be easily recovered without breaking 
the system. DeLaurentis (DeLaurentis, 1984) described two further attacks in which a 
participant can break such a common modulus cryptosystem. Particularly, he showed 
that knowledge of one key pair e;, di gives rise to an efficient probabilistic algorithm for 
factoring the modulus N.  Moreover, he also showed that knowledge of one key pair e^ , 
di gives rise to an efficient deterministic algorithm to generate other key pairs without 
determining A (N).  For a thorough discussion of the common modulus situation when 
using RSA we refer to Moore (Moore, 1992). However note that Simmons’s attack 
does not break the RSA system at all and the attack of DeLaurentis assumes that the 
attacker is also given the secret exponent.
1 We have already seen one way of extending this attack in Section 5.5.1; when a low public exponent 
is being used and just 1/4 of the least significant bits of d have been revealed (rather than knowing the 
top 3 /4  of the bits of d axe all zero).
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In this chapter we study the more realistic problem of what an opponent might do, 
given only several public exponents for a given modulus and the knowledge that the 
corresponding private exponents are quite small. Such a position could possibly occur 
if a person is using the same modulus iV, but different exponents e* to sign different 
classes of message.
Even though this situation is not common in present-day RSA systems, an analysis of 
the problem sheds some light on the gain of additional public information in attacking 
RSA and on the security of re-using the modulus N.  Moreover, it is an interesting 
mathematical problem in its own right, for which the lattice based solution shown 
below is an elegant solution. The general technique used here may also be useful in 
other circumstances. Finally if it is true, as hypothesised in (Boneh &; Durfee, 1999), 
that Wiener’s attack can be extended up to N l/2~e then perhaps this technique could 
also be improved in a similar way. If one were to assume this, then it could possibly 
restrict the search for a solution to extending Wiener’s original attack.
The question of how to combine several public exponents for a given modulus in order 
to reduce the size constraint on the private exponents for their efficient reconstruction 
was first studied by Guo (Guo, 1996). Still based on the continued fraction approach 
of Wiener, Guo showed how to break RSA given 3 public exponents even when their 
corresponding decrypting exponents are of size less than iV1/3. This method is described 
in Section 6.1.2. Using instead a lattice basis reduction approach we continue this study 
in Section 6.2, generalising (and improving) the result up to an arbitrary number of 
exponents. Particularly, we show that with n encrypting exponents e;, the lattice basis 
approach allows for the di to be as large as N an where
f (2ra+l)2n—(2ra+l) ( " )  .
(2n- 2)2^ (H + i) m s  even,
(2 » + 1 ) _ 2 - - 4 n ( ^ , )  i f  „  i8  o d d
I (2ra—2)2"+8n
It is interesting to note that the method of Section 6.2 allows for 2 encrypting exponents 
a decrypting exponent bound of ]V5/14, which is superior to the AT1/3 bound of Guo 
even for 3 encrypting exponents.
The author is grateful for helpful cooperation with Jean-Pierre Seifert in the work of 
this chapter.
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6.1 Low private exp on en t attacks on  R S A
6.1.1 W ien er’s approach
It was shown in Wiener (Wiener, 1990) that, if one assumes A(N) and e are both 
approximately as large as N, and if the decrypting exponent d is less than iV1/4 then 
the modulus N  can be factored by examining the continued fraction approximation of
e/N.  This follows because e and d satisfy the relationship ed — k \ ( N)  = 1. So letting
A(N) =  (p — 1 )(q — 1)/#, and s =  1 — p — q we have that
edg — k N  =  g +  ks. (6-1)
Dividing both sides by dgN gives
e k g +  ks f  k \  f  s \  1
N ~ d g  = dgN = \ d g )  \ N J  +  dN'
Now using the assumption that e ~  IV, and that s ~  iV1/2 means (from examining 
equation 6.1) that k/(dg) ~  1 so that the right-hand side of the above equation is 
approximately N ~ 1!2. It is well known (see for instance (Hardy & Wright, 1979)) that 
if
\x — a/b\ < 1/(2 b2)
then ajb is a continued fraction approximant of x. Thus if N ~ 1! 2 < 1/(2(dg)2) then 
k/{dg) will be a continued fraction approximant of e/N.  This is true whenever
d < 2 '1/2(1 / g ) N ^ 4, (6.2)
and g will be small under the assumption that A(IV) ~  N  (though clearly g > 2 since 
both p and q are odd). Given k/dg one may calculate
r = ( p -  1 )(q -  1) =  e^ ~  -  y  = [edg/k] (since g is small),
k k
and then we can factor N  since the factors p and q satisfy the quadratic relationship 
x 2 — (N  +  1 — r)x + N  = 0.
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6.1.2 G uo’s approach
The approach taken in Guo (Guo, 1996) assumes tha t one has more than  one e* for 
a given N ,  and tha t each of these e* has a relatively small d i .  Guo only considers
the problem for 2 and 3 encryption exponents. For 2 exponents we have the following
relations:
e i d i g  -  h ( p  -  l ) ( q  -  1 ) =  g  
e 2 d 2g  -  k 2 ( p  -  l ) ( q  -  1 ) =  g ,
so multiplying the first by k 2 , the second by fci, and subtracting gives
k 2 d \ e \  -  k \ d 2 e 2 =  k 2 - k \ .  (6.3)
Dividing now both sides of equation 6.3 by k 2 d \ e 2 implies the following
ei k \ d 2 _  k 2 — k \
e 2 k 2 d \  k 2 d \ e 2 ’
and assuming tha t the d i  (and hence k i  if the e{  are large) are at most N a  means tha t 
the right-hand side is about N ~ ( l + a \
For the fraction k i d 2 / { k 2 d \ )  to be a continued fraction approximant of e i /e 2 , we must 
therefore have that
2(MO2 < JV1+“,
and with the assumptions that k 2 and d \  are at most N a  and tha t g  is small this 
condition will be true whenever a  =  1/3 — e for some e >  0.
However, unlike Wiener’s attack, the fraction k i d 2 / { k 2 d \ )  does not break the RSA 
cryptosystem for two reasons:
• Firstly knowing, say, the numerator k \ d 2, does not allow us to find d 2 or k \  
without factoring this number.
• Secondly there may be a factor in common between d \ k 2 and d 2 k \  in which case 
the continued fraction method would not give a fraction with numerator k \ d 2 and 
denominator k 2 d \ , but rather the fraction with the common factor removed.
Guo assumes tha t the second problem does not exist, i.e. that we have g c d ( k \ d 2 , k 2 d { )  =  
1 , and it is estimated that this happens with probability 6 / 7r2 ~  0.61.
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To get around the first problem, Guo suggests tha t one could either try  to factor 
k\d,2 (a number of size about TV2/ 3 and not typically of a hard factorisation shape), 
or alternatively assume tha t one has another encrypting exponent with <  iV1/3. 
Then (repeating the above procedure with and e2 ) one can also find £3 ^2 , and 
calculating g c d ( k i d , 2 , £3 ^2 ) will hopefully (if gcd(&i, k%) =  1 ) give cfo and thus allow the 
factoring of N . The probability of this attack working under the given assumptions is 
(6/tt2)3 ~  0.23.
6.1 .3  B on eh  and D u rfee’s approach
For simplicity assume tha t gcd(p -  l ,g  — 1) =  2. Then to break RSA, and indeed to 
factor N  we must find an (x ,y ,z ) solution to the equation
x(m + y) + ze = 1,
where m =  (N  +  1)/2, y =  —(p +  q)/2, z is the decrypting exponent d and x  is the 
other coefficient from the extended Euclidean algorithm (around the same size as z).
Boneh and Durfee (see (Boneh & Durfee, 1999)) named this “the small inverse prob­
lem” . In their approach they treated this equation modulo e, and then used the univari­
ate modular approach of Section 4.1 on the resulting bivariate integer equation. The 
advancement was multiplying by both x and y in forming the necessary polynomial 
relationships for LLL to reduce.
W ith a certain, natural choice of polynomials they improved the bound on the sus­
ceptible d (i.e. d which lead to a polynomial time factoring of N ) to N a where a  =  
(7 — 2\/7)/6 «  0.285. Then, by removing some of the “less good” relations, they were 
able to further improve this to a  =  (2 — \/2)/2 «  0.292. See (Boneh &; Durfee, 1999) 
for details.
6.2 A n  ex ten sio n  in th e  p resence o f  m any sm all d ecryp ­
tio n  ex p o n en ts
In this section we will use, among others, ideas from both Wiener and Guo to solve 
the general problem of breaking RSA in the presence of n encrypting exponents e*, all 
with relatively small di < N an, i = 1 , . . . ,  n. The main technique used in deriving these 
results is the creation and subsequent reduction of certain lattices. The approach taken 
can currently only be classed as a heuristic method because, although the vectors we
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search for can be shown to be relatively short, we cannot yet prove tha t they are bound 
to be found by lattice basis reduction algorithms. Nevertheless, in Section 6.3 it is 
shown tha t our approach performs well in practice, and tha t the following theoretically 
derived bounds are frequently achieved. In particular, in the presence of n  encrypting 
exponents e;, our approach allows for the d i  to be as large as N a n  where
Ctr
(2n + l)2n—(2n + l) (n“2) 
(2n—2)2"+(4n+2)
(2n + l)2n—4n ((n» -} /3)
. (2n - 2)2"+8» ((„”:,%)
if n  is even,
if n  is odd.
The first few (from n =  1) start 1/4, 5/14, 2/5, 15/34, 29/62. In Section 6.2.5 it is 
shown tha t a n -» 1 as n oo.
If the LLL algorithm (see (Lenstra e t  a l , 1982)) is used in order to reduce the lat­
tices underlying our approach, and the (pessimistic) estimate for its complexity of 
0 (m6 log3 £ )  is assumed (given a lattice of dimension m  with largest norm 5 ) ,  then 
the complexity of our method is 0 (2 6nn 3 log3 N ) ,  and so clearly the attack is only 
practical for small n .
6 .2.1 Prelim inaries
In extending the analysis to n  encrypting exponents e* (with small decrypting exponents 
d i ), we use both Wiener’s and Guo’s ideas. We shall refer to relations of the form
digei -  kiN =  g + kiS
as Wiener equations, and we shall denote them by (see equation 6.1 for an example). 
Similarly we shall refer to relations of the form
ki dj 6j kj di €>i — ki kj
as Guo equations, and shall denote them G i j  (see equation 6.3 for an example). We 
shall also assume, for a given n, tha t the di and ki are at most N an, tha t g is small, and 
that s is around iV1/2. Notice tha t the right-hand sides of Wi and G i j  are therefore 
quite small; in fact at most N ^ ^ +an, and lVQn respectively. Finally we often refer to 
composite relations, e.g. W u G „ tWi in which case we mean the relation, whose left-hand 
(resp. right-hand) side is the product of the left-hand (resp. right-hand) sides of W u  
and G VtW. For example, W u G VtW which has a relatively small right-hand side, bounded
124
in size by j\K1/2)+2an.
In the following analysis we examine the cases of 2, 3 and 4 exponents before generalising 
the approach to n  exponents. This is done both to give explicit examples of the 
approach when in the presence of a small number of exponents, and also because it is 
not until the presence of 4 exponents tha t the general phenomenon becomes clear. The 
relations tha t we choose for the cases of 2, 3 and 4 exponents may seem “plucked from 
the air” , but the pattern is made clear in Section 6.2.5.
6 .2 .2 R S A  in th e  presence o f 2 sm all decryp tion  exp on en ts
Assuming that we have two small decryption exponents, then the following relations 
hold: W i , G i t2 , W i W 2 m, or more explicitly:
d i g e i  — k i N  =  g  +  k \ s ,
&id2 e2 — k 2 d \ e \  =  k \  — fc2,
d i d 2 g 2 e i e 2 -  d i g k 2 e i N  -  d 2 g k i e 2 N  +  k i k 2 N 2 =  ( g  +  k \ s ) ( g  +  k 2 s ) .
Multiplying the first of these by k 2 and the second by g  means tha t the left-hand sides
are all in terms of d i d , 2 g 2 , d \ g k 2 , g?2 <7&i, and &iA;2, and hence we may write these equa­
tions in the matrix form below.
0 N 2
- e i - e i  N
e 2 - e 2 N
eie2
{ k i k 2 , d i g k 2 , d 2 g k i , d i d 2 g 2 ) I  1 - N
ci
V
( k i k 2 , k 2 ( g  +  fcis),p(fci -  k 2 ) ,  ( g  +  h s ) ( g  +  k 2 s ) .
The size of the entries of the vector on the right-hand side are at most N 2ci2, jV(1/2)+2a2, 
N a2, and iV1+2c*2 respectively. These size estimates may be made roughly equivalent by 
multiplying the first three columns of the matrix by N ,  M \  =  iV1/2, and M 2 =  N 1 + t*2 
respectively, which gives the following matrix:
L2 =
(  N  -M iT V  0 N 2 \
M \e\ —M 2 e\ —e\N
M 2 G2 —62 N
\  eie2 )
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In this case the vector 6 =  ( k \ k 2 , d i g k 2 , d,2 g k i ,  d \ d , 2 g 2 ) will be such that
||6L2|| <  2iV1+2“2.
We must now make the assumption that, in the lattice generated by the rows of L2 , 
the shortest vector has length A 1/4-6, where A =  det(Z/2 ) «  j\K13/2)+a2, and moreover 
that the next shortest linearly independent vector has a significantly larger norm than 
the shortest vector in L 2 . Indeed, if the lattice L 2 is pretty “random” , there axe almost 
surely no lattice points of L 2 significantly shorter than the Minkowski bound 2A 1/4. 
Under these assumptions, then 6L2 is the shortest vector in the lattice if
N \ + 2cl2 <  ^y(13/2)+a2y / 4
for some small C2 , which is true if
OL2 <  5/14 -  e'.
This implies that the vector b =  (6 1 , 6 2 , 6 3 , 6 4) can be found via lattice basis reduction
algorithms (e.g. LLL) if a >2 <  5/14 — e', and then d \ g / k \  =  6 2 /6 1  can be calculated,
which leads to the factoring of iV as shown in Section 6.1.1.
6.2.3 R SA  in th e  presence o f  3 sm all d ecryp tion  exp on en ts
This method extends easily to 3 encrypting exponents. We now have the quantities 
1 , e i , e2 , e ie2 ,e3 , eie3 ,e2 e3 and from which to form linear relationships, and we
already have relationships concerning the first four of these from the 2  exponent case, 
namely 1, W i ,  G \ ^  and W 1 W 2 . For the remaining relationships we choose G ^ 3 , W iG 2)3 , 
W 2 G i ts and W 1 W 2 W 3 . These relations imply looking for the vector
6 =  { k i k 2 k 3 , d i g k 2 k 3 , k i d 2 g k 3 , d i d 2 g 2 f a ,
k \ k 2 d z g ,  k i d s g ,  k 2 d%g,  d ^ d ^ g 3 ) ,
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by reducing the rows of the following lattice: 
/
L 3 =
- N  0 N 2 0 0 0 —N 3
ei - e i - e i  N - e i 0 ei N e iN 2
e2 — &2 N 0 e2N 0 e2 N 2
eie2 0 - c ie 2 - e ie 2 - e \e 2N
63 - e 3N - e 3N e3 N 2
eie3 0 - e ie 3N




where D is the diagonal matrix
diag(iV3/2, N, N& W +a3, N l>2, N ^ 2)+a3, N 1+a3, iV1+“3, 1) 
used to maximise the determinant of L 3 and still keep
||6L3|| <  V 8 N ^ +3a\
Again, using the assumptions that the shortest vector in the lattice generated by the 
rows of L 3 has length det(L3)(1//8)-e , and is also significantly shorter than the next 
shortest linearly independent vector in L3, means that bL3 will be the shortest vector 
in the lattice L 3 if
jy(3 /2)+3a3 <  (- j ^ 2 0 + 4 a 3 j 1/8
for some small C3 which is true if
a 3 < 2/5 -  e'.
By using again the first two components of 6, as in the 2 exponent case, one may now 
factor the modulus N  as shown in Section 6.1.1.
6.2 .4  R S A  in th e  presence o f 4 sm all decryp tion  exp on en ts
In the presence of 4 exponents we can now use linear relationships among the quantities 
1 , ei, e2 , eie2 , e3, eie3, e2e3 , eie2e3, e4 , eie4, e2e4, 6364, eie2e4 , eie3e4 , 626364 and 
eie2e3e4. As before we already have linear relationships for the first half of these quan­
tities from the analysis in the presence of 3 equations. For the remaining quantities we
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use the relations G i^, ^ 1,2^ 4, G ij3G2,4, W iVI^Gs^, WiW zG 2 ,4 , W^U^Gi^
and W 1W2 W3 W4 . Putting these relations in matrix form, and multiplying the columns 
by appropriate factors to make all the relations of size at most jV2+4a4, results in a 
16 x 16 matrix, L4 , which has determinant jv(109/2)+13a4. The vector b we are now 
looking for is
b — (kik2 k ik^d ig k 2 k^k^k id 2g kzk^d id 2g2 kzk^
k\k 2 dsgk±, d\k2 d^g2 k ^  k\d2 d^g2 k ^  did2 d$g^k±, 
kik 2 kzd±g, d\k2 k^d^g2 , k ^ k ^ d ^ g 2, k \k 2 d$d±g2, 
did2 h d ^ ,  dik2 dsdig3, k ^ d ^ g 3 , did2 dsd^g4).
Therefore, again making the same assumptions as before, implies that the vector 6L4 
is the shortest vector in the lattice generated by the rows of L4 if
iV2+4a4 <  ( i / C4) i^V (109/2)+13o:4^ 1/16
for some small C4, and this is true if
a 4 < 15/34 -  e'.
Using again the first two components of 6, as in the 2 and 3 exponent case, one may 
again factor the modulus N  as shown in Section 6.1.1.
6.2 .5  T he general approach
We now work out the general bound on the di when we have n encrypting exponents. 
The reader is encouraged to refer back to the previous sections (when n = 2,3 and 4) 
as examples.
Given that there are n exponents e*, then there are 2n different quantities, hj, involving 
the e ’^s, and the product of all of these (assuming e N) is iV(n2n l\  This means that 
one considers a diagonal matrix, Ln, of dimension 2n, and that the determinant of this 
matrix, before multiplying the rows to increase the allowable bound, is jV(n2"
The last relation W 1W2 . . .  Wn has a right-hand side of at most jV(n/2)+nQ!n, and thus 
we increase the right-hand side of all the other relations up to this bound, making 
the desired vector b such that ||&Ln||oo is (still) approximately N(,n/2)+nanm general 
form of the desired vector b is that its j th entry is the product of n unknown quantitities 
a,i for i = 1 . . .  n, where di is either dig or ki depending on whether et- is present in the
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j th quantity hj or not.
We now consider the interesting problem of which relations to consider for n  equations. 
Observe that a general relation of the form
Ru,v = Wu ... WiuGjlyix... GjV)iv,
(where the «i , .. .  , 5 jv ,h , • • • Pv are unique), has a left-hand side composed 
of products of (u +  2 v) of the e^ ’s with coefficients that axe products of (u -I- u) of 
the unknown quantities ai  (where ai  is again either digi  or k{) .  Also notice that the 
right-hand side of RuiV has size at most j\j{u/2)+(u+v)an #
Our method requires all the coefficients to be roughly the same size (a product of n  of 
the quantities di) .  This means that relations which have coefficients less than this must 
be multiplied (on both sides) by some missing ki.  For example, in the the 2 exponent 
case we multiplied the first equation by &2 to make all the coefficients of size N 2c*2. 
This has the effect of increasing the right-hand side of relation RujV to a size bounded 
by jv(u/2)+(n- u)a" .
Given this new relation Ru,v we now need to make its right-hand side as large as the 
right-hand side of W\ W2 . . .  Wn, which means multiplying (both sides) by ]^in~u)/2+van m 
For example, these multiplication factors are the (diagonal) entries of the diagonal 
matrix D in the example when n = 3.
Say that the product of these multiplication factors (i.e. the determinant of D  in the 
n = 3 example) is N ^n, where (3n = x-\-yan, and let Ln denoted the lattice of (modified) 
relations as before. This means that (under the usual assumptions) the vector bLn is 
the shortest vector of the lattice if
N n/2+nan <  ( ^ j  ^ " - ^ x + y o n j 1/2"
for some small Cn, i.e. when
“ ** < - ~ r --------e'- (6-4)n 2 n — y
In order to maximise an we wish both x and y to be large. This means that the 
relations should be chosen to maximise v (and minimise u ). For instance when n =  2 
we choose the relations W i , G i t2 and W 1 W 2 rather than W 2  and W 1 W 2 because 
P2 = 2 in the latter case rather than 5/2 + <22 in the former.
With this general principle in mind we still need to explain exactly which relations
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we use. In order to mantain the triangularity of Ln we only consider relations which 










1 - 0 0 0 (n/2)
ei Wi 1 1 (1/2) + a n ( n - l ) /2
e2 Gl,2 2 1 a n (n/2) + a„
eie2 W{W2 2 2 1 + 2an (n — 2)/2
e3 Gi ,3 2 1 OLn (n/2) + a n
eie3 WXG2 ,3 3 2 (1/2) + 2an (n -  l)/2 + a n
e2e3 w 2g 1>3 3 2 (l/2 )+ 2a„ (n -  l)/2 + a n
eie2e3 Wt W2 W3 3 3 (3/2) + 3a„ (n -  3)/2
e4 Glt4 2 1 a n (n/2) + an
eie4 Wi<32,4 3 2 (1/2) + 2an (n -  l)/2 + a n
e2e4 Gi>2G3t4 4 2 2an (n/2) + 2an
e3e4 Gii3G2i4 4 2 2 a n (n/2) + 2an
ele2e4 W\W2G3,4 4 3 1 + 3an (n -  2)/2 + a n
eie3e4 WiW3G2A 4 3 1 + 3an (n -  2)/2 + a n
e2e3e4 W2 W3G1a 4 3 1 + 3an (n -  2)/2 + a n
eie2e3e4 W1W2W3 WA 4 4 2 + 4an (n -4 ) /2
es Gi ,5 2 1 a n (n/2) + an
61^ 5 w xg 2,5 3 2 (1/2) + 2an (n -  l)/2 + a n
6265 Gii2G3$ 4 2 2a„ (n/2) + 2a„
6365 Git3Git*> 4 2 2a„ (n/2) + 2a„
e4e5 G\y\G2$ 4 2 2an (n — 2)/2 + a n
eie2e5 WxW2G4,5 4 3 1 + 3a„ (n — l)/2 + 2an
eie3e5 Wi G2t3G4t5 5 3 (1/2) + 3an (n -  l)/2 + 2an
eie4e5 WiG2t4G3j5 5 3 (1/2) + 3an (n -  l)/2 + 2a„
e2e3es W2Gi,3G4,6 5 3 (1/2) + 3an (n -  l)/2 + 2an
626465 w 2 g 1ag 3,5 5 3 (1/2) + 3an (n -  l)/2 + 2a„
e3e4e5 W3G2,4Gi£ 5 3 (1/2) + 3an (n -  l)/2 + 2an
6ie2e3e5 WxW2W3G ^ 5 4 (3/2)+4 a n (n -  3)/2 + a n
eie2e4e5 WxW2WaG3^ 5 4 (3/2) + 4a„ (n -  3)/2 + a n
eie3e4e5 W{W3 W4G2,5 5 4 (3/2) + 4an (n -  3)/2 + a n
e2e3e4e5 W2 W3WAGit 5 5 4 (3/2) + 4an (n -  3)/2 + a n
6ie2e3e4e5 Wiiy2w 3iT4^5 5 5 (5/2) + 5an (n -  5)/2
A table showing the chosen relations for n < 5.
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After the initial “base relation” (which requires that the first component of b should 
be small), we seek a linear relation between e\ and 1 (or a multiple of this e.g. N ), and 
our only choice for this is W \. With the introduction of the next exponent e2 we now 
look for a relation between 1, e\ and e2. For this we can either choose W2 or G \^t and 
as explained above Gh,2 is the right choice.
A more interesting situation arises when the fourth exponent e± has been introduced, 
and one looks for a relation regarding eie4 and the previous ones. The best choice 
in this case turns out to be W \G 2 ,a- However, when considering the next relation 
regarding e2e4 and the previous ones we may now use G i^ G ^  because the left-hand 
side of this relation contains eie3, eie4 , e2e3 and e2e4 all of which are now present.
In general when looking for a relation regarding . . .  e;3 and the previous ones, one 
can use any relation Ru v^ where u +  v = s, subject to the required hj being present 
earlier. It can be shown that the number of relations Ru+v with v = t should be
(™) — (t^i) regardless of the size s = u +  v of the relation (though of course this
is subject to t < s and s +  2t < n). The contribution to (3n for such a relation is 
(n — s + t ) / 2  + ta n , and thus (summing over the possible n) the total contribution to 




Assuming n is even this sum can be simplified to
(2n  +  1)2" -  (2n +  1) („%) (n  +  1)2" -  (2n +  1) („%)
Pn = ---------------- 5------------ ' -  + ---------------- ^-----------------*
or if n is odd then the sum becomes
^ (2n +  l)2” - 4 n ( (n"_- /2) (n +  1 )2 - -  ^ ( ^ /2)
Pn =  -----------------------:--------   —  +   o -------*------  a n-
Using equation 6.4 this means that if n is even, then
(2n +  1)2” — (2n +  1)(„"2) 
0 ,1  ~  (2n — 2)2" +  (4n +  2) (n"2) ’
whilst if n is odd, then
(2n + l ) 2 " - 4 n ( („ "-)1/2) 
(2 n -2 )2 "  +  8n((„"_-)1/2)
(6.6)
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Either way, using Stirling’s formula n! «  \j2'mmne n we have that
(2 k \  (2 k)\ 1
k
as A; —>■ oo, which shows that an
(k\)2
1 as n oo.
22k <C 22k
The theoretical limits for which an when n varies from 1 to 100 are shown below for 
completeness sake, and to show how slowly the curve tends to 1. However one should 
understand that for n  above 10 say, the method is completely infeasibly due to the size 
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6.3 P ractical resu lts
Although our method is at the current time only heuristic, it works well in practice as 
can be seen from our experimental results below.
Our implementation uses the NTL library (Shoup, 1995) of Victor Shoup. Timings axe 
given for a 300 MHz AMD K6 running under Linux.
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Table 6.3.1 Average running time (in seconds) and success rate for 10 random exper­
iments e l s  a function of 0 2 .
RSA-500 with 2 public exponents
0L2 bit length of di avg. time in secs. success rate
0.356 178 0.441 40%
0.354 177 0.421 100%
Table 6.3.2 Average running time (in seconds) and number of success rate for 10 
random experiments as a function of a^-
RSA-700 with 2 public exponents
o;2 bit length of di avg. time in secs. success rate
0.357143 250 1.075 0%
0.355714 249 1.117 70%
0.354286 248 0.93 80%
0.352857 247 1.33 100%
Table 6.3.3 Average running time (in seconds) and success rate for 10 random exper­
iments as a function of <23.
RSA-500 with 3 public exponents
Q!3 bit length of di avg. time in secs. success rate
0.4 200 3.632 0%
0.398 199 3.567 40%
0.396 198 3.599 90%
0.394 197 3.726 90%
0.392 196 3.595 90%
0.39 195 3.529 100%
Table 6.3.4 Average running time (in seconds) and success rate for 10 random exper­
iments as a function of <24.
RSA-200 with 4 public exponents
0(4 bit length of di avg. time in secs. success rate
0.44 88 14.538 0%
0.435 87 14.496 50%
0.43 86 14.328 80%
0.425 85 14.159 100%
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Table 6.3.5 Average running time (in seconds) and success rate for 10 random exper­
iments as a function of 0 5 .
RSA-200 with 5 public exponents
«5 bit length of d{ avg. time in secs. success rate
0.45 90 424.756 0%
0.445 89 427.275 60%
0.44 88 422.74 100%
6.4  O pen  problem s
In (Wiener, 1990) it was commented that the attack could not be brought to bear if 
the Chinese remainder theorem variant of RSA was being employed, i.e. d was not 
small, but dp =  d (mod p — 1) and dq = d (mod q — 1) are both small (and hence 
decryption is still speeded up). One should observe that the generalised problem (with 
many e; and di) seems equally flawed against exposing this choice of RSA exponents.
Another theoretical problem raised by this work is to take steps towards proving the 
lattice assumptions used in Section 6.2. As the experimental results strongly support 
the derived bounds it is natural to ask whether the attack can be turned into a rigorous 
theorem.
Lastly, in (Boneh & Durfee, 1999), Boneh and Durfee conjectured that there may be a 
polynomial time solution for the small inverse problem, for any d as large as N l/2~£. 
It would seem that we are presently lacking techniques capable of doing this, but if 
this result is proved, it would be very interesting to see if the techniques of Section 6.2 
could be used to generalise it to many exponents ei and di.
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Part V:
Conclusions and Open Problem s
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and open problems
Below is a brief summary of each chapter of the thesis for the reader to recap. The main 
points of the thesis are highlighted in the following sections: the first of these shows 
the new results that have been achieved from this work, whilst the second discusses 
the problems that remain open.
A  b rief sum m ary o f th e  th esis
C h ap te r 1 gives an introduction to cryptography, and then introduces each of the 
subsequent chapters in detail. See Section 1.3 for a more detailed account of each of 
the chapters below.
C h ap te r 2 considers the study of smooth numbers in relation to detecting torsion in a 
group, and shows that artificial smoothness constraints make this problem easier than 
may be thought.
C h ap te r 3 then gives a solid introduction to the theory of lattices, proving numerous 
results which are used in subsequent chapters.
C h ap te r 4 studies the problem of finding small solutions to univariate modular equa­
tions. It gives an alternative (and simpler) method to that proposed in (Coppersmith, 
1996a) which is analysed in some detail. It also briefly considers polynomial equations 
in more variables.
C h ap te r 5 looks at the factorisation equation xy = N  showing that it can also be 
treated in a similar “modular” way. The method is extended to allow for factoring over 
Gaussian integers, factoring of numbers with repeated factors, and analysing factors 
which lie in residue classes.
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C h ap te r  6 considers Wiener-type attacks, i.e. exploiting the use of a small private 
exponent in RSA cryptography. It gives an overview of the problem, and then shows 
that if one has many public exponents all corresponding to small private exponents 
modulo N , then one can improve on Wiener’s original attack considerably.
7.1 R esu lts
The section highlights the original work contained within this thesis. This starts with 
Definition 2.2.3 which defines the concept of T-reliant addition chains. It is used to 
put the work described in (Brickell et al., 1992) in to an addition chain framework. We 
subsequently show that this work can be used to produce relatively efficient addition 
chains for sets of integers.
Later in Chapter 2 we define the concept of deficient numbers (see Definition 2.4.1). We 
firstly show how to classify (Theorem 2.4.2) and produce (Theorem 2.4.3) such numbers, 
and then show that 1-deficient numbers may be used to approximately halve the time 
needed to detect torsion in group orders of known smoothness (see Algorithm 2.4.4). 
We also show that general n-deficient numbers may be useful with enough processors 
(see Section 2.4.2).
In Chapter 3 the first piece of seemingly original work1 is Lemma 3.2.5 and the subse­
quent corollaries, in which it is shown how to deduce lower bounds for A* by examining 
the diagonal entries of a given triangular basis. This allows one to put definite bounds 
on the size of the vectors in an LLL-reduced basis as shown in equation 3.19, which in 
turn allows a slightly improved analysis on multivariate modular equations, as shown 
in section 4.7.
The next original concept in Chapter 3 is the notion of an effectively LLL-reduced 
basis. It is shown which of the classical results concerning LLL reduction rely on the 
“full” LLL conditions, and which just rely on the effective conditions. Also a slightly 
different variant of the LLL algorithm is described, where it is suggested that it may be 
better to do weak reduction at one block at the end, rather than all the way through 
the algorithm.
Another concept that relies only on an effectively LLL-reduced basis is the new result 
concerning LLL reduction on a given lattice basis or its dual. This is explained in 
Section 3.4.
1The result has a classical feel, but the author cannot find a previous reference to it. Certainly the 
use of this with LLL appears to be novel.
137
Section 3.5 then introduces the notion of unitary lattices, and extends the LLL algo­
rithm to work over such structures. This cannot really be claimed as original work 
because of (Fieker & Pohst, 1996) and (Schiemann, 1998), though it was done inde­
pendently.
In Chapter 4 the original work starts by describing the alternative method for solving 
univariate modular equations, given in Section 4.1. The connection between this and 
the existing method described in (Coppersmith, 1996b) is given in Section 4.4 and 
is shown to rely on the dual lattice results described in Section 3.4. We also (in 
Section 4.5) describe two small improvements to the general algorithm: removing one 
column of the matrix to be reduced, and a method to find slightly larger solutions for 
the same size of matrix.
The next piece of original work in Chapter 4 is the approach taken to break RSA 
when random padding is placed in more than one location. This work is described in 
Sections 4.7 and 4.8.4 and shows that there are provably weak ways to pad messages, 
even with many blocks. This is a partial answer to Open Problem 3 posed in (Boneh, 
1999).
In Chapter 5 the original work starts by describing an alternative factoring algorithm 
to the one shown in (Coppersmith, 1996a). In fact the results achieved from the 
alternative algorithm are slightly better than a naive use of Coppersmith’s theorem.
It is then shown, in Section 5.3, that one can factor over the Gaussian integers, by 
using the LLL algorithm over unitary lattices described in Section 3.5. This is shown 
to have an impact on the moduli used in a cryptosystem by Vanstone and Zuccherato, 
essentially square rooting the time needed to factor them. This is an example of the fact 
that although Coppersmith has given a general algorithm for solving bivariate poly­
nomial equations, the equations should still be treated with craft, and the immediate 
application of the algorithm may not always be the right approach.
Later in Chapter 5 we show how the lattice techniques can be used to factor numbers 
of the form N  = prnq. We give an 0{jpl~Tna) for the factorisation of such moduli, where 
p = N a i.e. 0(iV1/8) even for the case m  — 2. For large m  this method becomes 
superior to the elliptic curve factorisation method, as shown in (Boneh et ah, 1999).
Chapter 5 ends by studying the problem of divisors in residue classes. The whole 
approach to this problem is original, but the results are a little disappointing. The 
main new result is the bound of c(a) =  0 ( (a —1/4)-3/2), but as shown in (Coppersmith 
et al., 1998) Lenstra’s analysis can also be extended to give this bound as well.
Finally Chapter 6 explores the interesting, if not a little theoretical problem, of breaking
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RSA when one has many encrypting exponents e* each with relatively small decrypting 
exponents di modulo a common modulus N . The lattice based solution is interesting 
and the general approach may be useful in other circumstances. It is shown that when 
one has very many e*, 1 < i < ra, the di can be as large as iV1-e. However the 
complexity of the algorithm is exponential in m  and is certainly infeasible for m  > 10 
with present lattice reduction techniques.
7.2 O pen  problem s
Having given a overview of the thesis, and highlighted the original contributions made 
by it, it remains to discuss some of the related problems that are still open. Chronologi­
cally, the first problem encountered is to better understand LLL over algebraic number 
fields (see Section 3.6), i.e. to work out the complexity of the reduction algorithm 
over given algebraic number fields, and to write efficient implementations of these. It 
would be nice to find more instances2 of where the use such algorithms is helpful in 
cryptography.
In Section 4.7 we briefly discuss finding small solutions to multivariate Diophantine 
equations, and one particular method, using algebraic numbers, is shown for a class 
of equations arising from an application in RSA. Although, as shown in (Manders & 
Adleman, 1978) finding small solutions to even bivariate modular equations is NP-hard, 
it is an interesting problem to identify which instances of multivariate Diophantine 
equation are easier to solve than others.
The analysis of divisors in residue classes given in Section 5.5 is definitely an area for 
further work. The first goal is probably to align the results with (or possibly improve 
on) those given in (Lenstra, 1984). The ultimate goal is to join the upper and lower 
bounds described in Section 5.5.4, and thus produce exact upper bounds on the number 
of divisors in residue classes for given a > 1/4.
Chapter 6 poses quite a few unanswered questions. On the problem of Wiener’s attack 
it would be fascinating to increase the bound up to N l/2~e. If this could be done then 
perhaps the extended technique with many e* could also be improved in a similar way. 
Conversely if one were to assume this, then it could possibly restrict the search for a 
solution to extending Wiener’s original attack.
Further it would be rather nice to develop lattice techniques in which it can be proved 
(or at least good probabilities given) that techniques such as ours will definitely find the
2See Section 5.3 for one example.
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desired vectors. It would also be nice to find other equations for which this approach 
(which is relatively general) can also be applied to.
Finally the problem of when the Chinese Remainder Theorem variant of RSA decryp­
tion is being used with small dp and dq seems very hard to attack. Perhaps the problem 
of only knowing that dp and dq axe small could be shown to be NP-complete, or at least 
reduced to another supposedly hard poblem.
A final general point is that almost all the lattices in this thesis have quite discernible 
structure. It might possibly be the case that there exist more efficient ways to reduce 





Sym bol M eaning
Z,R,C The sets of integers, real numbers and complex 
numbers respectively
Q The set of Gaussian integers
|a| The absolute value of a real number a, 
or the length of a complex number a
IMI the Euclidean norm of the vector v, i.e. (]C?=i vi ) 1^2
IMIi the Sum norm of the vector v, i.e. ]£?=i KI
k l The largest integer < x when x G l
m The smallest integer > x  when s G E
Lxl The nearest integer to x £ R
GLn(R) The set of invertible matrices over the ring R
'Pb The set of primes < B
0 The number of ways of picking r objects from n
/ (i)M The application of the function f ,  i times
A (N) The Carmichael lambda function (see page 6)
Hi,j The coefficients resulting from the Gram-Schmidt 
orthogonalisation procedure (see page 38)
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